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Preface
In April 2016, the School of Sociology of the University of Arizona, the Institute of 
Sociology of the University of Neuchâtel, and the World Society Foundation (WSF) 
organized an international conference on “The Return of Geopolitics” within the 
framework of the WSF program for research papers on world society. The confer-
ence was cosponsored by the International Studies Association and took place at 
the University of Arizona, Tucson. The conference brought together about fifty re-
searchers and participants to investigate and debate the causes and consequences 
of the increasing global political and economic conflict in diﬀerent world regions of 
today’s world society—in five plenary presentations, five panel discussions and four 
workshop sessions. The aim of the conference was to contribute to a more compre-
hensive understanding of the reemergence of geopolitical rivalry in the early 21st 
century, characterized by increasing political and economic tensions, and the rise 
in nationalism. This “return to geopolitics” has been analyzed from historical, com-
parative and interdisciplinary perspectives. This volume contains a selection of ten 
contributions presented and discussed at the 2016 conference.1
Many people have contributed to the realization of this volume and of the 2016 
conference. First and foremost, the World Society Foundation and the editors would 
like to thank the authors for their stimulating contributions and their patience dur-
ing the reviewing and copyediting process. A big thank-you is due to the staﬀ and 
the students at the University of Arizona, notably to Allyson L. McAdams, Ryan 
Byrne, Andrew Davis, Erin Heinz, Kelly Huﬀ, Beksahn Jang, and Heidi Reynolds-
Stenson, for helping to prepare and organize the conference. Our thanks also go 
out to Thomas J. Volgy (University of Arizona) for help in selecting names of par-
ticipants and contacting the oﬃce of the International Studies Association (ISA) 
to seek their sponsorship and support. In that regard we also want to thank ISA 
Executive Director Mark A. Boyer for his support and Jeanne White, ISA Director 
1 More details on the 2016 conference, the World Society Foundation, and the WSF confer-
ence and research paper sponsoring program are available on the WSF website at http://www.
worldsociety.ch.
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of Conventions and Meetings, for help in negotiating a contract with the conference 
hotel in Tucson. For their excellent work on the editing and proofreading we are 
indebted to Nora Linder, Marilyn Grell-Brisk and Diana Luna. We should also like 
to thank Gabriel Robert for the cover image and the conference poster. Finally, we 
are very grateful to the Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines at the University of 
Neuchâtel for providing generous financial support for the organization of the 2016 
conference and the publication of this volume.
Neuchâtel/Zurich and Tucson, January 2018
Christian Suter, President of the World Society Foundation Zurich and
Director of the Institute of Sociology, University of Neuchâtel
Albert J. Bergesen, Director School of Sociology, University of Arizona
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The Return of Geopolitics in the Early 21st 
Century: The Globalization/Geopolitics Cycles
Albert J. Bergesen and Christian Suter
Introduction
The dramatic expansion of the world-economy after 1945 came to be characterized 
as one of “globalization.” Similarly, we have resurrected the older term of geopoli-
tics to characterize the re-rise of nationalism, border disputes, economic protec-
tionism and declining multilateral trade. Geopolitics had appeared before, and it 
soon became apparent that so had globalization, if that were to mean accelerating 
cross border flows capital, labor, product and ideas. And while diﬀerent moments 
of world history can be so characterized, it also becomes apparent that such repeti-
tions point toward a more cyclic dynamic, which we will call here the Globalization/
Geopolitics Cycle (GGC). From this point of view, the so-called return of geopoli-
tics of the early 21st century is but the latest cyclic turn of a larger and much longer 
world historical process. While the GGC is not fully understood, we can identify a 
few of its properties and historical instances.
Being cyclic in nature GGC theory has no starting point and so for an example of 
how the reasoning goes let us begin with the mid-19th century economic expansion 
which we could call an earlier globalization moment. By the last quarter of the cen-
tury though, British led economic expansion was slowing and Imperial Germany 
and the United States were emerging as new economic powers.1 The emergence 
of geopolitical rivalry as seen in both the second wave of colonialism and the then 
great depression of 1873–1896 marks a transition from globalization to geopoli-
tics as the dominant international logic governing the behavior of nations. It would 
seem a world of full blown nationalist imperative geopolitical motives is an unstable 
situation for by 1914 the system breaks down into World War One. The two world 
wars can be considered a single thirty years war—the Second Thirty Years War—
running from 1914–1945. At this point, we transition to another phase of economic 
1 The standard account does not include Imperial Russia as a rising power but international 
economic statistics on the rate of growth of the Russian economy suggests that it should also be 
included. When the origin of the war itself is more closely examined the importance of Russia is 
made clearer.
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expansion and globalization under the hegemony of the 20th Century United States 
which has now replaced the 19th century hegemony of Britain.
Late 20th century globalization seemed to confirm the obsolescence of national 
borders. But as we move further into the 21st century it is increasingly clear that 
nationalism has not only not gone away but is resurgent. From the Scots to the self-
styled Islamic State, groups want their own nations and Japan’s Shinzo Abe, China’s 
Xi Jinping, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, India’s Narendra 
Modi and Donald Trump of the United States all have nationalistic agendas. At the 
regional level, the transnational experiment that was the European Union is also 
suﬀering from economic tensions between its southern periphery and northern 
core along with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. And, on the national front, 
again, there is the rise of right wing parties such as France’s National Front, Greece’s 
Golden Dawn, and even in Germany the most prosperous of European Union coun-
tries, the Alternative for Germany argues that German interests have been subordi-
nated to those of Europe. Within Eastern Europe there is a similar rise in national-
ism, with the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists 
in eastern Ukraine. In the Middle East, there is continuing chaos and in the Far East 
there are disputes over islands and air space in the South and East China Seas. All of 
this compels us to recognize that world events are increasingly driven by the ancient 
forces of geopolitics.
The globalization/geopolitics cycle while not completely understood, has a 
number of distinctive properties that can be identified and on the basis of research 
better understood. We can identify a few of them here.
Globalization
It remains a somewhat ironic fact of international life, that periods of economic glo-
balization are also periods of hegemonic dominance by a single state politically. One 
thinks of mid-19th century Britain and mid-20th century United States. Multi-lateral 
trade agreements, for instance, appear under the condition of a uni-polar interna-
tional state system. And of course, the opposite is true; periods of multi-polarity, 
or hegemonic decline and increased equality between the great powers is also one 
of an increase in bi-lateral trade agreements. Uni-polar politically and multi-lateral 
economically and multi-polar politically and bi-lateral economically seems to fly 
against common sense reasoning that a uni-polar world would have others to the 
hegemon trade deals (eg. bi-lateral) while the multi-polar political world should be 
one characterized by more multi-lateral trade agreements. But it is not.
At the more general level of determining the ingredients of hegemony/uni-po-
larity the Thompson chapter argues that hegemony, or dominance, is based upon 
both economic and military power and that there can be a decline in one or in both 
dimensions of international power. Utilizing empirical data Thompson finds a great-
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er relative economic than military decline for the United States today. These find-
ings point to the complexity of international power and dominance, for if it were 
not for the rapid economic growth of Japan, China, and other east Asian economies 
the absolute American economic advantage would probably still be quite large. 
Also, the dynamic documented by Thompson seems general. It was not so much 
that Spartan military power had declined as Athenian economic power had so dra-
matically grown, and turn of the century British naval power was still quite large 
but relative to the economic growth of Imperial Germany and the United States it 
was in decline.
That hegemony is comprised of economic and political/military components 
seems reasonable. A second question arises as to exactly how it works? Meaning, 
how does a state or national economy actually exercise dominance over other states 
and their economies. As to economics there is a long literature dealing with the 
economic dependence of developing countries, or the third world, the global south, 
or the periphery in world-system theoretic terms. Exchanges of raw materials for 
manufactured goods, international agreements that favor the powerful rich coun-
tries (the core in world-system terms) and varieties of trade concentrations of both 
type of export and number of partners, often listed as a dominance mechanism of 
hegemonic economic states.
There is also something like Global Gramscianism that no doubt operates as 
well, where the hegemon poses as not so much the universal class, but as the uni-
versal state—but not an empire—that others buy into, such that hegemonic pow-
er is masked and thereby legitimated. As a process, this is not well understood 
at all and little studied. In response to the more conflict orientation of the origi-
nal Wallersteinian idea of the operations of the political economy of the capital-
ist world-system, a more Durkheimian and Weberian cultural perspective also 
emerged in sociological theory. Variously called the world-society or world-culture 
perspective associated with John Meyer and the Stanford School of world-system 
theorists, it studies global cultural templates, but not as agents of specific powers. 
As such world society/world culture perspectives are not Gramscian in nature; they 
are not concerned with the legitimation and normalization of power diﬀerentials 
but more Durkheimianly concerned with something like the collective representa-
tions of world society.
The Babones Chapter adds a very provocative perspective on how hegemony 
works in today’s world. As an example, he argues that the United States does not 
necessarily pose as the universal nation thereby masking its own power, but instead, 
in some global Gramscian way, other states come to feel that their society is a part 
of American society. Babones nicely notes the similarity of international influence, 
rule, hegemony—call it what you want—of the imperial Chinese system of tianxia: 
“all under heaven,” with that of American hegemony. Here of course it is all under 
the United States, and historically no doubt all under Rome, or Athens, or Britain, 
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and whoever else exercised such imperial systems.2 Tianxia hegemony has impor-
tant implications for the traditional Westphalian state system in existence since 
1648. It is less a system of equality amongst states and more one of deference and 
subservience to a single state (our idea of the hegemon) and to China in what was 
earlier the East Asian world-system. The analogy with the Chinese system then and 
an American Tianxia now is interesting and will no doubt open eyes and further 
discussions about the distinctive side of hegemony within the international system.
There is a broader issue here. It may be that the earlier Sino-Centric East Asian 
World-System operated in its cultural aspects as a Tianxia system and the Euro-
Centric Western World-System operated economically in as dependency core-pe-
riphery hierarchy system. The wedding of East and West into a unified world-system 
may combine both the distinctive cultural contributions of the Chinese with the 
hierarchic economic structure of the West to produce a fully rounded economic, 
social, political, and cultural totality. This, of course, is at this point largely specula-
tive and certainly something that with future empirical research will be sorted out 
one way or another.
As with the notion that the alternating globalization and geopolitical currents 
shift back and forth constituting a unique world-systemic cycle, it may also be the 
case that the hint of global hegemony may also not be unique with America. For 
as there have been earlier “globalization” epochs so too have great powers always 
sought to meddle in the internal aﬀairs of those they seek to influence. And iden-
tification of the weak with the strong, something like an international Stockholm 
Syndrome3 also seems a universal in human history.
In some sense, it was the distinctive geography of Europe, that gave rise to 
Westphalian like entities, from classic Greek city states to the European state sys-
tem. But would a Westphalian world of equal, separate, states have emerged on the 
Eurasian steppes? If not, it is not entirely clear how generalizable the Westphalian 
state system is, such that intervention in the aﬀairs of other states might not be as 
radically diﬀerent as the Babones chapter suggests. Or put another way, perhaps the 
world-system cycle of real interest is not so much globalization to geopolitics and 
back again, but Asian Western to Asian originated logics which govern the operat-
ing principles of the world-system as a whole. So, if in some sense, we see the rise or 
re-rise of east Asian dominance, then with it may very well come, the Tianxia model 
of interstate relations and its accompanying social psychology.
2 Almost all cultural aspects of the modern world-system have come out of non-Wallersteinian 
traditions, and Babones, trained at Hopkins with Chase-Dunn, has added a distinctly non-Meye-
rian perspective on the culture accompanying political economic dominance.
3 This is when captives or prisoners identify with their captors.
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Between globalization and geopolitics
Historical movement is sometimes clear cut but often one set of logics slowly gives 
way to another, and we can see this in the present transition from a period of glo-
balization under American hegemony toward a more multi-polar world operating 
under more classic geopolitical logic. As in all social liminal periods the transition 
zone is one of uncertainty when numerous paths seem possible, but as time passes 
and larger logics click into place historical direction becomes more easily identified. 
As historians often say, we are best at predicting the past, and while social scientists 
are prone to generalization, trend identification, and pointing out cyclic behavior, 
it turns out that most of that is about what has already happened. At the height of 
either globalization or geopolitics the nature of the epoch is very clear. But these in 
between times are no doubt shrouded in the fog of transition.
The Denemark chapter is very much a contribution to the hegemonic decline 
literature with its thesis of pre-emptive decline experienced in late hegemony. The 
chapter argues that hints of decline can lead to overreactions which if anything ac-
celerates actual decline. The chapter provides examples from British preemptive re-
sponses to decline in the latter 19th and American ones in the latter 20th century. If 
these preemptive reactions are general enough one should find them in the declines 
of the Netherlands and Spain in earlier world-system history, and perhaps with an-
cient Rome as well. Again, depending upon the level of generality that can be ex-
tracted from his examples, one could also image the preemptive process operating 
on almost any kind of social entity that experiences rise and fall cycles. Interestingly, 
and perhaps a stretch, but one naturally wonders if there is, somehow, a kind of pre-
emptive decline activity that can be found in the later stages of the historical epoch 
of diﬀerent styles of art, music, architecture, or drama.
Geopolitics
Almost by definition the return to geopolitics represents a rise in nationalism. The 
Karatasli chapter focuses upon state seeking secessionist movements since the late 
16th century within the context of the larger cyclical dynamics of the world-system, 
as groups involved in revolution, civil war, and secessionist activity in the name of 
seeking statehood appear with conjunctures of diﬀerent world-systemic cyclic cri-
ses. This is an important observation and accompanying empirical research, for up 
till now, by and large, the consequences of disorder and hegemonic decline have 
been on the possibilities of great power conflicts. While hierarchical order is foun-
dational for economic exploitation (core-periphery hierarchies in political economy 
of the world-system [PEWS] theory) it is also foundational peace amongst the great 
powers. It is a double hierarchy, where the states of the core dominate those of the 
periphery economically, but within the core the hegemonic state dominates the 
other core powers, e.g. the Great Powers. And that yields periods of peace (Bergesen 
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and Schoenberg, 1980). Hegemonic breakdown, or multi-polarity, though, is also 
associated with state seeking social movement activity, which is nicely document-
ed in the Karatasli chapter, which also includes a reference to a unique data set 
Karatasli assembled, the State-Seeking Nationalist Movements (SSNM) database 
(1492–2013). This should be of great use to scholars interested in social movements 
over long historical periods.
While the nationalism generated by geopolitics, or perhaps said nationalism is 
that which constitutes geopolitics, manifests in social movements, it is also pres-
ent in established states. The return of nationalism has been dramatic and seen ev-
erywhere. It is conventionally noted in nationalist poll results in Britain (Brexit); 
nationalist election themes in Europe and the United States; national claims and 
counter claims in Ukraine/Russia; civil war in Syria; and the jostling over who owns, 
controls, what aspects of the South China Sea.
Fitting into this trend, the Melville chapter highlights contemporary nationalist 
sentiment in Russia. Of particular interest is Melville’s discussion of the ideology 
of Eurasianism and the societal location from which various strands of Russian na-
tionalist sentiments arise. Taken together the Karatsali and Melville chapters nicely 
highlight the range of social and cultural movements that accompany the geopoliti-
cal turn in early 21st century world politics. In some sense, when the trans-national 
fades, evaporates or recedes, what is left is country, nation, state, which is culturally 
emphasized as in Russian and other countries of course, nationalism, and in move-
ments of various groupings to themselves realize a nation of their own.
More specifically, Eurasianist ideas reflect the fundamental observation of 
Weber that the modern state is a distinctly territorial entity, and for Russia as the 
United States, or any other country, it is land, on which have existed peoples and 
societies, that together constitute a clear geo and political mix; geopolitics. These 
sentiments are also expressed in the United States (Kaplan, 2017) and clearly articu-
lated in a review of the book with the title, “Geography Made America Great. Has 
Globalization Undone Its Influence?” (Rauch, 2017). One can easily imagine a simi-
lar title, “Geography Made Russia Great. Has Globalization Undone Its Influence,” 
and for that matter substitute any number of other countries and one can see the 
more universalist aspects of the tendencies highlighted by Melville.
The return of geopolitics is hegemonic decline, episodes of pre-emptive decline, 
rising nationalism in major powers and social movements within states. In some 
sense, a mix of this geopolitical stew is nowhere better seen than in the politics of 
today’s turbulent Middle East and North Africa, which is the focus of the Kumral 
and the Miles chapters.
 The topic of the Kumral chapter is a case study of the continuing Turkish/Kurdish 
violence set in the context of the geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War, which acts as an 
ethnic violence accelerator. Kumral argues that the Turkish state of Erdogan devised 
a plan to incorporate the Kurdish minority through a democratic opening along 
with an accompanying repression. The eﬀort, though, turned more toward repres-
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sion with the internationalization of the Syrian Civil War. As the Kurds fought the 
Islamic State group (IS), the Turks reacted by aiding the IS as a way to counter the 
Kurds. The issues are complex and this chapter does a good job outlining the twists 
and turns of how the return of geopolitics in the form of the internationalization of 
the Syrian Civil War aﬀected the relations between Turkey and its Kurdish minority.
The Miles chapter argues that, “[r]adical Islamist organizations in Africa . . . 
constitute branches of a transcontinental movement aimed at replacing a basically 
secular geopolitical order with a fundamentally faith-based (qua Islamic) one” (p. 
147). In explicating this thesis he focuses upon such jihadi groups as Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), El-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, and Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The idea of Muslim Umma, the community of all believers, is an alternative 
model of global order to the Westphalian idea of the sovereign independent na-
tion-states where each one is allowed to pursue their own religious persuasion. This 
chapter focuses upon insurgent groups on the ground, but the idea of a “transcon-
tinental” as opposed to a “transnational” movement highlights diﬀerences between 
the Western and Islamic model of global political order.
The final two chapters address the very meaning of geopolitics; but from two 
diﬀerent perspectives. The Dalby chapter is concerned with the idea of geopolitics 
from the perspective of what professional geographers call “critical geopolitics.” 
Classic geopolitical theory argues for the eﬀects of the geographic upon the po-
litical; but in what is called critical geopolitics the reasoning is reversed. It is the 
political which aﬀects the geographic. Using the idea of the Anthropocene (the idea 
of human eﬀects upon the environment as a distinguishable geologic epoch Dalby 
argues that it is the political that aﬀects the geographic (e.g. the environment). There 
is, of course, a possible feedback model here that would allow for classic and critical 
geopolitical eﬀects. Human economy, politics, capitalism, and so forth aﬀect the 
environment (critical geopolitics) but said altered environment acts back upon poli-
tics in one way or another (classic geopolitics).
Finally, the Bergesen chapter takes a diﬀerent perspective on the idea of geopoli-
tics. It begins with the traditional emphasis upon the constraining influences of the 
earth’s geography upon politics. It then notes that any study of geopolitics is also 
one of state power and, that in turn, is one of military capacity which has to include 
orbiting satellites. In eﬀect, land and sea power not only is supplemented by air 
power, but also increasingly by space power, such that one has to ask if one needs 
an astropolitical perspective to accompany that of geopolitics. Bergesen goes on to 
discuss potential problematic aspects of traditional international relations when the 
political is exported into orbit, such that, for instance, an armed satellite circling the 
earth every ninety minutes would make any number of countries face the military 
presence of any number of other countries (through their military satellites) almost 
constantly. While it is clearly too early for actual studies of space politics, nonethe-
less, there is enough politicization and militarization of space today, with a good 
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chance of its weaponization tomorrow, that any serious discussion of geopolitics 
must be accompanied by one of astropolitics as well.
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The Problem with Unipolarity
William R. Thompson
With the end of the Cold War, the United States is said to have entered a unipolar era 
in which it had no real competition, thereby encouraging the Afghanistan and Iraq 
involvements. I argue that this categorization of the post-Cold War era as unipolar is 
something of an error based on six types of analytical problems: a univariate emphasis, 
operationalization disagreements, the absence of threshold definitions, the conflation 
of relative power and the absence of challengers, the adoption of static over dynamic 
views, and privileging military over economic capabilities. After discussing these issues, 
a new metric is developed that combines energy and power projection resources. From 
this perspective, the United States has been unipolar since the end of World War II and 
its relative power position has been declining since the 1950s. It remains more powerful 
than its rivals but its edge has been slipping for some time. From this vantage point, the 
explanatory utility of the unipolarity concept is much less than it might seem. Relative 
decline and the ambitions of major power challengers are more useful.
Introduction
One of the reasons the world seems confusing to onlookers, especially in the United 
States, is that it was not very long ago that a very large number of people were con-
vinced that the United States had won the Cold War, ideological history was dead, 
and a new era of the United States’ predominance in a unipolar world had emerged. 
Then came 9-11, along with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and an almost return 
to world depression on a scale not seen since the 1930s. How can these disparate 
impressions be reconciled? Is/was the United States’ triumphalism warranted or 
was it a matter of misreading the structure of world politics? My argument is that 
the United States’ triumphalism was not justified and the world did not really turn 
unipolar over night with the collapse of the Soviet Union. What happened after 
the end of the Cold War, more accurately, was a temporary deviation from a longer 
sequence of protracted relative decline by the system’s lead economy—the United 
States. Starting from a very high level of power concentration vis-à-vis other states 
in the interstate system, the United States has a long way to go to fall out of first 
place in this global hierarchy. Yet that does not mitigate its gradually weakening 
foundation for power and influence. Some of that relative decline is natural and 
10 William R. Thompson
inevitable; some of it is traceable to poor U.S. decision-making that privileges the 
short term over long term considerations.
Part of the misinterpretation of systemic structure of power can be traced to 
the way in which we study polarity or distributions of power. collective approach is 
characterized by six problems that lead to debatable conclusions about how world 
politics works. After a discussion of the problem set, some solutions are advanced 
and a new operationalization of global power is developed. The new metric is used 
to both characterize polar distributions since 1816 and to assess the durability and 
conflict-proneness of variations in power distributions. In the end analysis, power 
concentrations come and go. Whether it is associated with diﬀerential propensities 
to conflict remains an open question given the empirical outcome established in 
this chapter.
Six problems
The study of unipolarity is characterized by six problems—some of which are dis-
tinctive to the topic while others are more generic to the study of international re-
lations.1 The two generic problems are a tendency to exaggerate the impact of any 
single variable, that is, a univariate explanation and the absence of any consensus 
about how to go about measuring the distribution of power—something that is fun-
damental to arguments about what diﬀerence greater or lesser concentrations of 
power might make. The four non-generic problems are related to the generic ones. 
One is the absence for any threshold for the attainment of polar status. As a con-
sequence, weaker and stronger candidates are lumped together. The second prob-
lem is the conflation of relative power and the presence or absence of challengers. 
People who study unipolarity assume that high relative power is accompanied by 
the absence of significant opposition when in fact that has not been the case. It 
may be that the presence or absence of challenges to leading states is actually more 
important than the actual distribution of power. But, it will be argued, it is diﬃcult 
to talk about one without considering the other. Yet the third non-generic problem 
overlaps with the second one. Polarity is strongly static.2 If a slice of time is coded 
as possessing the attributes on one type of polarity, it is assumed to be so character-
ized equally throughout the designated time period. Such stationarity seems highly 
1 For the unipolarity literature, see, among others, Krauthammer (1990/91), Layne ( 1993), 
Owen (2003), Buzan (2004), Mowle and Sacko (2007), Brooks and Wohlforth (2008; 2015), 
Ikenberry et al. (2011), and Hansen (2012).
2 See, for instance, the older polarity literature: Deutsch and Singer (1964); Waltz (1964; 1979); 
Bueno de Mesquita (1975); Siverson and Sullivan (1983); Wayman (1984); Sabrosky (1985); Hopf 
(1991); Wayman and Morgan (1991); and Kegley and Raymond (1994). Not all of the analyses of 
this earlier era were static—see, for instance, Thompson (1986), Spiezio (1990), and Mansfield 
(1993).
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unlikely, especially over a long period such as a century or even a half century. The 
alternative is to focus more on dynamics. How the distribution of power is changing 
may be more important than identifying the category in which it falls roughly over 
some specific interval. Finally, the fourth non-generic problem is the tendency to 
view power distributions solely through a military lens. Military power is certainly 
important but it hardly operates in a vacuum. The economic foundation that pays 
for military power is just as important. To examine one dimension while ignoring 
the other is simply distortional. Polarity needs to be examined in the context of its 
military-economic base.3
Each of these problems deserves some elaboration and resolution if we are to 
figure out what to make of unipolarity claims. However, since the question of power 
metrics, thresholds, and military-economic considerations are readily linked, it is 
most convenient to collapse these three problems under one heading, leaving us 
with four clusters to discuss.
Univariate explanations
The entire history of polarity analysis has been plagued by the tendency to assume 
or to proceed as if the only thing that matters is the distribution of power. Waltz’s 
(1979) structural realism framework is the leading example. Even if one wished to 
privilege structural factors over others, how, one might ask, is it possible to reduce 
structure to a single variable? The irony is all the more complete since most stu-
dents of international relations are quick to claim great complexity for their subject 
matter. Yet, even when we know better, we proceed to promote univariate explana-
tions. Power distributions do this. Arms races or alliances make decision-makers 
do things they might not have done otherwise. Living on islands encourages the 
development of navies while surrounding mountains make people more insular. 
Democratic regime types do a great deal of that. The presence or absence of group-
think makes all the diﬀerence in crisis outcomes. Without Hitler, there would have 
been World War II. If Archduke Ferdinand had not been assassinated, no World 
War I would have occurred.
While we need to advance generalizations linking variables, we should be cau-
tious in taking any two-variable generalization too seriously. If one variable could 
explain a great deal of variance, would we not have stumbled on this magic elixir by 
now? Of course, many analysts think we have found powerful univariate explana-
tions. The only problem is that if one holds their breath long enough, significant 
objections are usually forthcoming. The reason is simple. International relations is 
more complex than many other fields of inquiry. Even Albert Einstein knew that. 
3 Lest one dismiss this perspective as overly materialistic, there is certainly more involved in 
establishing and maintaining a foundation for power. Cultural and ideational factors can play a 
role but soft power does not lend itself readily to an empirical examination of power distribution.
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The problem is that we tend to overlook complexity when assembling our explana-
tions. Maybe we have to do this lest the sheer complexity of world politics paralyze 
us from advancing any explanations. But, in doing so we need to keep in mind just 
how limited is the probability that any one variable is going to account for a consid-
erable amount of variance in whatever it is that we are trying to explain.4
Polarity, in general, is usually relied upon to explain system stability and levels of 
conflict. The distribution of power should possess some link to these topics. It does 
not seem implausible that a system in which power is highly concentrated might be 
more stable and less conflictual than one in which power is widely dispersed. What 
happens in between the two ends of the concentration continuum may be less eas-
ily predicted. Even within the polarity literature, there is some recognition of com-
plexity in the occasional tendency to diﬀerentiate between polarity and polarization 
(Rapkin et al., 1979). A bipolar world, for instance, need not be highly bipolarized 
with all or most of the population adhering to one pole versus the other. It follows 
that a bipolar system that is also highly bipolarized could very well be more conflic-
tual than a bipolar system which is not particularly bipolarized. We do not have to 
travel very far back in international history to find an example in the waning years 
of the Cold War.
That some analysts persist in assuming that polarity and polarization mean the 
same thing is unfortunate and perhaps part of the more general analytical problem. 
Here, however, it is only invoked to suggest that one does not have to go very far to 
find qualifications to the power of information about power distributions. 
Static versus dynamic interpretations
The 16th through much of the first half of the 20th century are often described as mul-
tipolar in structure. Is it conceivable that 445 some years were equally multipolar? 
At various points in time, Spain, France, and Germany held predominant positions 
within Western Europe. Did that not alter the way in which a multipolar distribu-
tion of power might be expected to work? Alternatively, the following bipolar era in 
the second half of the 20th century was characterized by a long period in which the 
United States held a monopoly on the capability to deliver nuclear bombs/missiles 
over suﬃcient distances to reach its main opponent. At some point in the 1960s this 
began to change and by the 1970s the United States was according nuclear parity 
with the Soviet Union. Should we expect bipolarity to have the same impact in the 
1950s as in the 1980s? Of course, other processes such as learning to avoid full-
fledged confrontations may have intervened as well. But the initial bipolarity was at 
the very least highly asymmetrical at the global level in the early years of the Cold 
4 One of the ultimate ironies in the polarity literature is that Waltz (1979) devoted some space 
to criticizing reductionist theories and then proceeded to develop a univariate, structural realist 
explanation based on polarity.
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War. It became less asymmetrical in terms of relative capabilities after the 1970s but 
remained lop-sided in favor of the United States nonetheless.
Kirshner (2015) attributes the emphasis on static structure to the development 
of Waltz’s (1979) structural realism but static polarity arguments were of course 
quite common in the 1960s. Structural realism may have further reinforced static 
structural arguments but it certainly did not invent them. Yet Kirshner is correct 
to stress that classical realists such as Gilpin have argued for looking at how power 
distributions change as a more important factor than how we might code structure 
at any given point in time. The question, of course, remains an empirical one but 
the dynamic interpretation certainly sounds more plausible if we have to make a 
choice.5
Power metrics, thresholds, and military-economic 
foundations
International relations analysts have never done well at measuring one of our most 
central variables. To be sure, measuring power is not simple. Ideally, we would like 
to be able to assess who influences whom to do what but we usually have to settle for 
identifying who possesses varying shares of resources that are thought to provide 
foundations for influencing other people and states. Unfortunately, we do not agree 
precisely on which resources are thought to be most important. Waltz (1979, 131) 
threw out a long list of possible resources: population size, territorial size, resource 
endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and compe-
tence. The Correlates of War power concentration index (CINC) enthrones six indi-
cators as something akin to an industry standard: iron and steel production, military 
expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption, total population, and urban 
population.6 Other scholars, especially those working in the power transition re-
search program, emphasize gross domestic product as the best single indicator of 
national strength. 
The multiple indicator indexes represent the most prevalent approach to mea-
suring power distributions. When in doubt, hedge your bet by combining a number 
of diﬀerent indices and hope that something works.7 Of course, this interpretation 
is more than a bit cynical. An argument can be made for focusing on each and ev-
5 See, as well, Thompson (1986) which demonstrates the advantages of looking at structural 
change over structural statics.
6 Despite the widespread and professed dissatisfaction with the index, it is used repeatedly if 
for no other reason that it is readily available and intermittently updated. But it is fair to say that 
some of the components are quite attractive indicators—the real question is whether they should 
all be combined and combined in an unweighted fashion.
7 It is not clear that anyone has ever followed Waltz’s advice in operationalizing his list of power 
indicators.
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ery one of the indicators found in the Waltz and Correlates of War (COW) menus. 
The question, however, is whether an argument can be made to look at all of the 
indicators at the same time with equal weight given to each one. This type of argu-
ment, in fact, is usually missing altogether. Once one lists the factors that observers 
have thought to be relevant, it is just assumed that we can throw them together and 
see what happens. Yet what tends to happen is that bulk is privileged over quality. 
Large populations, economies, and armies can be useful resources. Their utility can 
also be exaggerated if the population is undereducated and impoverished or if the 
economy or army lacks cutting edge technology. By and large, bulk resources are 
more useful in local or regional defensive situations in the sense that large countries 
are hard to occupy and control. Alternatively, large countries can overwhelm small 
neighbors. Historically, states that have dominated their home regions (think India 
in South Asia, China in East Asia, Russia in Eastern Europe, or France in early mod-
ern Western Europe) have often depended on bulk predominance. Other things be-
ing equal, the bulk resources are less useful in global contexts because they are hard 
to mobilize for power projection purposes. Large populations can provide ample 
cannon fodder but not necessarily much else. Large underdeveloped economies 
generate little surplus that can pay for complex weapon platforms. This liability has 
long been a problem and was certainly manifested when India and China’s gross 
domestic products were the largest in the world prior to the Industrial Revolution. 
Their large economies did not prevent their defeats by relatively small forces with 
advanced cohesion and technology. For large armies to be eﬀective they need ap-
propriate firepower and relatively scarce (historically) naval and aerospace capabili-
ties to be transported over long distances.
When one looks only at bulk resource indicators, the outcome can be mislead-
ing. When one combines bulk resources with non-bulk resources (for instance, 
energy consumption, gross domestic product per capita, or naval size), they either 
cancel one another if they are equal in number or the bulk resources trump the 
non-bulk factors because bulk indicators tend to lead to concentrated outcomes. 
States with large economies also tend to have large populations and armies. Thus, 
our indexes of power give too much weight to bulk considerations and not enough 
to qualitative considerations.
Some of this problem is intertwined with problems in interpreting “great pow-
ers.” Since most international relations analysts assume that the history of interna-
tional relations should be equated with regional international relations in Western 
Europe, we begin with a checkered understanding of which states have been major 
powers—and thus potential poles. If 18th century Prussia or 19th century Italy can 
be counted as great powers, it becomes clear that the standards for major power 
status have not been uniform historically. This practice has been maintained by the 
Correlates of War codification of post-1816 major power status which ignores the 
non-European world prior to the mid to late 19th century and awards status pro-
motions to the United States and Japan after they defeat other states not viewed 
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as major powers. France and Britain retain their major power status after World 
War II dubiously. Germany and Japan regain their major power status after 1990 for 
reasons that are not altogether clear. In general, we simply lack consensual under-
standing of what counts for power purposes or where the threshold for promotion 
might lie even though we have proceeded as if we have agreed to something when 
we adopt COW standards.
A more defensible position is to suggest that there are three classes of states in 
international relations. Most states are minor powers with restricted military and/
or economic capabilities. They may be stronger in one sphere than in the other but 
they do not rank highly in both spheres. There are states that do rank relatively high-
ly in military and economic capabilities but their ability to project economic and 
military power are restricted for the most part to their home region. Then there are 
the few states that have the capability to project power beyond the home region to 
other regions. These states are global powers. 
While we cannot assume that this alternative framework will find widespread 
appeal, it does have clear implications for how one goes about measuring the dis-
tribution of power. If the tripartite classification is adopted, measurement of power 
distributions must be careful about mixing regional and global powers or, alterna-
tively, bulk and non-bulk resource capabilities. If we are addressing the global dis-
tribution of power, global powers should take precedence over regional powers. To 
make this distinction, some threshold distinguishing regional from global powers is 
necessary.
But there is another way in which the absence of thresholds becomes problem-
atic. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we can count the number of global 
powers accurately. If there is only one, must the system be unipolar? Yet what about 
bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar situations? Where do we draw the lines between 
and among these categorizations. Too often, polarity discussions proceed as if there 
is no problem in moving back and forth among these designations when that is sim-
ply not the case. Take the following example. What should we make of a system with 
two global powers, one of which claims 75% of the total capabilities that count and 
the other states possesses only 25%. Is the system unipolar or bipolar? If it is bipolar, 
is it bipolar in the same sense that a system with a 50:50 split in capabilities could be 
said to be bipolar?
Another illustration of the problem is to imagine two systems with three or more 
global powers. In one system, the capability distribution of the three leading states 
is 50, 25, and 25%. In the other, it is 36, 34, and 30%. How should we code system 
1 or system 2? System 1 might be unipolar or maybe it is tripolar/multipolar but 
certainly not tripolar/multipolar in the same sense that system 2 is. Putting aside 
for the moment the categorization problem, how should we view a system in which 
the leading state has declined in relative position from a 25% lead over its nearest 
rival (as in 50% versus 25%) to a 2% lead (as in 36% versus 34%)? Most polarity dis-
cussions have no answer for these questions because they choose to ignore precise 
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thresholds. A state that leads by 2% is still considered the leader even if in reality 
such a lead amounts to rough equivalence with other leading states. Yet no matter 
how these situations are construed, there can be little question that a lop-sided edge 
over rivals is diﬀerent from not much of an edge.
An alternative approach is to talk about algebraic qualifications of unipolarity. 
Buzan (2004) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2015) have talked about a single super-
power (i.e. unipolarity) but accompanied by one or more relatively weak challeng-
ers—as in 1 + X or 1+ X + Y. The X and Y qualifiers suggest that the predominance 
of the single leading state is somehow qualified or in the process of becoming quali-
fied. X and/or Y are significant actors but not yet in the “superpower” category. The 
problem here is that not much more information is conveyed beyond the caveat that 
unipolar leaders are confronted by challengers. At what point do these challengers 
rise to high enough status to change 1 into 2 or more great or super powers?8 In the 
absence of any explicit thresholds, the X and Y will remain nominal qualifiers for 
some time to come. But what if X and Y are allied or act in concert? Do we aggre-
gate their combined resistance? It is good to highlight the presence of challengers. 
Yet leaving them as X or Y remains awkward for operationalizing the distribution of 
power, just as forgoing the application of explicit thresholds leaves us in a subjective 
limbo when it comes time to estimate degrees of change.
The third problematic dimension of this cluster is the proclivity to diﬀerentiate 
between military and economic capabilities. For most polarity analysts (but not all), 
only military capabilities count. This tendency may reflect disciplinary preferences 
for analysts to specialize in one domain or the other. Thus, many international rela-
tions scholars have chosen to do security or international political economy (IPE) 
exclusively. Not surprisingly, it is the people who have taken the security path who 
are most likely to stress the significance of military capabilities alone. Similarly, IPE 
analysts are the ones who are most likely to argue that it is diﬃcult to focus on one 
sphere and to ignore the other. 
Yet it seems hard to deny that some states have economic clout but little mili-
tary technology. Others have military technology but weak economies. Both types 
of states are handicapped in what they can do in world politics. In extreme cases, 
former superpowers cannot aﬀord to send their submarines to sea for fear that they 
will never return. Major economies with limited military capability have to rely on 
allies to defend them from military attack. States moving up the hierarchy have to 
8 This approach is reminiscent of the older, Cold War tendency to refer to the Asian balance of 
power as a 2.5 power configuration. The Soviet Union and the United States were counted as 2 
powers. China was the 0.5 power. Yet at least this approach had the merit of implying two states 
were roughly equal and the third was not equal to the first two. What was left open-ended was 
whether China’s relative position was closer to 0.25 or 0.75 the weight of the other two states? Or, 
perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that the capability distance between China and 
the Soviet Union was less than the distance between China and the United States?
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make choices between expanding military capabilities or economic investments. 
They also have to decide what kind of military platforms they can aﬀord or figure out 
how to build. Even singular superpowers have significant problems financing their 
military activities abroad. It seems unlikely, therefore, that we can divorce discus-
sions of military capabilities from the context of economic limitations. Nor should 
we overlook the economic motivations for improved military capabilities. Moving 
up the economic hierarchy puts pressure on decision-makers to expand their mili-
tary arsenal to better advance and protect their expanding interests. Polarity needs 
to be measured in both military and economic terms.
Conflating power concentration and the presence or 
absence of challengers
The mention above of the 1+X+Y practice raises an additional problem. In unipolar-
ity discussions it is only natural to stress the dominance of the single leading state. 
But we need to combine the absence of thresholds and the temporary vicissitudes of 
world politics in order to generate a cautionary note. The absence of explicit thresh-
olds means that if the challengers are temporarily absent from the picture, the state 
left standing, almost regardless of its relative capability position, can be said to qual-
ify as the unipole. In the interval most celebrated as a unipolar era—from the end of 
the Cold War to some indefinite time thereafter—the United States was said to be 
at the apex of a unipolar hierarchy in large part because the Soviet Union had dis-
integrated and China had adopted a strategy stressing domestic development over 
foreign adventures. If the United States was catapulted to the top of the heap by de-
fault—that is, by the temporary absence of strong competition—it is not surprising 
that that situation did not last long or that the unipole did not manage to get much 
accomplished. The question remains, however, just how predominant the United 
States was in that unipolar interlude? Was it a genuinely unipolar interval or just a 
passing fluke of world politics? Must a unipolar state have no real competition to be 
able to claim unipolarity? However unlikely that may be, the moral of the story is 
not to ignore what else is going on besides the perceived predominance of the lead-
ing state. Thresholds or no thresholds, the systemic situation is apt to be diﬀerent 
when the unipole is very strong and uncontested than when it is moderately strong 
and challenged. Thus, we need to know not only how high up the hierarchy the 
leading state is but also just how far ahead the leading state is from the competition.
Problems that deserve resolution and attempts to do so
Polarity discussions continue to be too subjective—who counts, what counts, and 
how much counts? Explicit criteria for delineating diﬀerent types of, and changes 
in, power distributions should be desirable. Explicit thresholds for rank are also 
necessary. Otherwise, we will continue to talk around each other with varying but 
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ambiguously defined notions of what we are talking about. We probably also need 
to consider diﬀerent data bases than those that are conventionally relied upon. It is 
not clear that the “industry standards” have served us well. Moreover, we need to 
integrate military and economic capabilities in assessing how power is distributed 
in the international system.
A possible solution for explicit polarity criteria (Modelski, 1974; Rapkin et al., 
1979) has been around for some time but has never caught on. Whether this reflects 
a resistance to explicit criteria, disapproval of the specific criteria, or some combi-
nation is not clear. One criticism that has been broached (Brooks and Wohlforth, 
2015) is that the threshold for unipolarity is too high because no state has ever ex-
ceeded it is simply wrong as long as one calculates the threshold in terms of the 
pooled capabilities of the most likely elite culprits as opposed to using world capa-
bilities as the denominator.9 It also depends, of course, on what specific capabilities 
are examined—an issue we will examine shortly.
The polarity rules or critieria are simple and can be expressed in one complex 
sentence:10 In a unipolar system, one state holds more than 50% of available power; 
in a bipolar system, two states combined hold at least 50% of available power, and 
each holds at least 25%; in multipolar systems, power is concentrated in three or more 
states with each possessing at least 5% of available power but no two states holding 
more than 25%. The logic is that a state that can match the capabilities of any com-
bination of elite opponents (50%+) is a highly concentrated power configuration 
that can qualify as unipolar. This type of logic harks back to the original 19th century 
interpretation of great powers qualifying for their elite status by being perceived as 
capable of defeating another great power. In this case, however, the configuration 
allows for the possibility that one state could defeat a coalition of all of the other elite 
powers in the system. Bipolarity needs power to be concentrated in the capabilities 
of the leading two states and some semblance of symmetry between the two is most 
desirable. Consider an extreme alternative. Two states control 60% of the capabilities 
but one state claims 45% and the other 15%, giving one state a 3:1 advantage. Highly 
asymmetrical bipolarity is unlikely to work exactly as whatever eﬀects are attributed 
to symmetrical bipolarity. For multipolar systems, some asymmetry is tolerable but 
not too much lest the system move towards a genuinely non-multipolar system in 
which a number of states more or less are equal in their relative capability positions.
Nonetheless, there are a few possible holes in the schedule. One that was en-
countered earlier is that it is conceivable that one state could possess an impressive 
lead that still fell short of the 50% threshold. If one state controlled a capability share 
9 Interestingly, the criticism did not move the critics to suggest a threshold that they thought 
was more realistic.
10 These rules have been slightly modified at the multipolar level from the original specifica-
tions.
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in the 1940s (40–49%) and no other state controlled as much as 25% (otherwise 
the system might be unevenly bipolar), it is not clear what to designate such a con-
figuration. “Near unipolarity” was the category used earlier and it seems useful to 
retain this in between structural situation. It is also possible to imagine an excep-
tional multipolar system in which there are only three states with one or more states 
exceeding a 25% share. The question would then be whether such a clearly tripolar 
system would be expected to function diﬀerently than a typical multipolar (or bi-
polar) system.11 That seems to be a question that can be put oﬀ until it is actually 
encountered or becomes a theoretical puzzle.
The polarity schedule provides concise instructions on how to tell the diﬀerence 
among various polarity types. It does not tell us how to construct the percentage 
shares which are needed for identification purposes. For that purpose, a new, three 
indicator index is proposed which combines economic and military resources for 
distinguishing systemic-level power distributions. It relies on energy consumption 
to substitute for more conventional economic indicators in part because it does not 
require extensive manipulation to create a series back to 1816. The data are already 
available and do not have to be converted into a common currency or adjusted for 
parity purchasing equivalence or inflation. But, beside their convenience, energy 
consumption captures the very heart of modern economic development. The first 
two industrial revolutions, usually dated from the later 18th and 19th centuries, re-
spectively, ushered in revolutionary new technology for production and transpor-
tation purposes that were fueled by coal, petroleum, and electricity. Up to a point, 
those economies that adapted best to these new expectations became increasing-
ly heavy consumers of the new sces of energy that now powered their economic 
growth.12
Energy consumption, therefore is a good indicator of modern economic and 
technological development. Yet it has its bulk and qualitative dimensions just like 
GDP. The first two proposed indicators, thus, are energy consumption and energy 
consumption per capita. Total energy consumption tells us how powerful the over-
all economy is, assuming that the energy is consumed in an eﬃcient manner. Energy 
consumption per capita tells us how complex the energy package is. Moreover, one 
of the more attractive features of an energy consumption focus is that it captures 
perhaps the main way in which the world changed as it began to modernize after the 
first industrial revolution’s transformations in new technology and energy sources.13
11 Schweller (1998) once thought tripolarity was or could be distinctive.
12 Advanced industrial economies eventually level oﬀ in their energy consumption.
13 Buzan and Lawson (2015) contend that international relations scholarship has not fully rec-
ognized the significance of changes introduced in the 19th century. In terms of the energy shifts 
associated with the two industrial revolutions (coal, petroleum, electricity), I would certainly 
agree.
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Figure 1 depicts the fluctuations in relative energy consumption for the past 
two centuries.14 Total consumption and per capita shares are combined in one in-
dex. Britain’s energy lead as the first economy to commit to coal and steam engines 
was phenomenal and its lead was clearly maintained through the 19th century as 
long as COW major power rules are observed for entry into the elite pool. The fig-
ure shows an abrupt transition at the turn of the century with the inclusion of the 
United States as newly-minted great power. The United States went on to peak in 
the late 1940s before beginning its own relative decline in position. The decline was 
interrupted by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 but, interestingly, the “bounce” in 
the United States’ position did not rise above the 0.5 threshold. As China rises, the 
United States has resumed its positional decline trajectory.
The third indicator focuses on power projection capabilities. The leadership 
long cycle research program (Modelski and Thompson, 1988) committed early to 
what Posen (2003) later called “command of the commons” capabilities. For cen-
turies the only way to project force beyond one’s home region involved ships. Up 
to World War I and the advent of militarized air power, only navies could provide 
inter-continental reach. But leadership long cycle capability concentration hitherto 
has focused predominately on sea power measures. Beginning with state-owned 
vessels at the tail end of the 15th century and moving through the escalating num-
ber of guns required to serve a ship of the line in the 17th and 18th centuries, to the 
20th century development of heavy aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and 
nuclear ballistic submarines with long range missiles of varying number, lethality, 
and accuracy. 
All of these naval resources for projecting force at distance need to be accom-
panied by their land and space equivalents. Land missiles have diﬀerent numbers 
of warheads of varying lethality and accuracy. Non-US aircraft carriers tend to be 
relatively light and small vessels most useful for carrying helicopters or a few verti-
cal take-oﬀ and landing (VTOL) planes. So far, only the United States has invested 
in heavy carriers. But other states have invested in nuclear missiles, both at land and 
sea. Air forces also emerged in World War I. These weapons need to be measured 
as well. The power projection index treats land missiles the same way it treats ballis-
tic missiles at sea (warhead lethality and accuracy). Strategic bombers are counted 
from 1916. Military satellites in service are also indexed to go beyond land, air, and 
sea to include space.15
The final operationalization decision involves which states to include in the 
pool. If the modern world were not so concentrated in power capabilities, this deci-
14 It seems more straightforward to rely directly on the percentages at the expense of the polar-
ity categories. This approach has always been the hallmark of leadership long cycle analyses. See, 
as well, Mansfield (1993).
15 Michael Lee of Hunter College, CUNY has been critical to the expansion of this index.
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sion would be more significant than it is now. Given high capability concentration, 
it does not make too much diﬀerence whether one adds or subtracts comparatively 
weak states. As a matter of operational conservatism, the power capability data 
are pooled using the Correlates of War rules for great power status. This decision 
means that Britain, France, and Russia are included for the entire period. Austria-
Hungary drops out in 1918. Prussia-Germany drops out in 1945. Italy enters in 1860 
and leaves in 1943. Japan and the United States enter the system in 1895 and 1899, 
respectively, with Japan bowing out in 1945. China begins its great power status in 
1950. The Correlates of War approach also brings Germany and Japan back into 
elite subsystem in 1990 but that seems an easy change to ignore. Using this inter-
pretation of elite powers does not imply that the author is endorsing the wisdom or 
Figure 1: Energy consumption shares (combined total and per capita shares)
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accuracy of the operational specifications. Utilizing what is the industry standard 
simply eliminates one possible source of perceived bias. 
Figure 2 portrays the fluctuations in relative power projection capabilities over 
nearly the past two centuries. A maximal list of elite actors is adopted on the pre-
sumption that their relative shares will help sort them out. That is, marginal power 
projectors will show up in the figure towards the bottom of the scale, as in the cas-
es of Austria-Hungary or China. What comes through most clearly in Figure 2’s 
crowded array is Britain’s long slide, the United States abrupt ascent and relative 
decline that is less linear than Britain’s, and the Soviet Union’s abortive challenge in 
the mid-to-late 20th century.
What remains is to integrate the three series (shares of total energy consump-
tion, energy consumption per capita, and power projection) into one index. There 
Figure 2: Power projection shares
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are diﬀerent ways of going about computing this combination. All three indicators 
capture power potential—the power to produce or do damage at distance. If that 
potential is highly concentrated in one state economic-military inventory, it may 
not really matter all that much how one combines the three indicators. Yet the two 
spheres—economic and military—are very diﬀerent. Imagine a state with high ener-
gy scores but limited military capabilities. Contemporary Germany and Japan come 
quickly to mind. They are important actors but highly dependent on others to do 
their fighting for them. Reverse the combination—low energy scores but advanced 
military capabilities. Such states are also handicapped in the extent to which they 
can engage in world politics but they can punch above their weight from time to 
time. Contemporary Russia is a good illustration of this phenomena. For this reason, 
one could argue that power projection capabilities deserve more weight in the ag-
gregated index than the energy indices—of which there are already two—do. Thus, 
the two energy indices are given equal weight while the power projection shares are 
doubled in terms of their input so that the resulting index is based half on the two 
energy shares and half on the power projection shares.
Figure 3 shows the outcome for an 1816–2007 depiction of the two leaders 
share. Britain emerged from the Napoleonic Wars at its high point and declined 
more or less continuously for the next 130 years. The only departure from this trend 
line was the brief and restricted revival of Britain’s relative fortunes in the interwar 
years due to the defeat of some of its rivals in World War I. The United States’ ascent 
was quick and towering after World War II. But it also began to lose relative share 
position fairly quickly and more or less continuously as well, with two exceptions. 
The United States’ relative share of power capabilities rebounded after the end of 
Figure 3: British and U.S. relative power capability shares 
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the Cold War thanks to the temporary side-lining of Russian capabilities (and the 
slow emergence of Chinese capabilities). 
The other exception is that the United States’ relative decline started at a very 
high point which gives it some leeway in allowing others to catch up. For instance, if 
one starts at a 50% peak and relative decline takes away, say, a quarter of one’s lead-
ing position, the lead state is down to a 37.5% share. If one starts at an 80% peak and 
relative decline takes away a quarter of the lead, the lead state is still at an impressive 
60% position. Other things being equal, we should expect that the higher one’s start-
ing point, the slower the progress of relative decline. 
Coding for polarity
Table 1 lists relative power capability shares for selected years. The reader is remind-
ed that this approach focuses on the global distribution of relative power shares. If 
we were only interested in the European region, a diﬀerent calculus with diﬀerent 
indicators would need to be made. The point, however, is that we have been conflat-
ing the global system and the European region for too long. Some distinction needs 
to be maintained even if it runs afoul of our Eurocentric versions of world history.
Table 1 shows the 1816–1945 period beginning in unipolarity, continuing as uni-
polar for five decades, followed by four decades of near unipolarity, one decade of 
bipolarity and three decades of multipolarity, and ending in 1945 in a return to uni-
polarity. The post-World War II era began in unipolarity and has yet to move away 
from it. Despite the similarity in the two movements (see Figure 4), the outcome will 
not seem very familiar to most analysts.
The relative positions of both global leaders declined overall, with some devia-
tions from decade to decade. In the British case, one of the causes for the bump up 
in the fifth decade was mobilizing for the Crimean War. In the United States’ case, 
the reversal in trend was primarily due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Britain 
lasted five decades before dipping below the unipolar threshold. The United States 
has stayed above the threshold for seven to eight decades but has resumed a down-
ward movement in the eighth decade (not shown in Figure 4). Whether the United 
States’ trajectory will continue to resemble the British trajectory remains to be seen. 
Both the Chinese and Russians are working hard to see that it does.
Not only does unipolarity re-emerge after the Cold War, there is no bipolarity 
evidenced during the Cold War. Should that caution a re-think of the measurement 
apparatus? Perhaps, but not necessarily so. One thing that is missing in the mea-
surement apparatus is any reflection of nuclear warhead “overkill.” In other words, 
once one possesses a second strike capability, does it matter how many more war-
heads are available? The index simply counts the distribution of nuclear warheads 
(in terms of lethality and accuracy). Yet at some point the utility of more warheads 
is limited. Thus the way the index is constructed ignores the substantive parity that 
was achieved in the late 1960s or early 1970s in the Cold War. Giving more credence 
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to this element would make a stronger case for bipolarity after the late 1960s and 
through the 1980s—but not before when the Soviet Union had major problems de-
veloping accuracy and acquiring the ability to deliver their missiles to the desired 
targets in North America. But even so, few analysts would argue that Cold War 
bipolarity was ever symmetrical in terms of capability. It was primarily eﬀorts to 
overcome the asymmetry that led to the unintended demise of the Soviet Union.
Once the Soviet Union did collapse, the United States was left standing as the 
sole surviving “superpower” but without the major lead in its economic/energy 
foundation that it had possessed earlier. It had the military capability to project 
power in a number of directions but it was less able to pay for it. As it turned out, the 
temptation to use that military capability, in a brief interval that was unconstrained 
by rival opposition, did not necessarily lead to the military capability being used 
prudently. Nor did the military expenditure outlay lead to much in the way of up-
grading the power projection military capability—as opposed to spending money 
on ground activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.
What is often described as the “unipolar moment” did not quite measure up to 
a full-scale unipolar episode. Moreover, it was due almost solely to the temporary 
absence of Soviet/Russian activities and the lower profile strategy adopted by the 
Chinese in the late 20th century that prioritized economic development over inter-
Table 1: Major power relative power shares, selected years




StatesFrance Russia Germany Italy Japan China
1816 0.730 0.125 0.016 0.085 0.015
1825 0.659 0.166 0.008 0.110 0.024
1835 0.608 0.168 0.012 0.143 0.024
1845 0.576 0.184 0.008 0.148 0.035
1855 0.608 0.195 0.007 0.098 0.050
1865 0.446 0.194 0.014 0.067 0.096 0.055
1875 0.489 0.171 0.024 0.099 0.120 0.052
1885 0.472 0.244 0.023 0.051 0.099 0.073
1895 0.441 0.172 0.023 0.075 0.380 0.079 0.010
1905 0.349 0.101 0.019 0.070 0.153 0.030 0.026 0.251
1915 0.340 0.059 0.036 0.050 0.208 0.038 0.055 0.215
1925 0.277 0.139 0.013 0.057 0.080 0.053 0.381
1935 0.224 0.071 0.199 0.145 0.036 0.071 0.254
1945 0.229 0.040 0.067 0.033 0.017 0.614
1955 0.075 0.038 0.051 0.838 0.006
1965 0.061 0.047 0.188 0.685 0.011
1975 0.051 0.048 0.263 0.595 0.023
1985 0.044 0.063 0.328 0.532 0.034
2005 0.049 0.073 0.226 0.621 0.061
1995 0.043 0.074 0.280 0.581 0.039
Austria-
Hungary
26 William R. Thompson
national adventures. Both of these developments seem to have run their course. The 
Russians have become more active in an attempt to regain some of their lost status. 
It did not have to work out that way but there was probably some probability that 
it would. The Chinese are now more prepared to engage in military operations in 
the East and South China Seas, and perhaps elsewhere.16 Whatever the appropri-
ate adjective for the moment, it seems to have passed. None of this means that the 
United States does not remain the most powerful state in the system. That is not 
the issue about which we are arguing. Rather, the question is how strong the United 
States’ relative position was in the two decades after the end of the Cold War. The 
argument here is that it was not as strong as decision-makers thought in the heady 
triumphalism of winning/surviving the Cold War. It was not genuinely unipolar be-
cause the military edge component considerably outweighed the economic-energy 
component of the foundation.
Unipolarity conditions have existed, at least as specified by the standards em-
ployed in this chapter, but they are not recognized widely as such. The periods im-
mediately after the Napoleonic Wars and World War II qualified as unipolar from 
a global perspective. We do not tend to recognize those years as unipolar for sev-
eral reasons. We do not think globally and instead blur the distinctions between 
regional and global activities. The Soviet Union could threaten to do various things 
in Eurasian sub-regions that were close at hand. Even so, often, the perceived and as-
16 A new Chinese naval base in northeast Africa, for instance, suggests some commitment to 
patrolling western Indian Ocean waters.
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serted threats did not correspond to actual Soviet capabilities. U.S. observers tend-
ed to give Soviet capabilities too much credit—as demonstrated by alleged bomber 
and missile gaps.
Another reason for overlooking these periods of high concentration is that uni-
polarity has come early when global war winners are in a rush to de-mobilize and of-
ten before they have fully absorbed their newly leading roles. As lead economies and 
sea powers, the emphasis has been placed on reviving markets and prosperity, not 
dictating terms to other states and taking over their territory (Levy and Thompson, 
2011). Unipolar powers tend to be reluctant or unable to take full advantage of their 
strong positions. For instance, the United States’ monopoly on atomic weapons was 
explicitly used to persuade Japan to surrender but it was not used to force conces-
sions from the Soviet Union. Alternatively, one could argue that Britain’s gold and 
sea power in 1815 was of limited relevance to post-war negotiations over what to do 
about the French problem in Western Europe. Even during the Napoleonic Wars, it 
had had serious problems maintaining its coalitions designed to defeat the French 
armies. Thus, it is easy to exaggerate even very strong powers ability to influence 
other actors. These observations remind us that it is easy to exaggerate the power 
and influence of even unipolar powers.
Conclusions
Power distributions are not meaningless but their interpretation requires caution 
and does not appear to be as straightforward as is often assumed. Static character-
izations, in particular, can be treacherous if they suppress diﬀerent dynamics at play. 
The past two centuries have been characterized by global power concentrations 
that were initially quite high in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and World 
War II, respectively. The leading global power controlled a disproportionate share 
of economic power, as manifested in new technology and energy sources. Each state 
also virtually monopolized power projection capabilities with global reach. These 
high concentrations of power capabilities were not infinite in duration. The high 
concentrations peak and then decay rather slowly. Power projection shares tend to 
decay more slowly than technology/energy shares do.
Just where unipolarity fits within these long and slow deconcentration propensi-
ties will no doubt continue to be debated. However, the argument advanced here is 
that the much acclaimed, post-Cold War unipolar phase was less than it seemed. It 
passes muster as a unipolar phase according to a polarity operationalization tem-
plate but it did so more on power projection capabilities than it did on technology/
energy capabilities. Its behavioral manifestations seem less linked to the develop-
ment of a novel power foundation and more attuned to an exaggerated sense of 
triumphalism on the part of elites aﬃliated with the global leader and the very tem-
porary absence of major power challenges. At the same time, ironically, we tend 
to ignore the strong evidence for unipolarity in earlier, post-war circumstances or, 
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alternatively, the very strong position of the United States throughout the ostensibly 
bipolar, Cold War period.
In sum, unipolarity has played some role in contemporary world politics. 
However, it may not be the role(s) usually ascribed to it. It may very well also be less 
potent an explanatory variable than we have thought.
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Sovereignty in the Millennial World-System
Salvatore Babones
Standard treatments of sovereignty in international relations theory conceptualize it as 
an absolute, unitary condition. Each state is (nationally) the ultimate constitutional po-
litical authority within a given territory. But in a development that has gone unnoticed 
by international relations scholarship, this Westphalian system of state sovereignty has 
broken down. At least since 1945 major powers have mutually acquiesced in each oth-
ers’ settling of the internal aﬀairs of their respective client states, and since 1991 the 
United States has exercised a near-global authority to settle the internal aﬀairs of nearly 
all nominally sovereign states. This post-Westphalian system closely resembles the im-
perial Chinese system of tianxia: “all under heaven.” In the new American tianxia the 
United States is the central state of an interstate system in which the vast preponder-
ance of interstate relationships are (1) associations with the United States, (2) in di-
rect opposition to the United States, or (3) modulated by the United States. Moreover 
just as was the practice in imperial China, the United States primarily wages war to 
settle the internal aﬀairs of other states, not to impose external conditions on them. In 
this new, post-modern world-system the most important lever of power is influence 
at the imperial center. Thus the post-modern citizen of the world inexorably seeks to 
become, either metaphorically or (increasingly) literally, a citizen of the United States. 
The emerging liberal, universal, homogeneous state is not the United States per se, but 
the American tianxia writ large to cover the entire world.
Introduction
The Westphalian era is over. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia symbolized the consoli-
dation of the modern world-system into a coherent system of distinct states with 
normatively accepted rules of interaction. A world-system in general is “a social sys-
tem that encompasses a closed or semi-closed social world” (Babones, forthcoming) 
consisting of overlapping cultural, economic, and political systems. The modern 
world-system (Wallerstein, 1974) is the global world-system that for the first time 
incorporated nearly all of the inhabited areas of the world into a single overarch-
ing world-economy. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) that ended with the Peace 
of Westphalia was one of several watershed conflicts that collectively constituted 
a global adjustment to the creation of this global world-economy: the Ming-Qing 
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transition of 1618–1661 in China, the wars that created modern continental Russia 
(1598–1689), and the Iberian colonization of the Americas. The Westphalian sys-
tem of sovereignty can be seen as a response to the vast expansion of the world-
economy during this period, the price revolution it engendered, and the destabiliz-
ing forces it unleashed.
The Peace of Westphalia is customarily used as a symbolic marker for the emer-
gence of the “Westphalian” system of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is convention-
ally defined as “supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott, 2001, 16). It is well-
known and well-understood that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia did not specifically 
reserve supreme authority within territories to territorial states, nor did it lay out the 
axiomatic corollary that sovereign states could not intervene in the internal aﬀairs 
of other sovereign states. The Westphalian system of sovereignty is merely a norma-
tive artifact of the understandings and practices that emerged from the Thirty Years’ 
War and its associated peace (Croxton, 1999), and norms take time to develop and 
solidify. Whatever the specific causal channels through which the Westphalian 
system of state sovereignty arose, the practice of exchanging resident ambassadors 
was established among European states in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia 
(Wheaton, 1836, 167) and it is perhaps this overt act that should be seen as the 
marking the beginning of the Westphalian system. After all, the Westphalian system 
is a norm, and norms are generated through human interaction.
As has been recognized by constructivist international relations scholars, 
the unitary conceptualization of sovereignty is increasingly at odds with reality. 
(Biersteker and Weber, 1996). This gap has little to do with quasi-sovereignties 
like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and the Vatican, nor is it connected with the 
institutionalist “bugbear” (pick another word here) of the rise of non-state actors. 
The emperor-has-no-clothes gap between sovereignty in theory and sovereignty in 
practice is the gross disparity in the character of sovereignty as exercised by, say, the 
United States and Grenada. This gap is not limited to external sovereignty, where it 
is well-recognized, but applies to internal sovereignty as well. When a less powerful 
state alters its internal aﬀairs in accordance with the demands of a more powerful 
state, “the decision to grant such rights or adjust its policy is the decision of the [less 
powerful] sovereign state” (James, 1999, 464). Thus the actions of the less powerful 
state can be influenced but its sovereignty cannot be diluted.
If this de jure device closes a window it also opens a door. James (1999, 464) goes 
on to say of the less powerful state:
Were it not sovereign, there would be another entity which, because of its own consti-
tutional dispositions, would be regularly entitled to have a controlling or an overriding 
voice with regard to both the internal and external aﬀairs of the territory concerned.
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The term “constitutional” in this sense refers not to a written constitution (though 
it may include that) but to the accepted mechanisms through which political au-
thority is legitimately constituted within a territory (Malcolm, 1991, 17–20). James’s 
(1999) scenario prompts a practical question: is the United States “regularly enti-
tled to have a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal 
and external aﬀairs of ” Grenada, or any other country? Given James’ criterion, the 
answer depends entirely on the word “entitled,” since the United States regularly 
does exercise “a controlling or an overriding voice with regard to both the internal 
and external aﬀairs of ” Grenada—along with many other countries. And though no 
international legal scholar would say that the United States is constitutionally en-
titled to interfere in other countries’ aﬀairs, many non-governmental organizations, 
media organizations, policy pundits, human rights activists, and citizens of other 
countries regularly call for just such interference.
That last group is crucial. It is often the case that a large and/or influential seg-
ment of the population of a nominally sovereign country actively calls for the United 
States (or another country) to exercise “a controlling or an overriding voice” in the 
internal aﬀairs of their own country. In such cases it should not be taken for granted 
that the citizenry of the country constitutes a single body politic conferring legitima-
cy on the existing constitutional arrangement of the country. Accounting for such 
cases, the number of cases of unproblematic constitutional order (and thus unprob-
lematic sovereignty) among the 193 member states of the United Nations may be 
relatively small. Even among powerful, long-established countries the adherence of 
domestic political elites to the formal independence of the domestic constitutional 
order may be called into question. When European elites place their European iden-
tity ahead of their national identities, when East Asian elites request an American 
military presence or advocate membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, when 
Central Asian elites maintain their families in Moscow, when Latin American elites 
call for American military intervention in their own countries, and when Chinese 
elites seek American passports for their children, they all call into question the bed-
rock certainty of James’s (1999) “key feature” that sovereignty must be a unitary 
condition, to say nothing of legal and absolute.
The Westphalian system of sovereign states emerged as a creature of the modern 
world-system. The modern world-system created an environment in which power-
ful individuals and organizations required the protection and support of state enti-
ties to survive and flourish in an otherwise anarchic world-economy (Spruyt, 1994). 
The formal sovereignty of these states arose out of the everyday practice of their 
peer-to-peer interactions. Though James (1999) considers the exchange of ambas-
sadors to be three steps removed from sovereignty (after recognition and the es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations), from an historical and dramaturgical point of 
view the exchange of ambassadors seems more likely to have come first and to have 
ultimately given rise to the practice of diplomatic relations and the de facto recogni-
34 Salvatore Babones
tion of other states’ sovereignty. The long and diﬃcult struggles of Russia (Mancall, 
1971) and the United Kingdom (Fairbank, 1953) to convince China to accept their 
ambassadors supports this point of view. However Westphalian sovereignty arose, 
it was certainly exported from Europe to the rest of the world through the agency of 
the core European powers. But in an enlarged post-colonial state system dominated 
by the overwhelming power of the United States the Westphalian conceit that in-
terstate relations are fundamentally peer-to-peer relations is no longer tenable, if it 
ever was. Now that the material base of the Westphalian system has disintegrated, 
can the phenomenological superstructure be far behind?
Post-Westphalian sovereignty
In a development that seemingly went unnoticed by international relations schol-
ars, the Westphalian state system disappeared some time ago. The crux of the 
Westphalian system was that states would have only state-to-state relations with 
other states; they would not “reach into” the internal aﬀairs of other states except 
through the mediation of the respective state institutions. Wars between states 
might result in the transfer of territory, the payment of indemnities, and/or the im-
position of miscellaneous penalties. They might even result in the installation of a 
new sovereign. But they emphatically did not aim at the reconstitution of the so-
ciety of the defeated state. The Thirty Years’ War had begun as a religious war, and 
the contemporaneous English Civil War had similarly strong religious overtones. 
These were two of the most (self-) destructive wars in European history before the 
twentieth century. The Westphalian Peace that followed may not have been much of 
a peace, but for some 300 years it resulted in wars that were in the main fought be-
tween sovereign states for state advantage in an anarchic interstate system. The cen-
tral conceit of international relations theory—that states are fundamentally external 
actors vis-à-vis other states—ultimately derives from the Westphalian principle of 
non-intervention in the internal aﬀairs of sovereign states (Lake, 2008).
This principle ceased to operate in 1945. To see this, contrast the Treaties of 
Brest-Litovsk (1918) and Versailles (1919) with the Yalta Conference of 1945 and 
its aftermath. The treaties that ended World War I on both the eastern and the 
western fronts resulted in the transfer of territories and the payment of indemni-
ties. They also coincided with changes in government. But they did not themselves 
mandate changes in the constitution of political authority in the defeated countries. 
The Soviet government that ultimately arose in the East was an anathema both 
to the Germans who facilitated its success and to the Western allies that defeated 
Germany. The political constitution of Germany also changed between the signing 
of the Armistice in 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Yet the 
new Weimar Republic still had to accept full responsibility for the Kaiser’s war. The 
fact that yet another German government renewed hostilities a mere twenty years 
later had little to do with whether or not the terms of the treaty were just or fair. 
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Hitler’s Nazi government had the same kinds of Westphalian aims as Wilhelm II’s 
imperial government did a generation earlier, only more grandiose and gruesome.
Similarly, the little-remembered Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 imposed 
Westphalian-style conditions on the defeated minor powers of World War II. Italy 
and Finland lost territories and paid reparations—Italy to Yugoslavia and Greece; 
Finland to the Soviet Union. But they retained their constitutional autonomy. Not 
so the main belligerents. Germany and Japan lost territories, to be sure. But they 
were also occupied and their societies radically reshaped by the victorious powers. 
The political constitutions of both (West) Germany and Japan were more or less 
dictated by the United States, which also imposed major economic restructuring 
(including the breaking up of industrial monopolies, land reform, and mass union-
ization), changes to school curricula, and formal war crimes tribunals. In Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union imposed even more extensive restructuring on the consti-
tutions and societies of the states that came under its control. These gross violations 
of Westphalian sovereignty had been agreed in principle at Yalta and became the 
basis for the postwar settlement. It can fairly be said that the Westphalian system 
became a dead letter in 1945.
It remains a dead letter today. In the early twenty-first century five states have 
at least some real capacity to impose regime change on other states—the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—and the first four regularly 
exercise this power. It might be credited to the foresight of the architects of the post-
war settlement that these five states are the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, which in the United Nations treaty system has the sole in-
ternational legal authority to authorize the waging of war. That the United States and 
Russia routinely wage war in pursuit of the emphatically non-Westphalian aim of 
constitutional change is acknowledged by Lake (2008, 55), but the United Kingdom 
and France have recently done so as well, albeit with support from the United States. 
And interstate war is only one tool of regime change. The United States employs a 
wide range of policy instruments to install and maintain constitutional orders that 
accord with its desires in countries around the world, often in conjunction with its 
(many) allies. The Westphalian principle of non-interference in the internal aﬀairs 
of other states is repeatedly invoked in vain (if often somewhat disingenuously) by 
Russia, China, and other states that fall outside the American alliance system.
The breakdown of Westphalia does not apply only in the peripheries of the world-
system. Though not threatened by forcible regime change, states in the established 
core of the world-system also lack full constitutional independence. James’ (1999) 
test of regular entitlement to “a controlling or an overriding voice” in the aﬀairs of 
another country applies to the rich countries of Western Europe and the Pacific, 
though more subtly. Powerful individuals and organizations insist that their govern-
ments remain broadly in compliance with the preferences of the United States. For 
many national elites, continued access to the United States and its amenities is more 
important than the sentimental bonds of nationhood. Their preferred course is for 
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their countries not to come into conflict with the United States, but where their 
countries’ constitutional arrangements do come into conflict with the demands of 
the United States, the demands of the United States generally prevail. In the twenty-
first century this has been demonstrated repeatedly through other states’ complic-
ity in American torture rendition programs, the acceptance of the extraterritorial 
enforcement of American law, the observance of financial sanctions imposed by 
the United States on third parties, the toleration of American intelligence collection 
on foreign soil, the acceptance of American intellectual property standards, and of 
course the routine hosting of American military forces.
If the Westphalian system of state sovereignty truly did arise as a reaction to 
the emergence of the modern world-system, the cessation of the Westphalian sys-
tem may be seen as a reaction to the dissolution of the modern world-system. The 
modern world-system was a world-economy in which the economic system was too 
large to be controlled by any one political entity. As a result the world-market was 
an impersonal, exogenous force that placed hard constraints on all political actors, 
including sovereign states. In the modern world-system states may have been sov-
ereign vis-à-vis each other but were not sovereign vis-à-vis the world-market. The 
eventual endogenization of the world-market under the control of the United States 
started (clumsily) with the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates and 
limited international trade. It was temporarily set back by the 1970s oil crises but has 
now matured to the point where all peak markets (oil, metals, money) are politically 
managed by the United States and its collaborators. More importantly, the highest 
value economic activities are no longer concentrated in market sectors at all. The 
commanding heights of the contemporary global economy are in areas like tele-
communications, pharmaceuticals, and entertainment—areas that depend on state 
sponsorship through the protection of intellectual property. The only state with suf-
ficient global reach to enforce global intellectual property rights is the United States. 
Thus the global economy is no longer characterized by the dominance of an over-
arching world-market. The peak sectors of the global economy have been endoge-
nized under the political sponsorship of the United States (Babones, forthcoming).
In this post-Westphalian world degrees of sovereignty can be gaged by prox-
imity to American power. Only the United States can be said to exercise full state 
sovereignty, since only the United States is, practically speaking, immune to all ex-
ternal “controlling” or “overriding” voices originating in other states. Outside this 
American center, three broad, hierarchical circles of more or less limited sover-
eignty exist in the post-Westphalian state system. These might reasonably be called 
shared sovereignty, partial sovereignty, and compromised sovereignty.
The closest allies of the United States may not have any voice in the constitution 
of political authority within the United States itself, but they do share with the United 
States some influence over the shape of the world-system in which they are embed-
ded. This ring of shared sovereignty consists of the four major Anglo-Saxon allies of 
the United States: Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. These 
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four countries are close collaborators in the project of American global governance, 
or to use a less flattering description they are like barnacles on the American whale. 
The citizens, companies, non-governmental organizations, and governments of 
America’s four Anglo-Saxon allies participate directly in American global gover-
nance through their participation in a common cultural space of opinion forma-
tion, their close integration into the American economy (especially Canada and the 
United Kingdom), and their deep cooperation with the American security services. 
While these four countries are clearly “outside” the United States itself they are to 
some extent “inside” the institutions of American global governance. Their inclu-
sion in these institutions goes well beyond oﬃcial intergovernmental cooperation. 
For example, while think tanks located in these four countries have virtually no in-
fluence on domestic politics in the United States, they are closely interwoven with 
the American foreign policy community (Babones, 2015).
Other allies of the United States enjoy varying degrees of partial sovereignty in 
domestic aﬀairs (subject to currency, investment, and trade openness) while ced-
ing nearly all decision-making over foreign aﬀairs. Included in this category are the 
continental European NATO members, the East Asian treaty allies of the United 
States, and a few other states scattered throughout the world. These may be the only 
states in the post-Westphalian system that more or less fit the Westphalian concept 
of state sovereignty as interpreted by James (1999) and Malcolm (1991). They have 
voluntarily ceded to the United States the authority to make many of the decisions 
usually associated with sovereign authority—and could in principle seize it back. 
The fact that the states that govern every single developed country in the world 
today have chosen to align themselves, formally or (in a few cases) informally, with 
the American military alliance structure and the broader mechanisms of American 
global governance suggests that there may not be much sovereign freedom of 
choice in this decision after all. Nonetheless, the formal sovereignty of the Western 
European and East Asian allies of the United States is clear. Partially sovereign in the 
post-Westphalian system, these might be termed sovereign client states if viewed 
from a Westphalian perspective (Babones, 2014).
The remaining states of the world are subjected to compromised sovereignty: 
they (often loudly) proclaim the right of full legal sovereignty but are often unable 
to make this right eﬀective. Those states that accept compromised sovereignty suf-
fer peripheralization and economic colonialism. Those that do not accept compro-
mised sovereignty face strong external push-back and internal pressure for regime 
change. From a definitional standpoint the key fact here is not that these countries 
lack suﬃcient power to enforce their sovereignty (this issue is fully accounted for 
in James, 1999 and Malcolm, 1991) but that the constitutional authority of the gov-
ernments of these states to govern their territories in the ways that they do is not 
unambiguously accepted as legitimate by the populations they govern, and certainly 
not by their national elites.
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In the new, post-Westphalian state system, many states—perhaps the majority of 
states—lack full political authority within their own territorial borders for just this 
reason. In the developed countries of the West it would be diﬃcult to find members 
of the national elite who openly question the constitutional legitimacy of the states 
of which they are citizens and rarer still to find any who seek support from foreign 
governments and organizations to assist them in changing the constitutional orders 
of their countries. The fact that such support is often forthcoming in less developed 
countries regularly prompts their states to accuse the United States (and the “West” 
more generally) of violating international law by interfering in their internal aﬀairs. 
When a state’s political authority is not accepted as constitutionally legitimate by 
many of its own citizens, including many of its intellectual elite, and when external 
states similarly question the constitutional legitimacy of that state and actively seek 
to change the state’s political constitution to bring it more into line with their exter-
nal expectations, it seems only reasonable to consider the state’s sovereignty to be 
compromised.
Importantly, it is not only antisystemic states whose sovereignty is compro-
mised in such a way. All non-western countries host substantial pro-western po-
litical elites. It may be politically incorrect for a Western author to make such a 
provocative assertion. Nonetheless, it seems to be the case that (1) large proportions 
of the elite citizens of African, Latin American, and Eurasian countries question the 
constitutional legitimacy of the political authority of the states under which they 
live and (2) many of these very elites seek Western political interference in the in-
ternal aﬀairs of their own countries. If these two propositions hold, and if James’ 
(1999) constitutional interpretation of sovereignty is accepted, the implications for 
the Westphalian system of state sovereignty seem unavoidable. The passing of the 
modern world-system governed by the ultimate power of an exogenous world-mar-
ket and the concomitant passing of the Westphalian state system organized on the 
principle of unitary state sovereignty may be cause for sorrow or cause for cheer. 
Either way, it is becoming increasingly diﬃcult in the twenty-first century to file 
new empirical realities under the old conceptual labels.
An American tianxia
The global world-system is in the midst of a transition from the predominance of 
the global economic system (a “world-economy”) to the predominance of a global 
political system (a “world-polity”). The particular economic system that dominated 
the world in the second half of the second millennium was the market system; thus 
the late world-economy might be classified as a “world-market.” (Babones, forth-
coming) Other peak economic systems could be imagined, and often were. The par-
ticular political system that is coming to dominate the world in the first half of the 
third millennium is more diﬃcult to classify. The Wallersteinian term for a world-
system in which the political system is the predominant social system is a “world-
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empire,” but world-empires are weakly theorized in world-systems analysis. (Woolf, 
1990) In any case the word “empire” itself does not accurately describe the ways in 
which the United States exercises authority in the interstate system (Nye, 2004) and 
its use has so many meanings and connotations in English that it prompts objec-
tions from all quarters (Khong, 2013). The term “world-empire” is probably best 
reserved for world-systems in which a single state exercises full political jurisdiction 
over its entire world-system, such as the Roman Empire in the first few centuries 
AD. Another, less laden—or diﬀerently laden—term is required to describe the con-
temporary world-policy.
The contemporary world-polity dominated by the United States and its allies 
is unprecedented in scope but perhaps not in structure. It is a hierarchical polity 
composed of a central state (the United States), a small collection of allied states that 
are so closely identified with the central state that their military forces, intelligence 
services, financial markets, publishing houses, and intellectual communities are 
fully integrated with those of the central state (and have been for some 100 years), 
a large collection of treaty allies that broadly accept the overarching ideological as-
sumptions of the central state, and an even larger collection of dependent states 
that generally accede to the existence of a hierarchical state system that places them 
in a subordinate position. A small number of antisystemic states overtly object to 
the hierarchical organization of the world-polity, but only three of these states are 
strong enough to pursue somewhat independent foreign policies (China, Russia, 
and Iran) while the few other antisystemic states are in practice client states of one 
or more of these three.
This political configuration is strongly reminiscent of the Roman world of the 
late Republic (c. 200–92 BC), with Rome as the central state, the Latin allies sharing 
in Roman sovereignty, and various Mediterranean powers enjoying partial sover-
eignty in alliance with Rome, while the three Hellenistic successor states vied with 
Rome as antisystemic powers. The structural correspondence between the two sys-
tems is very close. Their trajectories, however, are very diﬀerent.
Unlike Republican Rome, the United States is not (or at least is no longer) ex-
panding its directly governed territory via the conquest of its neighbors, and the 
United States is not on the road to world-empire in the Imperial Roman sense. 
Quite the contrary: the emerging American-centered world-system is near-static 
in its state borders, with nearly all changes of border since the end of World War II 
consisting of the division of existing political entities while the external borders of 
those entities remain intact. The very few external border changes since the 1945 
settlement have either been trivial (conflicts over maritime and mountain frontiers 
where few if any people actually live) and/or of unrecognized legitimacy (e.g., the 
annexations carried out by Israel and Russia). The world map has changed dramati-
cally since 1945, but the borders that existed in 1945 have hardly budged. In any case 
most people’s understandings of the world-system structure of the Mediterranean 
world of the late Roman Republic are completely overshadowed by their impres-
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sions of the world-system structure of the high Roman Empire. Though the first may 
have been a world-polity without being an empire the second was unambiguously 
an empire and a world-empire.
East Asian history suggests a more appropriate model. From AD 1271–1911 a 
series of three dynasties (Yuan, Ming, Qing) ruled a united China that dominated 
East Asia from the disintegration of Genghis Khan’s Mongol empire until the intru-
sion of European territorial colonialism. Throughout this period China was the cen-
tral state of the East Asian political system. The modern Chinese name for China, 
Zhongguo, literally translates as “central state,” though it is customarily rendered in 
English as “Middle Kingdom.” Like China itself, the political system of which China 
was the central state historically did not have a name (as such), since in the Chinese 
conception of the world it encompassed the entire relevant world. In the words of 
Mancall (1971, 3), “the Chinese state was not a state at all in the conventional mean-
ing of the word, but rather the administration of civilized society in toto.” Chinese 
scholars were certainly aware of the existence of other civilizations—including an-
cient India (Tianzhu) and Rome (Da Qin)—and of course India was well-known 
to be the source of Chinese Buddhism. But geographical factors made these civili-
zations politically irrelevant to the Chinese governance of the East Asian political 
system (Mancall, 1971, 7). To the extent that the political system of which China 
was the central state had a name, or at least a label, it might be identified with the 
Chinese word tianxia (“all under heaven”).
Tianxia is an ancient concept in Chinese philosophy (Yan, 2011, 43–46) but it 
reached its highest development as a practical guide to the governance of a multi-
state world-polity under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Ming dynasty was a 
native Han Chinese dynasty that directly exercised what might be called full state 
sovereignty over the entire Han cultural area of the time, an area roughly corre-
sponding to contemporary China minus Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Qinghai, and Tibet. The founder of the dynasty, the Hongwu emperor, implemented 
a neo-Confucian civil religion embodied in a legal code that established the emper-
or as the embodiment of the mandate of heaven (tianming) under which all civilized 
peoples were to be governed (Jiang, 2015). The tianming concept was not new to 
the Ming dynasty, but its application via Chinese law to the entire East Asian world-
polity (tianxia) was. Wang (2013, 133) contrasts the Chinese concept of tianxia 
with the Latinate concept of imperium (“authority”), which is the root of the English 
word “empire.” He writes that tianxia:
. . . depicts an enlightened realm that Confucian thinkers and mandarins raised to one 
of universal values that determined who was civilized and who was not . . . tianxia was 
an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior moral authority that guided behav-
iour in a civilized world. (Wang, 2013, 133)
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Whereas the Roman imperium connoted an expressly delegated political authority 
to command obedience, the Chinese tianxia encompassed a moral authority that 
entitled the state to the obedience of its subjects and suzerains alike.
Those suzerains included three classes of external sovereigns. To the east and 
southeast of China were a ring of organized agricultural states that had adopted 
Chinese state Confucianism as a governing principle, accepted the Chinese astro-
logical calendar (along with its cycle of oﬃcial celebrations), and used Chinese as 
the oﬃcial language of government: Korea, Japan, the Ryuku Islands, and Vietnam. 
These states occupied a position that is in some ways analogous to that occupied by 
the partially sovereign developed democracies of today’s world. They were clearly 
incorporated into and actively participated in the Chinese tianxia. To the south 
and southwest of China were the organized agricultural states of (what is now) 
Southeast Asia: Sulu (in today’s Philippines), Java, the Muslim maritime sultanates, 
the Khmer Empire, and Thailand. These non-Confucian states nominally accepted 
Chinese leadership and often turned to China for the settlement of disputes but 
maintained independent foreign policies vis-à-vis each other. They occupied a posi-
tion that is in some ways analogous to the compromised sovereignty of today. And 
to the northwest and north of China were a shifting collection of nomadic and semi-
nomadic tribal societies, including Jurchen, Mongolian, Turkic, and Tibetan groups. 
Ming China engaged with these groups much as the United States today engages 
with failed and conflict-ridden states. Their chronic problems were to be managed 
through education in the manners of Chinese civilization.
The political geography of the Ming tianxia exhibits only minor topical similari-
ties to the political geography of the contemporary American-centered world-poli-
ty. Yet the governance structures of the Ming tianxia are strikingly similar. The main 
institutional mechanism through which the Chinese state managed the East Asian 
world-polity was the tributary system. In this system, the sovereigns of the other 
states (and quasi-states) of the East Asian world-polity regularly acknowledged the 
suzerainty of the Chinese emperor, who in exchange legitimized their rule over their 
various domains. Khong (2013, 9–13) identifies six key features of the Chinese trib-
utary system: Sinocentrism, hierarchy, cultural aﬃnity, non-coercion, diplomatic 
rituals, and the conflation of the domestic and interstate spheres. Khong identifies 
close parallels between Chinese and American practices on all six dimensions, but 
the last dimension is key. In the Chinese tianxia, “the Chinese emperor is the ‘gov-
ernor’ of not just China, but ‘all under heaven’” (Khong, 2013, 28), the “paterfamilias 
of all mankind” (Mancall, 1984, 38). This implied that the Chinese emperor was 
ultimately responsible for the sound management of the internal aﬀairs of the non-
Chinese states within the Chinese tianxia. As a result, the “divergent interests of 
each tributary or of groups within each tributary were . . . balanced by their common 
acceptance of the emperor’s power to recognize local political authority” (Mancall, 
1984, 39; emphasis added).
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Khong (2013, 29) draws an explicit parallel between the constitutional role of 
the Chinese emperor as “governor” of the East Asian world-polity and the constitu-
tional role of the president of the United States as “leader of the free world.” Khong 
does not use the actual word “constitutional” but the relationship is clearly consti-
tutional in the sense spelled out by James (1999) and Malcolm (1991): like Ming 
China’s Confucianism, contemporary America’s political and economic principles 
are embedded in the political authority structures of its allied client states. In the 
American system, democratic governance and respect for private property rights 
are prerequisites for admission to the society of civilized states (though not neces-
sarily in that order). In an echo of the external application of China’s Great Ming 
Code to the entire Ming tianxia, the United States today projects outward to the 
dependent zones of its world-polity a human rights regime that is overwhelmingly 
tilted toward the protection of the rights of identity groups that are politically mobi-
lized in the United States. The extraterritorial application of statutory American law 
is widespread, and frequently demanded by elites in subordinate states. (Cabranes, 
2015). Recent high-profile financial and sports corruption cases have even seen the 
extraterritorial application of American law in Western Europe.
Writing about the potential for a renewed Chinese tributary system in the twen-
ty-first century, Yan (2011, 204) claims that “the idea of sovereign equality among 
nations has become a universal norm of the contemporary world and it cannot 
be replaced with the hierarchical degrees of the tribute system.” Yet Khong (2013) 
shows that this is exactly what has happened, albeit with the United States rather 
than China as the tribute-receiving and legitimacy-dispensing central state. And 
unlike Ming China, which demonstrated (or bought) its primacy by giving gifts to its 
tributaries that were of much greater value than the tribute received from them, the 
United States collects the ongoing tribute of dollar seigniorage while oﬀering noth-
ing of definite value in return. The emerging American tianxia is still taking shape, 
but already it reaches deep into the psyches of most of the world’s educated elites 
through its preeminence in the universities, in entertainment, in business practice, 
and on the internet. As in Ming China, where non-Chinese elites “participated in 
a culture that transcended, and knew no specific reference to, particular boundar-
ies or geopolitical institutions” (Mancall,1984, 66), the emerging American tianxia 
is fast becoming “the common ideological heritage of mankind” (Fukuyama, 1989, 
9). Liberal democracy married to commodity fetishism is no longer the American 
culture but the world culture. If not the end of history, this does at least constitute 
the end of an era—and the beginning of new, millennial world-system.
A post-modern world-system
The military, economic, and cultural power of Ming China was unmatched in East 
Asia, but in general the successive Ming governments did not seek to expand the 
territorial extent of the Chinese state itself. Instead they sought to solidify tradi-
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tional state and quasi-state boundaries. When disputes arose between subordinate 
states and quasi-states in the East Asian system, the normal practice was for the ag-
grieved party to seek a dispensation from the Chinese imperial center. The conceit 
of tianxia was that judgments from the center should in principle be obeyed at the 
periphery. When the rulers of subordinate states refused to obey the directions of 
the emperor, the general practice was to attempt to force a change in the ruler of 
the oﬀending state rather than to use force against the oﬀending state itself. Such a 
change could sometimes be accomplished through the withholding or redirecting 
oﬃcial patents of oﬃce—in essence, through the use of tools of diplomatic recogni-
tion (Mancall, 1984, 39). Such spiritual tools were always backed up by temporal 
power, but the final resort to temporal power was viewed as a failure of the proper 
management of subordinates. Ming China sought to accomplish via internal inter-
ference what other world-polities (notably the Roman world-empire) accomplished 
via external coercion. Ming China acted as (forgive the anachronism) the central 
state of a post-Westphalian world-polity. The result was a period of extraordinary 
order and stability (Kang, 2010).
Similarly, the military, economic, and cultural power of the United States is un-
matched in the world today, but for more than a century successive American gov-
ernments have not sought to expand the territorial extent of the American state 
itself. Instead they have sought to solidify traditional state boundaries. When dis-
putes arise between subordinate states in the American system, aggrieved parties 
often seek a dispensation from the American imperial center. When the rulers of 
subordinate states refuse to obey the directions of the president of the United States, 
the general practice is to attempt to force a change in the ruler of the oﬀending state 
rather than to use force against the oﬀending state itself. Such a change could often 
be accomplished through economic sanctions, bombing campaigns, or (in the final 
instance) military occupation. The spiritual tools of human rights reports, election 
certifications, and public pronouncements are always backed up by temporal power, 
which is perhaps used more frequently than it should . . . but the system is still young 
and not yet mature. The United States is able to achieve via soft power—“attraction 
rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004, 256)—the acquiescence that Ming 
China had to purchase via subsidies and Imperial Rome had to enforce via conquest. 
The United States is now the central state of a post-Westphalian world-polity. The 
result is likely to be a period of extraordinary order and stability.
The stability of the American tianxia rests on the post-Westphalian inter-
twining of internal and external aﬀairs. This has aligned the interests (and world-
views) of decision-makers toward cooperation and self-restraint (Chan, 2012). The 
Westphalian use of force in sub-imperial interstate relations is rarely considered by 
state leaders to be a realistic policy option. The legitimate use of force is reserved 
instead to the United States (Babones, 2015). Though the present and increasing 
dominance of the United States in global aﬀairs may not be apparent in conven-
tional quantitative indicators like time series data on national proportions of global 
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GDP, it should be remembered that economic preponderance is merely an enabler 
of power (Nye, 2015). It does not itself constitute authority, imperium, or tianming. 
This is made clear by the fact that even though the preponderance of the United 
States in global GDP was much larger in 1955 than in 1995, the preponderance of 
American hegemony over the world as a whole was clearly much greater in the 
1990s. In any case much of the economic activity that contributes to the dominance 
of the United States occurs outside the territorial borders of the United States. For 
example, the global internet, finance, and energy sectors have been to varying de-
grees endogenized under American control. (Babones, forthcoming)
China’s Ming dynasty did ultimately collapse in 1644, to be replaced by the Qing 
dynasty. While the Chinese concept of tianxia was appropriated by the Manchurian 
Qing dynasty, the East Asian world-polity that was the Ming tianxia did not sur-
vive as an independent world-system. Beginning in the (long) sixteenth century and 
with the Ming-Qing transition of 1644 as a symbolic inflection point, the East Asian 
world-polity was absorbed into the expanding modern world-system. This transi-
tion is reflected in the fact that whereas the high Ming emperors self-confidently 
embraced interactions with the wider world (including the presence of Jesuit mis-
sionaries at the Ming court) the Qing emperors threw up a cordon sanitaire to ex-
clude, isolate, or neutralize external influences. Contacts with the non-Asian world 
were strictly limited and delimited. Though Qing dynasty sought to exclude Western 
influences, the long-distance trade by land and sea that integrated East Asia into the 
modern world-system created new patterns of interstate relations throughout the 
region. The Qing dynasty itself retained full independence until 1840, did not fall 
until 1911, and often prospered over the 267 years of its reign. But it was never the 
unchallenged central state of a distinct world-system. Its erstwhile client states had 
important interactions with external powers over which the Qing emperors held no 
authority. Whatever their rhetorical pretensions, the Qing emperors knew full well 
that their tianming did not encompass all under heaven.
The American tianxia is likely to last much longer, if only for the simple reason 
that there are no other world-systems for it to encounter. Barring science fiction 
scenarios, the American tianxia will play out strictly according to its own internal 
logic. Understanding that logic should be a major goal of the social science of the 
twenty-first century. Fukuyama (1989) should be read as prescient first attempt to 
achieve just such an understanding. It might be said that the American tianxia is the 
universal homogeneous state that Fukuyama was looking for but did not quite find 
at the end of history in 1989. Its civil religion of liberal democracy is more expansive, 
more universal, and (one might say) more attractive than the Ming civil religion 
of state Confucianism. Whereas Ming China exported governing ideas, the United 
States exports governing ideals. As a result,
. . . [the] American tianxia . . . has a missionary drive that is backed by unmatched mili-
tary power and political influence. Compared to the Chinese concept, it is not passive 
 Sovereignty in the Millennial World-System 45
and defensive; rather, unlike other universal ideals, it is supported by a greater capacity 
to expand. (Wang, 2013, 135)
The anarchic modern world-system of constant interstate conflict lasted five hun-
dred years. The hierarchical millennial world-system of regime management may 
last a thousand.
Pronouncements of thousand year reichs are always ripe for ridicule, perhaps 
rightfully so. But (as Wallerstein recognized) world-polities are highly stable sys-
tems. The Roman polity persisted over a continuous history of 2206 years (753 BC 
– AD 1453). It was a world-polity spanning the entire Mediterranean basin for more 
than 800 years, from the defeat of Carthage to the rise of the Caliphate. The Yuan-
Ming-Qing polity lasted 640 years (AD 1271–1911), including perhaps 250 years as 
the central state of a much larger world-polity that spanned all of East Asia. In the 
absence of contact with the larger world-economy the Ming world-polity would 
certainly have continued in existence, or have transferred over into the next dynas-
ty. As history actually did unfold the only factor compromising the Qing dynasty’s 
preponderance over East Asia was the intrusion of the European maritime powers. 
Other, less paradigmatic cases of world-empire were similarly long-lasting—despite 
the lack of modern transportation and information technology. By comparison a 
world-polity that has the capacity to monitor substantially all global communica-
tions has awesome powers of stabilization indeed. Increasing computing power and 
the advance of machine learning will only reinforce the concentration of political 
power at the center. Whether or not genuine political authority will follow is to be 
seen.
The Westphalian system of state sovereignty arose in the context of the 1640s 
consolidation of the modern world-system. Using conventional symbolic dates, the 
period from its emergence (1492) to its consolidation (1648) lasted 156 years. The 
entire reign of the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) might be considered the period of 
consolidation of the Ming world-polity, giving 97 years from emergence to consoli-
dation. The American tianxia may be said to have emerged in 1945 and consoli-
dated after 2001: the Westphalian principles that were eﬀectively discarded at Yalta 
were finally disavowed after the September 11 attacks. Thus in comparative and 
world historical terms, the new millennial world-system is still quite young. The 
states—and people—of the world are still learning how to inhabit it. The United 
States, long a magnet for the energetic and ambitious, has in the twenty-first cen-
tury become the destination of choice for the world’s elites, particularly for the 
Chinese elite. Just as Josephus and Peter made their way to Rome, in the post-mod-
ern American tianxia the elite citizen of the world is inexorably drawn to the United 
States. Wherever they live, and whatever their opinions of the United States, elites 
recognize the value of being American. Fukuyama’s liberal, universal, homogeneous 
world-polity may not be the United States per se. It is instead the American tianxia 
writ large to cover the entire world.
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Pre-emptive Decline: The Weakening of Great 
Powers and Geopolitical Volatility
Robert A. Denemark
Fear of national decline generates a potent psychological response that leads to the 
framing of, and support for, policies that are counterproductive in characteristic ways.  I 
trace the resulting process, labeled “pre-emptive decline,” as it emerged in debates over 
educational policy and reform in the United Kingdom in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, and in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century.   
Decisions were to be made, significant support existed for forward-looking change, but 
the policies adopted in the United Kingdom, and the social forces that were mobilized 
in the United States, were oriented toward social myths and archaic policy options.   
This is exactly the response that pre-emptive decline predicts.  Fear of decline appears 
to be self-fulfilling in both cases.
Introduction: Pre-emptive decline
The most dangerous time in the life-cycle of any geopolitical system is when its great 
powers are facing decline. Rising powers will prefer a diﬀerent set of global rules, 
established powers will seek to maintain the status quo, and the result is increased 
tension, arms build-ups, tightened alliance structures, and a greater tendency for 
violence. Some geopolitical perspectives recognize the incentives to engage in vi-
olence as inherent in the “position” of states. But geopolitics is not simply about 
fixed coordinates, it is also about their eﬀective meanings. We know that technology 
changes the meaning of distance and “natural” boundaries like oceans. Likewise, 
great powers evidence life cycles that impact their perceptions of their rightful 
“place” in the system. In the decline phase, great powers evidence a variety of sen-
sitivities that make their geopolitical “positions” especially relevant. Whether per-
ceptions are accurate or not, fear of decline gives rise to a dangerous heightening of 
self-doubt and an increase in frustratingly self-defeating behavior. This is a process 
I label “pre-emptive decline.”
I suggest that when popular opinion within a great power adopts the issue of 
decline, resources are squandered on maladaptive policy shifts and ill-conceived 
uses of force. This process is well understood in the study of corporations, military 
units, and bureaucracies. Typical responses to fear of decline include (1) the ten-
dency of leaders with high levels of self-esteem to overcompensate in the face of risk 
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to their organizations, overestimate their capacity, adopt risky behavior even when 
they are unprepared to prevail, and mindlessly persist in such behaviors; and (2) the 
tendency of those facing status threats is to revert to the most traditional, apocry-
phal, even mythological beliefs regarding what made them great in the first place. 
An attempt to reproduce the conditions evident in these founding myths generates 
harmful policy tendencies that waste resources and further erode their positions.
This work undertakes three tasks. First, I will review the literature that outlines 
the processes that lead to both overcompensation and reversion to tradition. This 
material is reviewed more fully in Denemark (2013). Second, I will concentrate on 
the cultural elements of this process and begin with a review of evidence of pre-emp-
tive decline in Britain during the period from about 1860 to about 1890. Prominent 
debates in this period concerned changes in educational curricula. Classical educa-
tion was unhelpful, and a move toward more modern subjects, especially and par-
ticularly the study of science and technology, was considered most important for 
continued success in the areas of national security and economic prosperity. This 
material is reviewed more fully in Denemark (2015).
Finally, I will consider a similar debate regarding science curricula, and concern 
for science overall, that took place in the United States in the period from the late 
1950s to the mid-1960s, and again in the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s. In the British and United States cases there were decisions to be made, and 
instead of adopting forward-looking reforms (as had been done in the past and as 
were being proposed at the time), the actions taken reflected an expressly backward-
looking search for solutions in the context of the foundation myths of the society 
in question. The resulting policies were (and are) wasteful and counterproductive. 
This is pre-emptive decline.
The psychology of pre-emptive decline
High self-esteem is a fundamental element in the personalities of individuals who 
are successful, in great part because they make sound decisions about appropri-
ate goals and necessary levels of eﬀort (Sanderlands et al., 1988). Such individuals 
are also vulnerable to three sets of errors when the status of their organizations is 
threatened. They are (1) overly optimistic; (2) tend to respond with increases persis-
tence (but no change in strategy); and (3) tend to engage in self-defeating patterns of 
behavior as a result. Threats to the status of the group are interpreted as individual 
threats, in contradistinction to those in low-status groups (Simon et al., 2001, 311).
Individuals have a natural and healthy tendency to over-emphasize their positive 
traits (Taylor et al., 1989). This is helpful so long as the exaggeration is not too far out 
of alignment with actual abilities. But those who represent significantly powerful 
organizations tend to move self-perception out of the realm of acceptable exaggera-
tion. Baumeister (1989, 186) traces several historical instances where the exaggera-
tion of abilities led to economic, political, or military disaster and concludes:
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. . . one important mechanism for the self-destructive consequences of power is the 
expansion of illusions beyond the optimal margin. Initially, gains in power overcome 
depressing assessments of the status quo, and the expansion of the margin of illusion 
may generate excitement and attract additional supporters. But as the margin of illu-
sion continues to expand, it renders the individual or group increasingly prone to make 
nonoptimal decisions . . . and these may contain the danger of self-destructive conse-
quences.
Poor policies, overcompensation, and violence
Poor decision-making follows personal overestimation, and emerges in response 
to three tendencies. First, there is a tendency to over-commit to initial strategies. 
Attempts by individuals with high self-esteem to deal with a given challenge in the 
same (unsuccessful) manner persist surprisingly well beyond the point of their be-
coming counterproductive, and regardless of contrary advice (McFarlin et al., 1984). 
Self-defeating strategies like reducing preparatory eﬀorts emerge (Tice, 1991). 
Baumeister and Scher (1988) record a tendency to engage in poor bargaining strat-
egies that enhance the risk of failure. In general, judgment declines and there is an 
increasing willingness to undertake badly calculated risks (Baumeister et al. 1993). 
Theories of identity predict that the receipt of negative social feedback, which is 
inconsistent with a given “standard of identity,” will generate not only a response 
aimed at bringing identity and feedback into alignment (Burke, 1991), but “more 
extreme versions of behavior associated with that identity” (Willer et al., 2013). In 
this way evidence of failure can reinforce failure.
It is a relatively short jump from threats to high-status groups that are popu-
lated by individuals with high levels of self-esteem, to the choice of more violent 
means for addressing that perceived threat. Several mechanisms help generate re-
sentment, increase misunderstanding, and justify violence. We may begin with the 
tendency of threats to group status to generate defensiveness, even when the threats 
are hypothetical. For example, conflict between State A and State B may be viewed 
as a threat by State C if it fears any change in the status of members of the system, 
even if neither States A nor B have any interest in challenging State C.
Another source of tension emerges because dominant groups create hierarchy-
enhancing myths that are deployed when they are threatened. There is a strong ten-
dency to aﬃx blame for the “threat” to members who are acting contrary to these 
myths (Cohrs, 2012). Delegitimization of critics is a first critical step in releasing 
moral and normative restraints against the use of violence (Bar-Tal and Hammack, 
2012).
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Prospect theory
The findings of prospect theory (eg. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Taliaferro, 2010) 
also lend support to the increased tendency toward risk-taking behavior and vio-
lence. Applications of prospect theory to international relations stress the greater 
tendency of risky behavior in the context of potential losses. Increasing use of coer-
cive diplomacy or military intervention are likely outcomes (Taliaferro, 2010). The 
logic of the link between identity, status threat, and violence, is especially well un-
derstood in the study of ethnic group conflict. Horowitz (1985) traces the literature 
that ties social change, to increased desire to protect group status, to the increase in 
prejudice and the legitimation of violence. The use of traditional symbols to gener-
ate “new” hatreds is traced in a particularly insightful volume by Kaufman (2001). 
These myths and symbols are well-suited for such manipulation given the psycho-
logical dynamics of identity, bias, and related perceptions of threat (Kaufman, 2015).
Taken together, threats to high status groups are internalized, lead to enhanced 
levels of in-group cohesion, to discrimination against others, to delegitimation, and 
this facilitates a range of over-compensation, risk-taking, and violence.
Maladaptive responses to crisis: Restricted information, control, and tradition
The tendency toward overcompensation, maladaptive policies, and violence is rein-
forced by another problematic outcome of status threats to organizations populated 
by leaders with high self-esteem. Janis (1972) traces the organizational pathologies 
of governments under crisis conditions. The two most problematic responses are 
1) self-imposed restrictions on incoming information, especially the censoring of 
unwelcome facts or criticisms; and 2) a constriction in control, where a small group 
of powerful individuals centralize decision-making. Taking this analysis one logical 
step further, Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981) suggest that these two processes 
will generate a tendency to respond to threats with well-learned or traditional be-
haviors. Dozens of studies in the 1950s and early 1960s tie stress to restricted atten-
tion, increased anxiety, and arousal, all of which tend to narrow perception, reduce 
flexibility, and increase the use of “well-learned or habituated” responses (Staw et 
al., 1981, 505). Staw and his colleagues argue that at the group level we may expect 
increased cohesiveness, constriction of leadership and control, and increased ex-
pectations of in-group uniformity, such that:
. . . a threat to the vital interests of an entity, be it an individual, group, or organiza-
tion, will lead to forms of rigidity . . . Thus, maladaptive cycles are predicted to follow 
from threats which encompass major environmental changes since prior, well-learned 
responses are inappropriate under new conditions. (Staw et al., 1981, 502)
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Several studies have confirmed the relationship between stress, group threat, and 
reversion to tradition. Both Shaham, Singer, and Schaeﬀer (1992), and Klein (1996), 
note that individuals tend to use existing heuristics when subjected to stress, even 
during relatively simple tasks. Schwabe and Wolf (2009) outline the long history 
of research on the relationship between stress and “reversion to tradition” that has 
evolved in the study of neuroscience and brain chemistry. The neuro-chemical 
foundations of the tendency are made clear by Hermans et al. (2011) in a study that 
maps the relevant neural network. The condition is so well understood that drugs 
have been developed to intervene in the process. These are most often prescribed 
for musicians who suﬀer from stage freight.
George et al. (2006) suggest that the reason that group threats generate tradi-
tional responses is that there is a desire to reestablish a degree of control. Control 
is often perceived to exist if the group under threat exhibits behaviors generally ex-
pected under such circumstances. Such behaviors oﬀer comfort and solace “through 
conforming to normative expectations” as does simply “mimicking the organizing 
templates . . . that are viewed as legitimate” (George et al., 2006, 355). And Ocasio 
(1993, 33) suggests that:
Economic adversity increases reliance on core cultural assumptions, values, and beliefs, 
as interpreted by participants in organizational decision-making, increases the rate of 
adoption of solutions that are consistent with the core cultural assumptions and de-
creases the rate of assumptions of other forms of organizational change.
The link between status threats and a reliance on the most traditional and rigid re-
sponses is well-supported.
The British example
In an earlier paper (Denemark, 2015) I argued that the British exhibited this exact 
pathology as questions about their ability to overcome challenges to their declining 
global status began to emerge. This took place in the period from roughly 1860 to 
1890, shortly after which the power of the British was not simply questioned but 
had quite clearly diminished. Rapid social change had set the stage for this process.
Social upheaval
The English nation rested on a set of cultural pillars that included the Church; a be-
lief in the liberal economic order and the industrialization it brought; and views of 
traditional family life. These institutions were in decline long before Britain’s global 
position actually began to erode. Only half the population identified with the oﬃcial 
doctrines of the Church of England by the time of the Census of 1851. Urban work-
ers were particularly dismissive. The Church itself was divided in its response, and 
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the state was altering exclusionary laws so that Catholics (from 1829) and even Jews 
(from 1858) attained full civil rights.
Liberalism and the industry it brought with it had also come to be questioned. 
The repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846, which signaled the rise of the free market and 
the decline of traditional land owners, undercut conditions for nearly one million 
agricultural laborers and sent them to urban areas (Hobsbawm, 1968, 93). In 1860 
the textile industry went into decline, leaving workers with neither jobs nor places 
to return. Liberal orthodoxy was blamed, as widespread poverty and social insta-
bility saw socialist and protectionist platforms emerge even in mainstream parties 
(Bédarida, 1990, 107).
Traditional family life declined with the mass urbanization of this period. 
Science and technology (hygiene, nutrition, birth control) brought a new sense of 
control to what had largely been considered traditional and unchanging patterns of 
life (Briggs, 1987, 287).
In this same period, public exhibitions (and contests among industries of various 
nations for technical prizes) focused attention on the link between science and in-
dustry (Saﬃn, 1973,194–195). The weak performance of British entries in the Great 
Exhibition of 1862 showed that others were getting ahead (Pollard, 1989, 116–117). 
By 1867, and again in 1870, British industrial dominance appeared to be in retreat, 
and concern with the education of the general population in science and technology 
emerged (Sanderson, 1995, 62). In this context, new challenges came to be seen less 
as hurdles to be overcome and more as none-too-subtle messages that something 
had gone fundamentally wrong.
The educational system
One of the few consistencies in the voluminous literature on British decline is the 
frequency with which blame is laid at the schoolhouse door. Schools were criticized 
as lacking in any science and technology (hereafter “S&T”) oﬀerings that would help 
Britain cope with its diﬃculties. Part of the reason for this was inertia. Education 
was private or church-sponsored, designed to cultivate good aristocrats, good 
Christians, and foster eﬀective social control. Classics dominated the curriculum. 
Schools ignored all elements of modern society including the English language it-
self, geography, mathematics, and science.
Debates of various sorts emerged over whether, and if so, how, the lack of sci-
ence education harmed the economy (McCloskey, 1970; Payne, 1990; Robbins, 
1990; Rubinstein, 1990; and especially Pollard, 1989). While traditional economic 
measures did not suggest a need for more science training (eg. wages were not ris-
ing in this area), Pollard (1989, 142) concludes that British business needed science 
to remain competitive, did not realize, ignored or even opposed the extension of 
relevant educational systems, and suﬀered as a result.
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Classical education was also said to be responsible for the gentrification of the 
business class. The purchase of country estates, and the cultivation of a dislike for 
the “dirty” job of industry, were part and parcel of the educational messages of the 
day (Wiener, 1981; Daunton, 1989; Taylor, 1996, 163). Education was also thought 
to be politically and culturally dangerous. It would make it more diﬃcult to keep 
people in their “proper place” both in the social order and on the shop floor (Safin, 
1973, 139; Pollard, 1989, 207; Sanderson, 1995, 12). It would necessitate the raising 
of taxes, and increase pressure on the franchise (Sanderson, 1999, 209).
The final criticism was that the educational system was disorganized. There were 
overlapping constituencies even among the rather minor educational duties under-
taken by the state (Pollard, 1989, 119, 145). Educational innovators were especially 
interested in touring German facilities until the war scare of 1859, after which all 
things German lost their cachet (Newsome, 1961, 237).
Unexpected maladaptive reform
What followed were a series of highly visible, highly popular, and prestigious 
Parliamentary Commissions on education at every level. Scientists created lobbies 
of both the general and the highly elite sort. All three of the major Parliamentary 
Commissions on secondary education that convened between 1858 and 1864 found 
S&T studies lacking and urged, sometimes demanded, their adoption. The lack of 
S&T was identified as “a great practical evil,” “wrong,” and there was popular support 
for the conclusion that “the neglect of the natural sciences is the most lamentable 
feature of the public school syllabus at this time” (Saﬃn, 1973, 239, 68). Later com-
missions reiterated calls for including science, lamented the slow pace of change, 
and urged that additional funds be spent (Pollard, 1989, 118–119, 245). Social com-
mentators expected a “revolution” in the educational system, but were surprised by 
the outcome (Mack, 1941, 103–104). Fears of British decline raised questions about 
the fundamental character of the nation. Newsome (1961, 3) argues that:
The cry had gone up for educational reform. Those who were in a position to carry out 
reform responded by looking to the past for their ideal. They strove to return to first 
principles, to original intentions; to fulfil what the founders had hoped for . . . .
Instead of adopting an educational system suitable for the modern competitive 
economy, they decided that “the past was to revivify the present” and noted that 
England’s strength rested in the timeless values of the countryside, even though that 
countryside no longer existed (Briggs, 1965, 381). These ideals included patriotism; 
Christianity; social hierarchy; defense of the empire; and character (Saﬃn, 1973, 
272; Bédarida, 1990, 80). The Bible and the Roman Empire were to be the models 
for the regeneration of the British spirit (Bédarida, 1990, 93).
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Fearing economic and political decline, looking to a mythological rural past, 
and seeking refuge behind the empire, the new educational paradigm was labeled 
“Muscular Christianity” and was built around service (Newsome, 1961, 235–237). 
Put less grandly, one prominent headmaster noted that such changes were explic-
itly designed to make students into “handy rifle skirmishers,” while another talked 
about his school as “a splendid institution for . . . turning out Army oﬃcer material” 
(Newsome, 1961, 198, 201–202). Another bragged that the changes meant the end 
of some of the few existing science programs (Newsome, 1961, 201–202). This is 
what emerged in the context of a debate about national character that was driven 
by perceptions of decline. These perceptions drove calls for resurgence, leading to 
a focus on the past and various myths retarding national character and the founda-
tions of national strength (Sanderson, 1995, 62).
The British are not alone in this backward looking mechanism for approach-
ing tomorrow’s problems with today’s policies embodying yesterday’s myths. Taylor 
(1996, 170) finds this same process, and this same outcome, in the decline of the 
Dutch. Thomson (1998, 80–96, 117–118, 187) uncovers much the same process in 
the cases of Byzantium, Venice, and Spain. The question for us is whether we might 
also find this in the United States?
The U.S. example
The British example establishes a strong link between fear of decline and over-com-
pensation that leads to self-defeating behavior. The U.S. example, while not yet fully 
reviewed, oﬀers some enticing evidence. Unlike Britain in the 19th century, with its 
relatively small size and unitary political structure, the United States diﬀuses power 
over educational standards quite broadly. Local, state, and national policies could be 
contradictory. As a result, fear of decline could express itself unequally across popu-
lations and regions. This more variegated response to socio-political and economic 
challenges is well illustrated in the United States of the early 1960s and again from 
the mid-1970s into the 1980s.
Religious faith is the most unique pillar of U.S. political culture. The earliest set-
tlers to the United States were fired by a sense of mission. From this perspective 
the United States is literally a “chosen nation” and was required to retain rigorous 
national standards to remain worthy of the role for which it was created (Murphy, 
2009, 10–12). According to a study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002), the 
United States was the only developed nation in which a majority reported that reli-
gion still played a “very important” role in their lives.
Religion is unique explicitly because it is so closely associated with the perceived 
global mission of the United States. Murphy (2009, 13) argues that:
At the grandest level, we find interpretations of American history that root themselves 
in myths of the nation’s origin and view its rise to world power as part of a divine bless-
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ing bestowed on the earliest settlers and national founders. This inheritance . . . shapes, 
or ought to shape the political decisions of subsequent generations.
Individual piety was aggregated and became social morality, which justified the 
great role the United States was to play. Loss of that moral stature would signal not 
just the rise of decadence but the loss of God’s favor, and therefore the end of the 
rationale and special mission of the United States. The term “God and Country” was 
no empty phrase, nor was the order arbitrary.
In his prophetic treatment of anti-intellectualism, Hofstadter (1963) notes the 
critical role that “mission” played in the vision of the population regarding the proj-
ect they were engaged in. In the religious communities that founded this country 
and animated its institutions and policies for three centuries, the argument was 
about which group would lay legitimate claim to the special God-given mission of 
the United States, not whether there was such a mission or whether we could aﬀord 
to take actions that threatened this special relationship. This conflict has animated 
several serious upheavals, as when the established (17th and 18th century Puritan) 
church was challenged by primitive preachers who lacked education but experi-
enced a “calling.” These “native” preachers were dismissive of the sterile narrative 
of religious life that was oﬀered by traditional clergy. Education in general was at-
tacked, and there were even revivalist book burnings (Hofstadter, 1963, 70). Though 
charismaticism declined at the end of the 19th century, it would return when indi-
viduals became concerned with the state of the nation. Reinhold Niebuhr (1927, 
2–3) argued that:
Extreme orthodoxy betrays by its very frenzy that the poison of skepticism has entered 
the soul of the church, for men insist most vehemently upon their certainties when their 
hold upon them has been shaken. Frantic orthodoxy is a method for obscuring doubt.
The moral purpose of the nation gave it the power to prevail. Lacking that purpose, 
or in the absence of that sense of mission, there was no point in even attempting to 
prevail.
The relationship between religion and perceptions of the strength, mission, and 
vitality, creates a fascinating dynamic. When actions contrary to God’s will appear 
to dominate the populace, there is concern that the decline in the moral fabric of the 
people will cascade and threaten not just the health of the country, but of the world 
as well. Alternatively, when people fear that the country is declining they search 
the community for evidence of “immoral” actions and fret for the future of both 
our country and the world. Murphy (2009, 101, 10) argues that “In the Christian 
Right jeremiad . . . the American experience is part of God’s unfolding plan for hu-
man history” and is designed to remind us that since the United States is a “chosen 
nation,” having “strayed from the path of rightly ordered politics and society” has 
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implications that “are not merely social and political but world-historical, even tran-
scendent, in nature.”
Sputnik and decline
One way to understand this process is to look at the challenge oﬀered by the launch 
of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, by the USSR in 1957. This caused a double-
edged crisis in the United States that had significant religions implications. First, the 
apparent superiority of the USSR caused a greater concern than earlier challenges 
posed by events like the partition of Berlin, Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb, or 
the victory of the Communist Chinese. These setbacks were surrounded by ques-
tions about internal subversives. Our leaders were blamed for not being suﬃciently 
vigilant. The perception was that these failures could have been successfully faced 
with strength and determination. But Sputnik was not something the USSR stole 
from the United States. Instead, it was an advance that the Soviet “system” had facili-
tated and that the U.S. “system” had failed to foresee, halt, or preempt. This gener-
ated the serious concern that we were declining in our ability to compete.
Sputnik initiated a whole-sale turn-around in perceptions of the need for science 
in oﬃcial circles (Hofstadter, 1963, 5). But popular perceptions focused instead on 
the more fundamental question of what had “gone wrong” with the United States, 
and how it must have strayed from the righteous path (Eve and Harrold, 1992). 
President Eisenhower did not consider Sputnik a serious threat, but he did believe 
that an increase in support for U.S. science and technology education was called for. 
His low-keyed public response included a series of educational reforms. The federal 
government, in the guise of the National Science Foundation (NSF), designed new 
curricula and sponsored new textbooks that emerged in the early 1960s. Chemistry 
and physics were unproblematic, but biology proved a mine-field. While the oﬃcial 
response to Sputnik was to enhance education, the popular response was to recon-
sider the fundamental roots of the U.S. character. The most important of these roots 
was religious faith, and the new biology curriculum was antithetical to the pious 
prescription for halting decline.
The push to modernize science in the wake of Sputnik was generally viewed 
by the government as a matter of national defense. Such initiatives were usually 
well supported, especially by conservatives. The textbooks that the NSF sponsored 
may have oﬀended those with traditional religious proclivities, but their reception 
among the broad range of conservatives, who had criticized the science curricu-
lum for most of the 1950s for its lack of rigor, was far more hostile than could have 
been predicted (Nelkin, 1982, 58). Religion emerged as not simply a pillar of politi-
cal culture, it was now viewed as the solution to the threat of decline that Sputnik 
illustrated. In a 1958 survey of school principals, the majority believed that science 
should receive additional coverage, but a stunning 80% believed that religion was 
the real solution (Larson, 2003, 91). Science was blamed for declining religious be-
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lief as well as for a bevy of social ills that generated decadence and national decay, 
while religion was identified as the way to address that threat by re-introducing a 
sense of moral purpose to our study of nature (Nelkin, 1982, 21, 58–59).
We also see church demography change during this period. The growth of evan-
gelical churches and strong religion was a palliative to increased social dislocation 
and helped fuel the arguments against the teaching of evolution (Denemark, 2010). 
“Textbook watchers,” who had been active since the 1920s, suddenly found ready 
audiences. In 1961 the first major “modern” anti-evolutionary “science” book, The 
Genesis Flood, was published to significant accolades and sales. By 1963 the drive 
to control the spread of evolutionary ideas for the sake of maintaining godliness 
and morality, the drive against the new NSF-generated science curriculum, and a 
renewed electoral focus on school boards, was well advanced. Anti-evolution leg-
islation, dormant since the 1920s, was again being introduced (Larson, 2003, 47). 
The issue was supercharged in 1962 when the United States was rocked by Supreme 
Court rulings that restricted school prayer. The issues were conflated, and drove a 
largely successful movement to capture school board seats and positions on com-
mittees charged with text-book selection. Publishers knew they had a better chance 
to acquire lucrative contracts if evolution was watered down or missing altogether 
from their texts (Scoog, 2005).
The dislocations of the 1970s
Between 1963 and about 1968, when a new series of anti-evolution laws adopted by 
states were struck down by the courts, the furor over evolution declined (Larson, 
2003, 148). Evolution was still connected to broader concerns regarding issues like 
school prayer, but had clearly taken a back seat. It is important to note that the peri-
od during which eﬀorts to remove evolutionary teaching from the schools was rich 
with new movements and ideas. The mid-1960s saw the rise of believers in extrater-
restrial visits, a fascination with extrasensory perception, eastern philosophy, free 
love, and the drug culture. But renewed concern for evolutionary teaching did not 
emerge until these movements were well past their primes, and it would arise in the 
absence of the introduction of new books or new rulings that directly threatened 
religious institutions. Once again, I contend, fear of decline was the central driver of 
concerns over the finding of viable educational system.
The decade of the 1970s began with the publication of Alvin Toﬄer’s best-selling 
Future Shock. The pace of change had increased to the point that it would be dif-
ficult for people to cope. This was true in every facet of life, and Toﬄer argued that 
it would generate a fundamental fear of the future. A set of diﬃcult-to-understand 
changes appeared, as if on cue, in the wake of that publication. The end of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system in 1971 was not generally understood by the public, but 
the economic upheaval (inflationary pressures, import taxes, price controls) were a 
certain sign of disquiet. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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(OAPEC) was founded by the most radical oil producing states, and U.S. involve-
ment in the 1973 Yom Kippur War saw the first cartel-generated fuel shortages. 
But nothing added more to the national sense of decline than the loss of the war 
against Vietnam. The United States negotiated a cease-fire after a decade of hostili-
ties and began to withdraw in 1973. Religious leaders touted the defeat in Vietnam 
as a warning from God (Murphy, 2009, 102).
Religious organizations of all sorts began to proliferate in response. Evangelical 
churches blossomed in the 1970s in fast-growing communities populated by the rel-
atively well educated and well oﬀ, like Orange County, California (Hinch, 2014, 4). 
Angry and newly assertive fundamentalists actually engaged in riots to force their 
religious concerns on unwelcoming agencies (Nelkin, 1982, 95). The United States 
elected its first expressly evangelical president, Jimmy Carter, though he proved a 
major disappointment in that his personal life was governed by religious doctrine, 
but his policies remained centrist in nature. In response, the more conservative 
Christian sects began to mobilize for political purposes in contradiction to much 
of their earlier teachings. Emblematic among them was the work of Richard Falwell, 
who sponsored a series of “I Love America” rallies in 1976 which evolved into “The 
Moral Majority.” Small religious schools saw their enrollments increase. Falwell’s 
Lynchburg Baptist College grow from meager enrollments at its founding in 1971 to 
new heights, and changed its name to Liberty Baptist College in 1976.
The anti-evolution movement adopted new strategies. “Creationism,” which was 
the term used to contrast the Biblical understanding of cosmology from the scien-
tific version, changed its name to “creation science” and altered its strategy to argue 
for “equal time” (Larson, 2003, 124). This tapped a large and popular vein among 
Americans, with half admitting to believe in the Biblical account of creation, and 
over 80% supporting the teaching of “both” perspectives (Larson, 2003, 130). A new 
series of political maneuvers threatened the autonomy of the NSF in an attempt to 
dissuade the organization from additional action on science curricula.
“Creation science” eventually proved unsuccessful. Courts generally accepted 
definitions of science that disenfranchised “special creation” as a relevant topic, so 
another shift took place in 1978 when “intelligent design” was adopted as the new 
term for creationism. This perspective criticized the “theory” that specialized or-
gans, like eyes, or special forms of life, like humans, could arise from an arbitrary 
process, and the alternative was the idea that some intelligence (unnamed so as to 
avoid obvious legal pitfalls) must be implicated in the process. New institutions and 
think-tanks gathered the faithful, sponsored the writing of books that reconsidered 
the idea of creation, charted legal strategies, reviewed textbooks, organized lobby 
eﬀorts, and sponsored events to mobilize relevant voters.
Further dislocations followed. In 1979 the U.S.-supported Shah of Iran was 
toppled and a radical Islamic republic took the U.S. diplomatic legation hostage. 
Stagflation gave way to inflation in the range of 20%. Fueled by fear and supported 
by a large and newly politicized religious right, Ronald Reagan defeated the incum-
 Pre-emptive Decline: The Weakening of Great Powers and Geopolitical Volatility 61
bent Carter and brought religious policies into the Administration. Fear of political 
and economic decline was now very expressly and popularly defined in terms of 
moral decay. The government was identified as unsalvageable and was to be hob-
bled. In 1985 Grover Norquist founded an anti-tax group, apparently at the behest 
of President Reagan, from which he launched his eﬀorts to “cut government in half 
in twenty-five years, to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bath-
tub.” States returned to court to support anti-evolution laws. Equal time bills were 
adopted, for example, in Louisiana, for the first time with support from voters and 
legislators in both rural and urban areas (Larson, 2003, 130–145). NSF curriculum 
programs were definitively shuttered (Nelkin, 1982, 124). Creationism was support-
ed by new federal justices appointed by the president (Larsen, 2003, 174).
In court testimony over the Arkansas case, Professor George Marsden (1982, 69), 
a religious historian who has been on the faculty at Calvin College, Duke Divinity 
School, and the University of Notre Dame, suggested that:
. . . after World War I there was a period much like the period today [1982] where there 
was a sense of general unease for the progress of American Civilization. There was a 
sense that something had gone wrong; a rather indefinite sense, not a real disaster, much 
like the 1980s, it seems to me. And in that context, that saying evolution is a problem 
was something that became convincing to a wide variety of people. So out of that World 
War I concern for the progress of civilization, evolution began to emerge as a symbol of 
the Fundamentalist fight against secularism.
This round of panic would dissipate at the end of the 1980s. Popular perceptions 
of decline began to subside. The scientific community mobilized, anti-evolutionary 
legal challenges were struck down, and the G.H.W. Bush administration was far less 
concerned with this issue. Most critically, the USSR self-destructed. Nonetheless, 
it would take years for arguments about the teaching of “intelligent design” to work 
their way through the courts. The most important case was not settled until 2005. In 
the interim, millions of dollars in legal costs would be wasted by school districts and 
states, and fear of attention and controversy had kept evolution out of textbooks 
and classrooms (Skoog, 2005). Anti-science sentiments, policies, and budgets, have 
returned with a vengeance in the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The 
winning campaign slogan reflected a desire for the resurrection of America.
Does it matter?
The question we must ask is whether it makes any diﬀerence that the anti-evolution 
movement has worked to keep scientific concepts, methods, and arguments out of 
the schools during specific periods? First, there is no small irony surrounding the 
fact that the first major post-World War II “fear of decline” was generated by a scien-
tific breakthrough by the USSR, and eﬀorts to redress the gap were undercut by the 
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conservative evangelical and fundamentalist religious groups that most feared and 
hated the Soviet Union. Writing in 1959, Admiral Hyman Rickover, credited with 
the creation of a nuclear powered navy, argued that “Our technical supremacy has 
been called into question” and urged parents to force schools to enhance the science 
curriculum. This was to no avail. Nelkin (1982, 39 for Rickover quote, 154) argues 
that the economic challenges of the early 1980s would also have benefitted from an 
enhanced science curriculum, and concludes that:
Ironically, the educational programs initially developed to promote scientific and tech-
nical competence have been eliminated just at a time when our national competence in 
the face of economic competition is once again in question.
In the British case there was a debate as to whether a lack of science education re-
ally had an impact on the British state and economy. The conclusion was that it did. 
This is all the more likely in the United States. Post World War II lead economic 
sectors were all founded upon scientific breakthroughs in areas like electronics and 
aerospace (Modelski and Thompson, 1996, 25). The science curriculum has long 
been a sore point in the history of U.S. education, in great part because the link 
between science and economic growth is clear. By the early 1990s more than 300 
reports were published in support of reforming science education (Bybee, 1995). 
While reports by the NSF or the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science might be criticized as self-interested, support for science, technology, and 
innovation were also found in the publications of the Brookings Institution (West, 
2011), the National Bureau of Economic Research (Basu et al., 2001), and the World 
Bank (Qiang, 2009). All conclude that real growth and real increases in productivity 
are generated primarily, if not solely, by science and technology.
Jelen and Lockett (2014, 2) argue that:
. . . the ongoing nature of the controversy [over the teaching of evolution] has occa-
sioned intense political conflict. . . and has had an important eﬀect on the delivery of 
science education at the middle school and secondary levels . . . .
They are speaking for a majority of scholars who consider this question. Anti-
evolutionary movements do more than retard the study of biology. First, they strip 
the populace of information necessary to understand public issues and make a range 
of decisions about their lives. The medical field has grown in size and sophistication, 
and questions about personal health choices, much less moral and ethical concerns, 
emerge that can only be dealt with by a scientifically literate population (Nisbet, 
2005). This is also true in the environmental area, where the regulation of certain 
substances is based on scientific understandings of human and reproductive health 
(Brewer and Ley, 2013; 2014). Second, and more fundamentally, attacks of this sort 
work to delegitimize the entire corpus of science as a field that is inherently con-
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trary to the appropriate authority of God. This conflict becomes less an argument 
over content, or even the implications of content, and more an argument about 
the epistemological tension that arises when science and faith seek authority over 
knowledge and cosmology (Gauchat, 2014, 338). The result tends to be a reduction 
not just in knowledge about, but in perceptions of the relevance of, legitimacy of, or 
support for, science in society as a whole.
Scholars are finding that support for science is eroding among select popula-
tions due to faith-based attacks. Those who self-identify as “conservatives” had the 
highest levels of trust in science (relative to “moderates” or “liberals”) in 1974 and 
now have the lowest levels of trust. Areas where religion and faith overlap are more 
and more subject to a popular environment in which lack of understanding of sci-
ence makes it easy to degrade support. Public understanding of science has always 
been and remains quite low (Miller, 2004), leaving science vulnerable to attacks 
that substitute easy-to-understand polemics for diﬃcult-to-understand technical 
arguments. As the range of issues that evangelicals care about extends, the range 
of issues over which scientific evidence will be trusted will tend to shrink. Finally, 
neo-liberal attacks on science have taken a new direction in arguments that gov-
ernment funding should avoid universities and research institutions and go directly 
to corporations who will “put the knowledge to use” in a more immediate manner 
(Gauchat, 2012, 183). The narrowing of science that would inevitably occur under 
such a situation is a serious threat. Pre-emptive decline has implications for the way 
in which we consider geopolitical struggle, and for understanding the types of poli-
cies and pathologies we should expect from great powers during certain portions of 
their life-cycles.
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Political Economy of Secession: Global Waves of 
State-Seeking Nationalism, 1492 to Present
Sahan S. Karatasli
Through an empirical analysis of nationalist movements of the world from 1492 to 
2013, this chapter argues that state-seeking nationalism has been characterized by a 
cyclical pattern in core and semi-peripheral regions of the capitalist world economy. 
Due to uneven development of capitalism, this pattern is very diﬀerent from the pat-
terning of peripheral decolonization. In core and semi-peripheral regions of the world-
economy, state-seeking nationalist movements tend to rise during “contentious con-
junctures” periods of historical capitalism—which are characterized by simultaneous 
and prolonged crises in social, economic and geopolitical spheres—and decline during 
material expansion and world-hegemony periods. Empirical analysis presented in the 
chapter shows that financial expansion processes produce contentious conjunctures 
and hence contribute to the emergence of global waves of nationalism. After present-
ing the empirical pattern in the light of statistical and comparative-historical evidence, 
the chapter examines diﬀerent phases of contentious conjunctures and discusses three 
major mechanisms that produce global waves of state-seeking nationalism.
Introduction
On October 1, 2017, more than two million Catalans demanded an independent re-
public in a referendum which had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court 
of Spain. Independence side won receiving 92 percent of the votes. Consequently, 
on October 27, the Parliament of Catalonia declared unilateral independence from 
Spain. As a response, the Spanish government took unprecedented measures to 
avoid Catalan independence and assumed direct control over some of Catalonia’s 
autonomous powers.
Catalan referendum was not the only bid for independence that recently took 
place. It occurred almost simultaneously with the non-binding independence ref-
erendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, where 93 percent of the voters demanded indepen-
dence. The Catalan and the Kurdish eﬀorts for independence also took place during 
heightened debates regarding a second independence referendum for Scotland. In 
the previous 2014 referendum, Scottish pro-independence vote had increased to 
a historic 45 percent but failed to achieve the necessary majority. At the time, the 
main dilemma many Scottish voters faced was that if they gained their indepen-
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dence, they would be unable to stay in the European Union. Now, the tables have 
turned. During the 2016 “Brexit” vote, 62 percent of the Scots—as well as 56 per-
cent of the Northern Irish population— voted to stay in the European Union while 
England and Wales decided to leave. Within hours of the closing of the polls, many 
pro-independence parties and groups in Scotland and Northern Ireland—first and 
foremost the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Sinn Fein—raised the possibility of 
independence referenda under these radically new conditions.
Far from being isolated incidents, these events are all interlinked parts of radical 
changes we have been observing in the geopolitical landscape of the world since the 
turn of the 21st century. In recent years, we have been witnessing a global resurgence 
of nationalism by communities belonging to existing states (i.e. state-led national-
ism) as well as nationalist tendencies by stateless communities aiming to produce 
new independent states (i.e. state-seeking nationalism). Although these two ten-
dencies are closely linked to each other, the primary focus of this chapter is the lat-
ter tendency: the curious and unexpected resurgence of state-seeking nationalist 
movements around the world.
In contrast to perspectives claiming that the importance of nation-states would 
decline and secessionist nationalism and other kinds of state-formation attempts 
would gradually move to the dustbin of history due to forces of globalization, a wide 
spectrum of state-seeking movements are rapidly resurfacing around the world in 
synchrony with rising economic, geopolitical and social crises. A brief look at some 
of the major political events in recent years will suﬃce to illustrate that movements 
aiming to establish new states are far from being over. In Ukraine, for instance, the 
2014 Euromaidan Revolution and the following Russian military intervention led 
to a series of state-seeking movements in Crimea and the Donbass region. Crimea’s 
declaration of independence and its immediate request to become a part of Russia 
was interpreted as an act of annexation by Russia, the first in Europe since the end 
of the World War II. In the aftermath of this crisis, pro-Russian secessionist forces 
in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine also followed the Crimean model, 
proclaimed their republics and held referenda seeking legitimacy in May 2014.
Likewise, during the chaos of the Syrian internationalized civil war, the self-
proclaimed “Islamic State” in the Middle East declared the restoration of the ca-
liphate in 2014, which had been abolished since 1924. After the declaration, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) aﬃrmed its territorial claims in Libya, Egypt, 
Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and continued to dismantle the geopolitical ar-
chitecture of the Middle East created by the Sykes-Picot agreement. In the course 
of the Syrian civil war, Kurdish militia forces in Syria also gained the control of the 
Rojava region, proclaimed their self-rule, gained the de facto autonomy of the Afrin, 
Jazira and Kobané cantons, and declared an interim constitution in January 2014. It 
was partly these actions by ISIL on the one hand and Kurds in Rojava on the other 
hand that pushed Masoud Barzani to organize the 2017 independence referendum 
in Iraqi Kurdistan. Rival Kurdish political groups in the Middle East believe that the 
 Political Economy of Secession: Global Waves of State-Seeking Nationalism, 1492 to Present 71
Middle East region has entered a new phase, which produce various opportunities 
for Kurds to determine their future status.
Western and Southern Europe is not immune from the rising tide of secessionist 
nationalism either. In addition to the Catalans in Spain, centrifugal secessionist ten-
dencies can also be found in Flemish and Walloon movements in Belgium, Basques 
in Spain, Corsicans in France, Venetians (and Lega Nord) in Italy, the Northern Irish 
and even the Welsh—despite their “Brexit” vote—in the United Kingdom.
If we turn our gaze to rest of the world, we can also count the Quebecois in Canada, 
the Uyghur and the Tibetan nationalist movements in China, the Palestinians in the 
Middle East, the South Yemeni movement in Yemen, the Pashtun and the Baluch 
movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Tuaregs in Mali, the Saharawi move-
ment in Western Sahara, the Somaliland and the Puntland movements in Somalia, 
the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians in Georgia, the Aceh and West Papuans 
in Indonesia and various other secessionist movements in Congo and Nigeria. 
Needless to say, this is a highly heterogeneous and still a partial list of existing state-
seeking movements in the 21st century. While it is diﬃcult to estimate with certain 
precision how many active state-seeking movements are there in the world in the 
21st century, even according to conservative measures, there are more than a hun-
dred movements as seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1 illustrates that there are still considerable number of movements around 
the world struggling for independence. Yet, it does not help us assess whether inten-
sity of these movements have been increasing or decreasing. If there is an increase 
in the frequency of state-seeking movements, we also need to answer, why we see 
such resurgence. To answer these questions, this chapter examines the temporal 
patterning of state-seeking movements in the world from late 16th century to pres-
ent, and introduces a world-historical explanation to the resurgence of state-seek-
ing movements in the early 21st century. I put forward three related arguments.
First, I argue that we have been experiencing a major resurgence in the frequen-
cy of state-seeking movements in the world. Unlike widely assumed, however, these 
movements are neither reactions against globalization nor products of enduring 
primordial ethnic or national identities. They are consequences of the deepening 
of a multiplicity of interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres, 
which reduce states’ capacity to maintain their hegemony over their subjects/citi-
zens and to keep existing secessionist tensions under control and provide various 
structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization.
Second, the resurgence of state-seeking movements around the world in the 
21st century is a continuation of a rising tide of secessionism that started in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, when the U.S.-centered capitalist world-economy and 
the inter-state system entered into a period of instability and crisis (Arrighi, 1994; 
Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Wallerstein, 2000). This vicious cycle produced the sur-
prising revival of nationalist movements in the advanced, industrialized, developed 
regions of the “West” in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and came to a peak with 
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the dissolution of the USSR in the 1988–1992 period. It may be diﬃcult to establish 
the immediate links between the revival of nationalism in the “West” in the 1960s 
and the 1970s and the contemporary rise of state-seeking nationalism in the 21st 
century because this period was interrupted (and intermediated) by the U.S.-led 
financial expansion and globalization process. Instead of solving the multiplicity of 
crisis in economic, geopolitical and social spheres, however, the U.S.-led financial 
expansion and globalization process started to produce much deeper crises in these 
spheres in the early 21st century. This ongoing vicious cycle has been manifesting 
itself as an intensification of an interlinked chain of economic crises, geopolitical 
conflicts and social revolts and revolutions on a global scale. The escalation of these 











Source: Author’s calculation from Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations (Minahan, 2002), Encyclopedia of Modern 
Separatist Movements (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000) and digitized news reports provided by LexisNexis and 
Proquest newspaper archives (also see Karatasli et al., 2012)..
Notes: Each of the encyclopedias includes around 350 active state-seeking nationalist movements in the 
world. Figure 1 shows state-seeking nationalist movements that are common in both of these encyclopedias 
as well as the international press. The figure eliminates movements if their claim or activities for indepen-
dence are not visible in the international press since 2000. Size of circles reflects relative size of populations of 
these stateless nations (as of 2002). White circles show movements which already gained their independence 
after 2000.
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contentious processes has not only been reducing states’ capacity to contain seces-
sionist conflicts through eﬀective use of coercion and consent but has also been 
producing various unusual structural opportunities for state-seeking mobilization 
on a world scale.
Third, I maintain that this is not the first time that we see such a multiplicity of 
interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social spheres—intermediated by 
financial expansion processes—producing a global wave of secessionism. On the 
contrary, from the mid-15th century to present, emergence of prolonged periods of 
interlinked crises in these spheres—which I call as “contentious conjunctures”—has 
been an integral part of the evolution of historical capitalism and the inter-state 
system. Every financial expansion period of historical capitalism (Arrighi, 1994) has 
produced “contentious conjunctures” and led to the emergence of a global wave of 
state-seeking movements within the boundaries of the capitalist world-economy, 
especially in core and semi-peripheral regions. Pendulum-like movement of global 
political economy, swinging back and forth between material expansion (of trade 
and production) and financial expansion periods has produced successive cycles of 
state-seeking movements in the longue durée, especially in core and semiperipheral 
regions.
The method: A longue durée analysis of state-seeking 
movements
In order to understand the present and near future of state-seeking nationalism 
in the 21st century, we need to overcome two major biases prevalent in the litera-
ture. The first bias is related to the use of relatively short time horizon for analyzing 
the historical trajectory of movements and making generalizations about the near 
future (Silver and Karatasli, 2015). From 1945 to late the 1990s, for instance, the 
widely shared expectation regarding the demise of state-seeking nationalist move-
ments around the world was partly based on extrapolations from short-term trends. 
Of course, when compared with level of state-seeking movements in and around 
World War I—which was the greatest wave of state-seeking nationalism the world 
has seen until that time—nationalism seemed to come to an end in the post-World 
War II era, especially in advanced, industrialized Western regions. This expectation 
was repeatedly declared by scholars of international relations (Carr, 1945), political 
scientists (Deutsch, 1953) or historians of nationalism (Shafer, 1955; Kohn, 1956). 
Hence revival of nationalism in Western regions (advanced, industrialized) of the 
world (e.g. the Northern Irish and the Scottish movements in the United Kingdom, 
the Quebecois movement in Canada or the Basque movement in Spain) in the late 
1960s and early 1970s came as a major surprise and was perceived as an anomalous 
trend.
Indeed, the massive wave of decolonization of the 1945–1970 era was also 
among such surprises. The elimination of imperial administrations in the colonial 
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world by movements of national liberation was an inconceivable situation in the 
early 1940s (Hobsbawm, 1992, 169). Later on, however, it became commonplace 
for social and political scientists to describe it as an inevitable trend. Likewise, even 
in the mid-1980s, no one expected the dissolution of the USSR. On the contrary, 
most social scientists and scholars of nationalism perceived the disintegration of 
the USSR almost as an “impossible” event (Beissinger, 2002). Many overoptimistic 
expectations regarding the decline of nationalism in the West and the stability of 
existing modern state structures were often reinforced by empirical analysis with a 
relatively short-term temporal frame.
Longer historical perspectives help overcome this myopic bias by revealing mac-
ro-structural processes that link social and political movements in space and time. 
A good example is Bergesen and Schoenberg’s (1980) classic study of long waves of 
colonization and decolonization. Using a dataset they compiled from Henige’s cata-
log of colonial governments from 1415 to 1969, Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) 
analyzed colonization and decolonization processes in the entire history of the 
world-system. This long historical study not only helped social scientists observe 
successive waves of colonization and decolonization but also started a major discus-
sion about structural dynamics that produced these patterns (see Bergesen, 1985). 
The emerging debate made a major contribution to structural dynamics of coloniza-
tion and decolonization. From this scholarship, we learned that during world hege-
monic crisis, inter-great power rivalry increases, economic competition turns into 
political competition, inter-state system becomes very unstable and interactions 
between these processes produce a race for colonization. During periods of world 
hegemonies, however, inter-great power rivalry pacifies, need for direct colonial 
rule decreases and these processes help produce a major wave of decolonization 
(see Figure 2). These long historical studies also revealed very interesting similarities 
between waves of decolonization of Latin America in the early 19th century during 
the British world hegemony and decolonization of Asia and Africa in the mid-20th 
century during the U.S. world hegemony, despite the obvious diﬀerences between 
these two distinct forms of decolonization movements.
This brings us to the second bias: making generalizations from a limited num-
ber of cases, from selected economic or geographic regions, or from specific forms 
of movements. Of course, compared to the 1970s and 1980s, today, more scholars 
recognize that to be able to make generalizations about temporal-spatial patterns of 
movements, you need to examine all relevant cases as an interlinked totality. What 
is still less widely understood, however, is that diﬀerent movements—interlinked 
to each other in space-time through structural processes—might be aﬀected by the 
same macro-processes in very diﬀerent ways. The temporal patterning of nationalist 
movements in peripheral regions of the world economy for instance does not have 
to be in synchrony with nationalist movements in core regions. In a major study on 
waves of nationalism and nation-state formation in the world from 1815 to 2001, 
for instance, Wimmer (2013) tests Strang’s theory of decolonization, which builds 
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upon the original Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) study and links waves of de-
colonization to Wallerstein’s (1974) world hegemonic cycles. Wimmer (2013) finds 
no robust quantitative evidence supporting the theory. Does this mean that world-
hegemonic cycles or macro-structural economic and geopolitical processes do not 
have an eﬀect on the temporal patterning of state-seeking movements as a whole? 
Before we reach this conclusion, however, we need to take into consideration an 
alternative explanation: same world-hegemonic cycles might aﬀect state-seeking 
movements in core and peripheral regions in diﬀerent ways.
Because of uneven development of capitalism and the inter-state system, not all 
regions of the world are aﬀected from these world-hegemonic cycles in the same 
way. In each phase of the cycle, there is a major unevenness in states’ capacity to 
contain state-seeking movements through coercion and consent based on their 
geo-economic locations. This ability to coercion and consent to contain national-
ism is closely linked to what Deborah Yashar (2005, 6) calls as the “reach of the state,” 
understood in terms of the “state’s actual penetration throughout the country and 
its capacity to govern society.” While this capacity is never absolute in any state, its 






























Notes: Five year aggregates for successful decolonization activities are shown. Post-1970 instances of decolo-
nization are updated at http://www.irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/socchange/data/colanddecol.xls, last re-
trieved August 31, 2015.
Source: Data from Henige (1970). See Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) for the original study on long waves 
of colonialism and decolonization using Henige’s (1970) data.
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degree is not independent from states’ position in the world-economy and inter-
state system hierarchy. While this capacity is much higher in states that politically 
and economically benefit from material expansion of trade and production during 
world hegemonies (such as “developed,” “core” states of capitalist world-economy), 
it is much lower in the “underdeveloped” peripheral regions, including many de-
pendent territories, colonies and post-colonial states. Because political-economic 
development of core regions is organically linked to the underdevelopment of these 
“peripheral” regions, during world hegemonies, while people residing in core re-
gions might benefit from economic growth and prosperity, people residing in pe-
ripheral regions do not. This has diﬀerent eﬀects on states’ capacity to contain na-
tionalism during world hegemonies. This capacity is stronger in core regions but 
much weaker in peripheral regions.
Similar relational processes can be observed in the uneven patterning of war and 
peace relationships. As I will elaborate in following sections, periods of wars and pro-
longed conflicts also reduce states’ capacity to eﬀective govern their subjects and to 
contain state-seeking movements, while periods of peace and stability increase this 
capacity. Yet international peace has never been distributed evenly across the world. 
To give one example, when social scientists use generalizations like “Hundred Years’ 
Peace” (of the 1815–1914 era), which Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944], 5) sees as a “phe-
nomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization,” they often ignore the 
fact that this “peace” was not global. Every time that peace was established among 
great powers in the global North (after the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648, the Peace of Vienna in 1815 and the establishment of the United 
Nations in 1945), the global South turned into an arena of warfare and conquest. 
These sorts of diﬀerent, yet relational, processes inevitably had a major impact on 
the uneven geographical patterning of social revolts and revolutions as well as state-
seeking mobilization on a global scale.
This tendency towards uneven geographical patterning of state-seeking nation-
alism is further amplified by geopolitical interests of emerging world hegemonic 
powers. Establishment of world hegemonies—such as the Dutch world hegemony, 
the British world hegemony and the U.S. world hegemony—play a key role in the 
demise of vicious cycles of interlinked crises in economic, geopolitical and social 
spheres by stabilizing international order. Hence during world hegemonies, state-
seeking nationalism in core and semiperipheral regions start to decrease. In the 
course of their escalation to global political and economic preeminence, however, 
new world-hegemons have also been interested in liquidating the colonial and ter-
ritorial possessions of former world-hegemons and/or rival great powers (Karatasli 
and Kumral, 2017). In this pursuit, they have used two strategies: direct military 
conquests and supporting the subject polities of these rival great powers in inde-
pendence. From one world hegemony to another, however, the role played by direct 
military conquests tended to decrease and the role played by supporting indepen-
dence movements tended to increase. For instance, the British support for Latin 
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American independence movements in the 19th century was much higher than the 
Dutch in the 16th century; and the U.S. support for decolonization (in rivalry with 
the USSR) in the mid-20th century was much higher than the British. That’s why 
from one world hegemony to another, decolonization movements tended to in-
crease in synchrony with the establishment of new world hegemonies, as identified 
by Bergesen and Schoenberg’s (1980) study (see Figure 2).
The pattern: Global waves of state-seeking movements, 
1492 to present
To be able to assess the trajectory of state-seeking nationalism in the 21st century, 
then, we need to expand the geographical and temporal scope of the analysis more 
than conventionally done; and pay attention to diﬀerential consequences of macro-
structural processes. In order to analyze state-seeking nationalism in the longue 
durée without being anachronistic, we also need to introduce a more general and 
broader conceptualization of state-seeking nationalism. For this purpose, in my re-
search, I compiled a new major database—State-Seeking Nationalist Movements 
(SSNM) database—which helps observe a wide spectrum of state-seeking move-
ments from 1492 to 2013 (Karatasli, 2013). In the construction of the SSNM data-
base, I defined state-seeking movements as socio-political movements of stateless 
communities that seek to establish an independent state and to become a member 
of an inter-state system. This definition has its roots in Charles Tilly’s definition of 
state-seeking nationalism, which occurs when “some population that currently did 
not have collective control of a state claim . . . an autonomous political status, or 
even a separate state” (Tilly, 1994, 133). This definition also builds upon Weber’s 
(1946, 172) definition of nation as “a community of sentiment which would ade-
quately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence, [as] a community which normally 
tends to produce a state of its own.” According to this definition, what characterizes 
a nation is not a set of objective criteria such as language, ethnicity, religion, or com-
mon myths of origins but the collective demand for an independent state. State-
seeking nationalism aims to make the “political (governance) unit” and “national 
unit” congruent (Gellner, 1983; Hechter, 2001) by acts of secession, irrespective of 
competing foci of aﬃliation such as language, ethnicity, race, religion or common 
myths of origins.
Building upon this definition, for the 1815–2013 period, the SSNM dataset uses 
news reports about state-seeking movements from digitized newspaper archives of 
the Guardian / Observer and New York Times (Karatasli, 2013). In contrast to data-
sets which only focus only on successive nation-state formation attempts or only on 
nationalist armed conflicts, the SSNM dataset includes a wide spectrum of action 
repertoires—which includes peaceful rallies and demonstrations for independence, 
independence referenda, violent uprisings, armed conflicts, unrecognized decla-
rations of independence—by any geographically concentrated community which 
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demands an independent state for their own. For earlier periods, I compiled anoth-
er dataset which includes a list of revolutionary situations and conflicts involving 
state-seeking movements from 1492 to 1830 in regions of the world that have been 
incorporated into the capitalist world-economy.1
Using the SSNM database, Figure 3 and 4 documents historical trajectory of 
state-seeking movements within the boundaries of the capitalist world Economy. 
Figure 3 focuses on the 1492–1830 period and shows the frequency of state-seek-
ing movements in regions where historical capitalism expanded until that point: 
Western Europe, North America, Latin America and Eastern Europe. As Figure 3 
shows, there are major cycles of state-seeking movements within the boundaries of 
the capitalist world-economy which broadly overlap with contentious conjunctures 
of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle (1560–1648) and the Dutch systemic cycle 
(1760–1815).
First of these contentious conjunctures—mediated by Genoese-led financial-
ization—coincided with the escalation of state-seeking movements concentrated 
in Europe including the Dutch War of Independence (1568–1648), the revolt of 
Moriscos (1568), the Aragon rebellion (1591), the Catalan uprising (1640–1659), re-
bellions in Wallachia and Moldovia (1594–1598), the Portuguese War for indepen-
dence (1640–1668), the secessionist plot in Andalusia (1641), revolutions in Naples 
(1647) and Sicily (1647), and various Protestant revolts in Western Europe and 
Central Europe (e.g. in Hungary in 1605–1606) which aimed create new “national” 
states.2 In this cycle, Dutch and Portuguese revolts became successful in establishing 
new states, and the Old Swiss Confederacy (Republica Helvetiorum) gained recogni-
tion, hence de jure independence. Although Catalonia proclaimed Catalan Republic 
in 1641 and revolt in Naples led to the establishment of Neapolitan Republic in 
1647, these republics were soon suppressed. All other movements failed.
The second contentious conjuncture period was the 1760–1815 era—medi-
ated by Dutch-led financial expansion—which overlapped with a major wave of 
secessionist movements on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the successful re-
volt of the Thirteen Colonies against the British Empire (aka the American War 
of Independence 1775–1783) is the most well-known anti-colonial struggle of the 
period, it was not the only one. There was a larger wave of state-seeking revolts by 
1 It was Charles Tilly who first used a dataset of “revolutionary situations” to analyze histori-
cal development of nationalism in Europe from 1492 to 1992 (Tilly, 1994). The revolutionary 
situations dataset of the SSNM database expands Tilly’s data in space—by including involve all 
non-European locations that have been incorporated into the capitalist world-economy between 
1492 and 1815—and in time by going back to 1492. In identifying regions already incorporated 
into the capitalist world-economy, I relied on the findings of Incorporation Research Working 
Group of Fernand Braudel Center at State University of New York, Binghamton (Hopkins et al., 
1987; also see Karatasli, 2017).
2 There are also religious movements (e.g. French Wars of Religion in 1585–1598) and conflicts 
in the British Isles (such as the Irish Revolt of 1641) with weak/unclear secessionist demands.
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indigenous and creole populations against Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the 
South. In Central and South America, the Mayan Indian’s revolt in Yucatan in 1761 
(which proclaimed the independence of Yucatan from Spain) under Jacinto Canek, 
the Quito insurrection of Guatemala against Spain of 1765, the Guanajuanto re-
volt in 1767, the new Granada revolt in 1774, the Tupac Amaru II Rebellion (1780–
1781), and the independence movement of the captaincy of Minas Gerais from the 
Kingdom of Portugal (1788–1789) were among the other movements which de-
manded an independent state of their own in the American colonies in this wave.
It must also be noted that movements that led to the first great wave of decolo-
nization in the first half of the 19th century also originated during this contentious 
conjuncture. Furthermore, the independence movement of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) 
against the French Republic—which achieved its victory in 1801 and became the 
first successful slave revolt to create a state for its own—also belongs to this period. 
The Haitian revolution became a model and a major source of inspiration for vari-
ous state-seeking slave revolts in the Americas. Europe was not immune to these 
developments either. The Corsica rebellion of 1768–1769 against French invasion 
was among the first upheavals. The United Irishmen revolted repeatedly against 
the British rule in 1798, 1800 and 1803 but they failed to establish an independent 
state of their own. The Brabantian Revolution—temporarily creating the short-lived 
United Belgian states in 1790—and emerging revolts in Hungary and northern Italy 
started to challenge the rule of Joseph II of Austria. Furthermore in Eastern Europe 

















Notes: Left scale: number of revolutionary situations involving state-seeking movements.
Source: SSNM Database (Karatasli, 2013).
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first centrifugal tendencies against the Ottoman Empire in its European territories 
(e.g. Greek, Cretan, Serbian and Bulgarian revolts) and the 1794–1795 Polish rebel-
lion against Russia took place in this period.
Figure 4 turns our gaze to the last two centuries and illustrates the increasing 
complexity of spatial-temporal patterning of state-seeking movements from 1815 
to 2013. The trajectory of state-seeking movements in this period has recurrent as-
pects of the earlier era as well as some novel features. One of the recurrent features 
is that two contentious conjunctures of this era also coincide with two major cycles 
of state-seeking mobilization. One of the novel features is that the intensity of state-
seeking movements during material expansion periods (and world-hegemonies) is 
much higher than former periods. As Figure 4 shows, in addition to the sporadic 
revolts in concentrating in Western regions, Eastern Europe and Latin America in 
1830, 1848 and 1860s during the British material expansion and world-hegemony, 
there is a major cycle of state-seeking movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, North Africa and the Middle East during the U.S. material expansion concen-
trating on the peripheral colonies in the 1960s. An important feature of the global 
wave of state-seeking movements of the 1960s is the extremely low level of mobi-
lization in Western and Eastern European territories, which constitute the major 
portion of the global waves of the 1890–1933 period as well as 1973–present. We 






















Notes: Left scale: frequency of news reports on state-seeking movements, The Guardian/Observer, inversely 
weighted by average number of pages newspapers have each year.
Source: SSNM Database (Karatasli, 2013).
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explained why we must expect peripheral-colonial regions of the capitalist world-
economy to have a diﬀerent temporal patterning than non-colonial core and semi-
peripheral regions above. If we leave this massive wave of decolonization that took 
place primarily in peripheral colonies temporarily aside, we can see that the two 
other major cycles of state-seeking movements coincide with two financial expan-
sion periods.
The first contentious conjuncture period of this era is the 1873–1929/45 period, 
mediated by British-led financialization—which coincided with the strongest wave 
of state-seeking nationalism in world history until that point. This major wave of 
nationalism, interlinked with wars, social revolutions and imperialist conquests, 
dissolved almost all existing formal empires including the Ottoman Empire, the 
Austrian-Hungarian empire, and—albeit temporarily—the Russian Empire and 
even large territories in China under the Qing dynasty. From 1876 to 1915, alone, as 
Lieven puts it, one quarter of the world’s surface changed hands. Eruption of the two 
world-wars brought this transformation to a much higher level. From the beginning 
of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, 33 new states joined the 
modern inter-state system and 45 other nations declared their independence and 
proclaimed states for themselves but were not recognized (Minahan, 2002, 2121–
2125). In Europe and the Middle East, for instance, the Republic of Flanders (1917), 
the Republic of Abkhazia (1918 and 1920), the Rhineland Republic (1919 and 1923), 
the Democratic and Socialist Republic of Bavaria (1918), the Euzkadi Republic 
(1931), the Catalan Republic (1931 and 1934), the Alawite Republic of Latakia 
(1939) and the Kingdom of Montenegro (1941) declared their independence but 
they were not recognized.3 There was a longer list of nationalist movements—such 
as the Kurds in the Middle East—who struggled for their independence in this con-
tentious conjuncture but failed to gain it.
The second contentious conjuncture of this period is the one we are still living 
in today. The vicious cycle started with the signal crisis of the U.S. world hegemony 
in the 1968/73 period, led to the financialization of world economy in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s, and has started to link political-economic crisis with geopolitical cri-
sis since the turn of the 21st century. This most recent contentious conjuncture also 
coincided with a series of state-seeking mobilization on a world scale. This emer-
gent wave of state-seeking movements started in the late 1960s and the 1970s in 
Western Europe (e.g. the Scottish and Welsh movements in the United Kingdom, 
3 We can also count the Finnish Socialist Workers’ Republic (1918), the Slovak Soviet Republic 
(1919), and the Serbian-Hungarian Baranya-Baja Republic (1921) which were set up by the com-
munist revolutions but were suppressed; the Idel-Ural State (1917–1918), the Belarusian People’s 
Republic (1918), the Hutsul Republic (1919) and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917–1920) 
which were set up by anti-Bolshevik forces and eventually suppressed by Red Army and the 
Bolsheviks during the Civil War; the Komancza Republic (1918–1919), the Banat Republic (1918) 
and the Republic of Prekmurje (1919) among these unrecognized declarations of independence.
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the Catalan and Basque movements in Spain, the Flemish and Walloon movements 
in Belgium, Brittany and Occitanie in France, and the Quebecois movement in 
Canada); it came to a peak in the 1990s with the dissolution of the USSR and the 
Eastern bloc countries and rising secessionist movements around the world. After 
a short-term decline during the U.S.-led financial globalization era, state-seeking 
movements started to rise again, especially in Western regions since the turn of 
the century. This period is still unfolding in front of our eyes and producing the 
rapid intensification of state-seeking movements around the world, from Scotland 
to Eastern Ukraine, from Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria, to Catalonia.
Empirical evidence: Systemic cycles of accumulation and 
state-seeking nationalism in the West
When we conpare the patterns of decolonization and patterns of state-seeking na-
tionalism as a whole, we will that the dynamics of state-seeking nationalism in co-
lonial and peripheral regions of the world-economy are diﬀerent from those of the 
non-colonial core and semiperipheral countries. In contrast to colonial peripheral 
regions, frequency of state-seeking movements seem to increase not during ma-
terial expansion and world hegemony periods but during financial expansion and 
world hegemonic crisis periods.
In order to more directly examine whether or not levels of state-seeking move-
ments were significantly greater in number during periods of financial expansion/
world-hegemonic transition than periods of material expansion/world-hegemonic 
consolidation, Figure 5 and Table 1 compare levels of state-seeking movements in 
core and semiperipheral regions during each phase of Genoese-Iberian, Dutch, 
British and U.S. systemic cycles.
Figure 5 illustrates boxplots showing the distribution of state-seeking move-
ments in each period using the same data. In the boxplots, I also located the po-
sitions of both mean and median, to illustate changes in the distribution across 
historical phases of capitalism. Comparison of these boxplots reveals that state-
seeking movements during financial expansion/world-hegemonic crisis periods 
have higher dispersion, higher means and higher medians than material expansion/
world-hegemonic consolidation periods. As evident in Figure 5, the only exception 
is state-seeking movements in Western Europe during the Dutch systemic cycle. 
This “anomaly” is partly related to the fact that state-seeking movements during 
the crisis of Dutch world-hegemony mostly concentrated in the Americas (e.g. 
American War of Independence, Latin American decolonization movements and 
other nationalist creole uprisings, Haitian war of independence), whereas on the 
European side of the Atlantic, social-political unrest mostly took the form of social 
revolts and revolutions (e.g. French revolution).
Table 1 extends this analysis and presents the results of one-way ANOVA, fol-
lowed by Bonferroni post-hoc test of diﬀerence, and their non-parametric alter-
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Table 1: Comparison of frequency of state-seeking movements by phases of 
historical capitalism
Genoese Genoese Dutch Genoese Genoese Dutch
M-C-M’ M-M’ M-C-M’ M-C-M’ M-M’ M-C-M’
Genoese M-M’ (a) 1.803*** (a) 1.594***
(b) 9.233*** (b) 9.319***
Dutch M-C-M’ (a) 0.666** (a) −1.136*** (a) 0.637*** (a) −0.957***
(b) 4.838*** (b) −6.830*** (b) 5.149*** (b) −6.566***
Dutch M-M’ (a) 1.504*** (a) −0.298 (a) 0.837*** (a) 0.442** (a) −1.152*** (a) −0.19
(b) 7.022*** (b) −1.070 (b) 4.397*** (b) 2.824** (b) −6.446*** (b) −1.815
Oneway ANOVA: F(3, 319)=36.49, p<0.001 Oneway ANOVA: F(3, 319)=46.36, p<0.001
Kruskal-Wallis: X2(3)=101.081, p<0.001 Kruskal-Wallis: X2(3)=107.483, p<0.001
British British US British British US








U.S. M-C-M’ 5.977 −19.263** 5.35 −8.91*
7.44 −19.57** 6.20 −9.07**
3.970*** −3.678*** 4.130*** −2.348*
15.340*** −11.097*** 15.712*** −7.219***
U.S. M-M’ 59.421*** 34.181*** 53.443*** 22.22*** 7.95 16.87***
58.881*** 31.865*** 51.432*** 23.84*** 8.57* 17.65***
7.230*** 4.219*** 6.808*** 6.984*** 2.921** 5.485***
21.366*** 10.842*** 18.266*** 21.166*** 8.150*** 15.196***
Oneway ANOVA(w): F(3, 194)=37.60, p<0.001
Oneway ANOVA(u):  F(3, 194)=20.66, p<0.001
Kruskal-Wallis (w): X2(3)=865.368, p<0.001
Oneway ANOVA(w): F(3, 194)=24.90, p<0.001
Kruskal-Wallis (u): X2(3)=66.163, p<0.001
Kruskal-Wallis (w): X2(3)=737.671, p<0.001




All four regions combined
(core and semiperiphery)
Western Europe and
North America (core only)
Kruskal-Wallis (u): X2(3)=85.376, p<0.001

















































Notes: (a) Numbers reflect the diﬀerence between frequencies of row categories and column categories, cal-
culated through Bonferroni post-hoc test of diﬀerence; (b) Numbers are z values of the (nonparametric) two 
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test; (u) Results using the unweighted data from the SSNM 
database; (w) Results using the weighted data from the SSNM database; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).
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Western Europe
Notes: Left scale: number of revolutionary situations involving state-seeking movements. Diamonds indi-
cate the mean and triangles indicate the median of each distribution. M-C-M’ stands for periods of material 
expansion and world-hegemonic consolidation; M-M’ stands for periods of financial expansion and world-
hegemonic transition.
Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).
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Western Europe and North America
Notes: Left scale: frequency of news reports on state-seeking movements, The Guardian/Observer, inversely 
weighted by average number of pages newspapers have each year. Diamonds indicate the mean and tri-
angles indicate the median of each distribution. M-C-M’ stands for periods of material expansion and world-
hegemonic consolidation; M-M’ stands for periods of financial expansion and world-hegemonic transition.
Source: SSNM database (Karatasli, 2013).
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natives—Kruskal-Wallis test, followed by Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
tests—which are more situable for data which are not normally distributed. Both 
one-way ANOVA and its nonparametric alternative—Kruskal-Wallis test—show 
that there is a statistically significant diﬀerence in at least one of these historical 
phases. Bonferroni post-hoc tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show us where 
these diﬀerences come from: All financial expansion periods had significantly 
greater number of state-seeking movements than material expansion periods that 
preceded them; and all material expansion periods had significantly lower number 
of state-seeking movements than financial expansion periods that preceded them. 
Again, the only exception is state-seeking movements during the Dutch systemic 
cycle in Western Europe that we discussed above, where there is no significant dif-
ference between material expansion and financial expansion periods. All of these 
results are robust to cut-oﬀ points chosen for the beginning and end of financial and 
material expansion periods.
Explanation: Three broad mechanisms
How can we explain these patterns? Why do frequency of state-seeking movements 
in Western, non-colonial locations decrease during material expansion and world-
hegemony periods and increase during financial expansion and world-hegemonic 
crisis periods? I argue that pendulum-like movement of global political-economy 
and the interstate system swinging back and forth between material expansion and 
financial expansion—and between world hegemonies and hegemonic crisis—aﬀect 
rulers’ capacity to contain rebellion through eﬀective use of coercion and consent. 
Below I will briefly summarize three broad mechanisms: (1) prolonged periods of 
crises in the macro-economic sphere which dissolves social and political compacts 
made by rulers and subject nations/communities, (2) prolonged periods of crisis 
in the geopolitical sphere intensifying inter-state rivalry and warfare, and (3) pro-
longed periods of crisis in the social sphere producing social revolts, rebellions and 
revolutions. Table 2 gives examples of these crises in each systemic cycle of accumu-
lation in capitalist world-economy from mid-15th century to present. In all conten-
tious conjunctures of historical capitalism, these mechanisms have interacted with 
each other, reduced states’ capacity to keep conflict under control and produced 
many structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization.
To explain how these crises aﬀect state-seeking movements, below I will briefly 
summarize some of the key causal mechanisms that link these crises to state-seek-
ing mobilization.
Economic crisis and dissolution of social and political compacts
In the macro-economic sphere, stable macro-economic growth or prolonged peri-
ods of crisis have major consequences for both state-led and state-seeking national-
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ism through their eﬀects on the hegemony-building capacity of rulers and states. 
Under conditions of stable economic growth during periods of material expansion 
and world hegemonies, states which benefit from the economic upswing will have 
more resources to establish “social compacts” through provision of public good or 
introduction of socio-economic privileges to contain rebellion. Hence during pe-
riods of economic growth, states can contain state-seeking movements more eas-
ily because they will have more to oﬀer to their subjects in terms of public goods 
(Wimmer, 2013, 37–72), redistribution, welfare and development (Mishra, 1999; 
Keating, 2001; Moreno and McEwen, 2005; Derluguian, 2013). States which benefit 
from a stable economic growth (i.e. core and semiperipheral countries) can also 
Table 2: Three phases of contentious conjunctures
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establish “political compacts” relatively more easily. This is because when there are 
plenty of resources to redistribute due to a stable economic boom, states can more 
easily tolerate the economic costs of providing autonomy or indirect rule (e.g. re-
duction of taxes or loss of control over local resources) if they need to.
During the material expansion phase of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle 
(from mid-15th century to mid-16th century), for instance, Catholic Kings and ruler of 
Spanish-Habsburg Empire benefited from such economic boom from Transatlantic 
trade and managed to oﬀer various social, economic and political privileges to sub-
ject kingdoms or “nations” residing in their territories. During the material expan-
sion phase of the Dutch systemic cycle, all major colonial powers managed to keep 
secessionist conflicts in settler colonies by oﬀering them economic, social and po-
litical privileges thanks to superprofits provided by the Transatlantic trade. During 
the material expansion phase of the British systemic cycle, even the rulers of the sick 
man of Europe—the Ottoman Empire—managed to preserve its territorial unity by 
oﬀering its non-Muslim communities many economic and political privileges (e.g. 
Tanzimat and Islahat reforms). Likewise, during the material expansion phase of the 
U.S. systemic cycle, implementation of developmentalist policies by many core and 
semiperipheral states helped reduce state-seeking movements especially in Europe 
and North America. In all of these periods, frequency of state-seeking movements 
in the core and semiperipheral regions has rapidly declined.
It would be erroneous, however, to assume that once these social and politi-
cal compacts have been made, state-seeking nationalist problems are solved for 
good. On the contrary, these kinds of social and political compacts can very well 
be unmade when existing resources available to rulers start to shrink. Among other 
things, macro-economic downturns—which are recurrent features of all financial 
expansion periods of historical capitalism—play a key role in this process. Economic 
crisis and stagnation conditions in the macro-economic climate (often through its 
interaction with other forms of geopolitical and social conflicts) tend to pressure 
states and leaders to “unmake” existing social or political compacts. When states 
start to take away previously granted social or political rights or privileges, how-
ever, they not only lose their consent-making capacities but also provide with major 
grievances and structural opportunities for state-seeking nationalist mobilization. 
During the crisis of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle (spanning from mid-16th 
century to mid-17th century), centralization policies by rulers of Europe (such as 
the policies of Philip II, which was a response to both the Price Inflation and the 
intensification of inter-state and intra-state conflicts) ended up unmaking social 
and political compacts (e.g. tax privileges enjoyed by subject kingdoms, regions and 
communities) which had maintained unity of the centralizing states. During the cri-
sis of the Dutch systemic cycle, which came to a peak after 1760s, all colonial pow-
ers were forced to take away social and political privileges given to settler colonies. 
Imposition of high taxes during both Genoese-Iberian and Dutch systemic cycles 
has been a major source of grievance by subject kingdoms, nations or settler colo-
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nies. A similar pattern was observed during the crisis of the British systemic cycle 
(spanning from 1870s to 1930s). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, 
Ottoman rulers after 1870 could no longer pursue the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms. 
To pay their debt to the British Empire, they were pushed to impose further taxes to 
the non-Muslim regions of the empire (such as the Balkans), which produced griev-
ances and opportunities for nationalist mobilization against the Empire.
From this perspective, gradual dissolution of developmentalist policies (their 
capitalist and socialist variants) starting with the crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle 
in the late 1960s had a major role in the rise of secessionist activities in core and 
semiperipheral countries (Derluguian, 2013). In their propaganda for secession, for 
instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP) today mainly emphasizes the social and 
economic benefits Scottish people will receive if they get rid of neoliberal British 
policies and if they are provided with the exclusive rights over the revenues from 
the sale of North Sea oil. Oil ownership and developmentalist policies, SNP argues, 
will boost incomes of Scottish people by 30 percent, provide them jobs and reduce 
unemployment. Although SNP’s emphasis on the link between independence and 
development issues is not new (Nairn 1977; Breuilly, 1982), the 2007/8 crisis created 
a wide platform on which SNP’s message was favorably received by more people 
than before.
Geopolitical crisis and escalation of inter-state rivalry and warfare
A similar dynamic can be observed in the geopolitical sphere. Periods of geopoliti-
cal stability and crisis also aﬀect state capacity to contain state-seeking movements 
through the use of force and consent. When inter-state rivalry and wars are absent 
or low in the region, states can more easily turn their attention to internal conflicts 
and contain state-seeking movements through coercion. Intensification of wars, 
geopolitical crisis and escalation of inter-state rivalries, however, reduce state’s ca-
pacity to keep social and political conflict under control through eﬀective use of 
coercion and consent. In doing so, geopolitical crisis and wars also produce a fertile 
climate for state-seeking movements to challenge existing states using emerging in-
stabilities (Skocpol, 1979; Wimmer, 2013). Competition and rivalry among states 
in an interstate system also help state-seeking movements mobilize by providing 
them with external aid from rival states as well (Gurr, 1993; Mayall, 1994). Financial 
expansion—and world-hegemonic crisis—periods intensify these geopolitical ri-
valries and produce various structural opportunities for state-seeking mobilization 
(Arrighi 1994; Karatasli and Kumral 2013). The Eighty Years’ War and the Thirty 
Years’ War during the crisis of the Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle, the Seven Years’ 
War and the Napoleonic wars during the crisis of the Dutch systemic cycle, the two 
World Wars during the crisis of the British systemic cycle and the return of geopo-
litical conflicts and warfare during the crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle (e.g. War in 
Afghanistan, War in Iraq or the “internationalized” Syrian civil war) all produced a 
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fertile environment for state-seeking mobilization. The Kurds in northern Iraq, for 
instance, managed to mobilize and to gain their de facto autonomy using the desta-
bilization of the state apparatus during the First Gulf War, and gained their federal 
government mostly due to the collapse of the Iraqi state apparatus in the course 
of the War in Iraq (Lachmann, 2010, 184). Kurds in Syria managed to assert their 
self-rule in Rojava using opportunities produced by the Syrian civil war. Interstate 
wars also help state-seeking movements mobilize by providing them with external 
aid from rival states (Gurr, 1993; Mayall, 1994). Rise of secessionist movements in 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, for instance, cannot be considered inde-
pendent from the Russian military intervention in Ukraine from 2014 to present. 
Since the beginning of the military intervention, Russia’s military and logistic aid to 
secessionist minority nationalism in this region has been one of the key factors that 
helped secessionist movements mobilize (Beissinger, 2015).
It must be noted that this conceptualization is diﬀerent from conventional ap-
proaches which maintain that wars (or inter-state rivalry) would strengthen state-
led nationalism by uniting citizens around a political cause and producing a sense 
of solidarity through sacrifice, danger and diﬀerentiation from “others” (Tilly, 1990; 
Mann, 1993; Centeno and Enriquez, 2016). While it is true that external wars 
strengthen state-led nationalism, they do not necessarily weaken state-seeking 
movements and provide unity. In states where state-seeking movements exist, ex-
ternal wars might end up producing further polarization. State-seeking movements 
can oppose wars of their states especially if these wars harm these communities 
politically, economically or culturally. In the 16th and 17th century, the Dutch and the 
Catalan rebels in Spanish-Habsburg Empire were extremely critical of wars fought 
by the Castilian crown. These grievances, in return, played an important part in 
state-seeking mobilization against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire. Likewise, despite 
expectations of Tsar Nicholas II, the Russo-Japanese of 1904–1905 did not produce 
unity among Russian subjects. On the contrary, it produced a social revolution 
against the Russian Empire and strengthened various state-seeking movements (e.g. 
Polish movement) in the Russian Empire. It is not a coincident that Bolsheviks who 
mobilized a wide spectrum of national liberation movements against the Russian 
Empire in the course of the 1917 Revolution considered war as the greatest gift im-
perialism gave to revolution. By the same logic, today if Turkey decides to declare 
war to Syria, this process will more likely to further polarize the Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalists residing in Turkey, rather than creating further unity.
Social crisis: Escalation of social revolts, rebellions and revolutions
Escalation of social rebellions, revolts and revolutions in the world is a third major 
mechanism that eﬀects state-seeking mobilization on a wider scale. Similar to the 
eﬀects of inter-state wars and geopolitical conflicts on state-seeking movements, 
emerging instabilities due to the rise of strong social and political revolts, revolu-
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tions or rebellions in a region also provide a more fertile environment for state-seek-
ing nationalist organizations to mobilize and challenge their states. This is mostly 
because, like wars and military conflicts, strong revolts, rebellions and revolutions 
also destabilize existing states. Likewise, many state-seeking nationalist movements 
can also ride the tide generated by other social and political revolutions. Instabilities 
created by Protestant revolutions in Europe in the 16th century, indigenous rebellions 
of the late 18th century in Latin America, French Revolution of 1789–1799, French 
Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 etc. all created oppor-
tunity structures for many state-seeking movements in the regions aﬀected by these 
great upheavals in extremely complex set of ways. For instance, the Dutch indepen-
dence movement of 1555–1648 was riding the tiger of Protestant revolts. Creole 
nationalism in Latin America in late 18th century and the Haitian Revolution were 
influenced by rising tide of revolutions on both sides of the Atlantic; and they fur-
ther triggered other national revolutions. National liberation movements in Tsarist 
Russia in the early 20th century cannot be thought independent from the Bolshevik 
revolution. Likewise, today, the Syrian civil war, which provided structural opportu-
nities for mobilization to Kurds in Rojava, must be seen as a part of the Arab Spring 
revolutions. Together with Kurds, Berberis in Algeria or South Yemenis in Yemen 
also started to use structural opportunities provided by the Arab Spring movements 
to mobilize masses for greater autonomy and independence. We must also note that 
in the course of these upheavals, some state-seeking movements also emerged as a 
reaction to these major revolutions. In the 17th century, for instance, Catholic re-
gions of the British Isles reacted against the spread of the Protestant revolutions 
by attempting to declare their self rule. Secessionist movements in contemporary 
Ukraine, as another example, are apparent reactions to the Euro-Maidan revolts and 
the Ukrainian revolution. If opposition becomes successful in Syria and the Asad 
regime is ousted, this would probably trigger an Alewite secessionism in the region.
These tidal influences, however, are not the only ways through which escala-
tion of social movements might contribute to the strengthening of state-seeking 
movements. Some social revolutions in world history—such as the Protestant 
Revolutions, the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, and the Bolshevik 
Revolution—have produced new forms of state structures, new state-society rela-
tionships, and new ideologies justifying state-formation. These political, social and 
ideological innovations, in return, contributed to the development and mobiliza-
tion of various state-seeking movements in the world through emulation of tactics, 
strategies and ideologies and through the external aid coming from these newly es-
tablished revolutionary governments.4
4 For the eﬀects of French Revolution see Tilly (1990, 107–108).
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End of globalization discourse and return of the geopolitics 
in the 21st century
From the perspective presented in this chapter, prolonged periods of crises in eco-
nomic, geopolitical and social spheres become extremely fertile for state-seeking 
mobilizations. What makes these “contentious conjunctures” extremely fertile for 
state-seeking mobilization is that these crises in economic, social and geopoliti-
cal spheres occur in synchrony with each other, interact with each other and they 
produce a much deeper crisis on a global scale. From a world-historical perspec-
tive then, the combination of crises in these three spheres is more than the sum of 
their individual eﬀects. In the People’s Spring of 1848, for instance, while one could 
observe the eﬀects of economic and social crisis on nationalism, the third compo-
nent—the crisis in the geopolitical sphere—was missing. Hence, we saw a major 
wave of nationalist movements in Europe, but these movements were smashed by a 
reactionary coalition of rulers (i.e. Holy Alliance) without spreading further. Hence 
the frequency of 1848 wave of nationalism was dwarfed compared to what we have 
observed in and around 1914, where all crises aﬀected each other and produced the 
greatest wave of state-seeking nationalism that the world has seen until that point.
I argue that a major force that interlinks these crises in these diﬀerent spheres in 
core and semiperipheral locations is the financialization process (Karatasli, 2013). 
Financialization processes emerge as a partial solution to the emerging signal crisis 
of systemic cycles of accumulation. In the short term, all financial expansion pro-
cesses led by leading business and government complexes of the capitalist world-
economy temporarily created super-profits and temporarily provided growth and 
stability. The growth and stability in financial expansion periods, however, were il-
lusionary. In the medium term, all financial expansion processes ended up plant-
ing the seeds of a deeper crisis in these three spheres. Hence, in each contentious 
conjuncture of the capitalist world-economy, we actually saw not one but two ma-
jor waves of state-seeking seeking movements: one during the signal crisis of the 
systemic cycles of accumulation that preceded financialization processes and one 
during the terminal crisis of systemic cycles of accumulation that followed the fi-
nancialization processes. It is easy to see these two waves in recent decades. The 
revival of nationalism in the West in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was linked to 
the signal crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle, and the one we have been observing today 
is linked to its terminal crisis.
This is precisely why the resurgence of expectations about the final demise of 
nationalism during the financial globalization led by the United States during both 
Reagan and Clinton eras has been extremely misleading. Like all previous historical 
periods of financial expansions, the emerging stability was provided at the cost of 
producing deeper crises in economic, social and geopolitical spheres. At the turn 
of the 21st century, we started to see that crises in all spheres are coming back. The 
2007/8 financial crisis and its global repercussions in the global economic sphere, 
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post-2007 waves of social revolts and revolutions around the world (i.e. the 2011 
wave of revolutions, Arab Spring, Occupy-type movements, Ukrainian revo-
lution) and return of geopolitical conflicts (i.e. War in Afghanistan, War in Iraq, 
Syrian “Internationalized” Civil war) all signal that we are entering into the second 
and more chaotic phase of the contentious conjunctures. As in previous historical 
phases, these instabilities have been pushing rulers to take away previously oﬀered 
social, economic and political privileges (such as unmaking of developmentalist re-
gimes), to rely more on coercive tools to secure their territorial unity and borders. 
All of these processes produce not only grievances but also major structural op-
portunities for state-seeking mobilization in the early 21st century. That’s why from 
Scotland to Eastern Ukraine, from Catalonia to Kurdistan we see a resurgence of 
state-seeking nationalism all around the world. Whether or not this resurgence will 
produce a great wave of secessionism that will surpass what we have observed in the 
early 20th century, however, depends on how this crisis of the U.S. systemic cycle and 
the world hegemony will unfold in the near future.
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6
“Fortress-Russia”: Geopolitical Destiny, 
Unintended Consequences, or Policy Choices?1
Andrei Melville
This chapter examines the recent phenomenon of “the return of geopolitics” within the 
current Russian political and ideological context. Russian geopolitical narrative with its 
roots in the so-called “Neo-Eurasianism” should be understood as one of the crucially 
important components of the new conservative wave in Russian politics and ideol-
ogy presenting a new version of the long-awaited after the fall of Soviet Communism 
Russian national idea. Along with the simplified “black and white” geopolitics, among 
its other components one should mention the concept of Russia as a unique civili-
zation-state with a special mission in the world, a belief in the irreconcilable clash of 
values and ideologies, social conservatism based on traditional values and religious 
fundamentalism, and political conservatism as the defense of the status quo. This new 
conservative consensus seems to be rather durable as it reflects the status quo priorities 
of the central authorities and powerful elite groupings seeking guaranteed access to 
rents; conservative attitudes of the specific “middle class” dependent on the state and 
without democratic request; as well as dominant public attitudes. However, there may 
be various sources of potential vulnerability of the current neo-conservative “consen-
sus,” which are analyzed in the conclusion of this chapter.
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose
Probably the most dominant theme in today’s discourse on world politics and inter-
national relations is “the return of geopolitics” (as Walter Mead 2014 puts it in his 
seminal article). Searching on “the return of geopolitics” in Google, for example, re-
trieves 585,000 titles in 0.35 seconds, such as: “The Return of Geopolitics to Europe,” 
“The Return of Geopolitical Risk,” “The Return of Realpolitik,” “The Emerging 
China-Russia Axis: The Return of Geopolitics,” “History Isn’t Dead Yet: Asia and 
the Return of Geopolitics,” “Ukraine and the Return of Geopolitics,” “The Return 
of Geopolitics: The Ascension of BRICS,” “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,” “Russia, 
1 This chapter advances some topics outlined in Melville (2018). Some titles and quotes in this 
chapter were translated from Russian. This work is supported by the Russian Science Foundation 
under grant №17-18-01651 National Research University Higher School of Economics.
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Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” “The Russian Mind Today: 
A Geopolitical Guide,” and “Russia and the Return of Geopolitics.”
Indeed, traditional geopolitical narratives seems to resurrect it as the slogan of 
the day, as if Friedrich Ratzel, Karl Houshofer, Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, 
and Nicolas Spykman are all back today. It also seems as if the dire realities of to-
day’s world politics reconfirm once again pronouncements about the inevitability 
of Realpolitik, the war of all against all and geopolitically predetermined confronta-
tion over traditional spheres of influence, disputed borders, zero-sum game and the 
primacy of military power. Indeed, geopolitical rivalry reemerges as a destiny one 
cannot avoid.
The reality of global confrontation (or, rather, even in the plural—confronta-
tions) is back; new tensions and conflicts over control of territory, spheres of influ-
ence, shifting balances of power are escalating before our eyes in diﬀerent areas 
from Central and Eastern Europe, to Middle East, Central, South and East Asia, and 
even the Arctic. International law and many international institutions are in jeop-
ardy if not in decline as their universal norms and values are contested. Perceptive 
observers warn about dangers of the return to a Neo-Westphalian world or even to 
the realities of the Thirty Years’ War in Central Europe (1618–1648). Worries about 
the Cold War 2.0 are also popping up all over. Regardless of the specific analogy, we 
are witnessing the end of a three decades period after the dramatic international 
and domestic changes since Gorbachev’s “perestroika,” “velvet revolutions,” Soviet 
disintegration and subsequent hopes and illusions about the advent of global coop-
eration and integration. And it seems that these changes are irreversible and they 
largely predetermine our future.
Today Russia, along with other supposedly “discontented” or “revisionist” powers 
(China, Iran and some others), stands in the center of heated debates on geopoliti-
cal revival in current academic and political discourse. According to this argument, 
Russia denies the post-Cold War world order as unjust because of its discriminating 
unipolarity imposed by force and arrogance and reclaims its great power status and 
role in the international system. The gist of this argument is largely shared by those 
in the West who see Russia as “revisionist” and “authoritarian” and also by those in 
Russia who believe it is “rising from the knees” and “ascending.” For the first group, 
Russia simply returns to its historical pattern—authoritarian state dominated soci-
ety inside and in pursuit of its traditional geopolitical goal of “strategic depth for se-
curity” on the outside. For the second group, Russia, after being the major contribu-
tor to the end of Communism and collapse of the Soviet Union, rises against the 
discriminating status of the “looser” doomed to remain in the humiliating “pupil” 
position in world aﬀairs—an unjust position which was awarded to her by the West. 
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For both parties of these heated geopolitical debates Russia willy-nilly occupies 
the de facto position of “fortress-Russia”2 vis-à-vis the West, surrounded by monu-
mental adversaries who challenge its sovereignty, status, national interests and even 
survival. There are fundamental political and ideological diﬀerences in these ap-
proaches, conclusions and suggested recipes; but their common geopolitical de-
nominator is without doubt. However, here is the big question: is it all about geo-
politics? 
This brings us to a larger issue related to the real meaning of “the return of geo-
politics” thesis. In at least one sense geopolitical reality of international relations, 
strictly speaking, never “went away”—so it does not need to “return.” Territory and 
geography, definitely were, and remain, a perennial factor in world politics as well 
as in rivalry and competition for advantage. These go together, though, with the 
ages-old, and necessarily coming to the front in today’s global world eﬀorts, joint 
responses to new threats and challenges. But in another sense, “geopolitics” (espe-
cially in its simplified versions) is “geographically deterministic” and oﬀers black-
and-white answers to very complex and multidimensional questions related to 
global dynamics of today’s world order and its future and relationships between 
varieties of international players and prospects of mutual eﬀorts to respond to new 
challenges. In such a simplified picture of the world, there exist only conflict and 
confrontation as primordial features of international politics; states are doomed to 
struggle with each other constantly repeating historical cycles of animosity, hostil-
ity, and the “war of all against all.” 
This simplified version of “geopolitics”3 oﬀers a static (no dynamics) picture of 
the reproduction of international interactions based on assumptions of the geo-
graphical predetermination of an inevitable confrontation between “world centers.” 
Factors such as globalization, information revolution, economic, financial, techno-
logical, cultural, interdependence, global threats and the need for cooperation are 
simply marginal in this discourse. 
One needs to add that these arguments usually go together with either laments 
or ecstasy (depending on own values and perceptions) about “the end of globaliza-
tion” as the final coups de grâce for the supposedly universal liberal world order. And 
this same logic can be seen in the reasoning of the opposite political and ideological 
2 “Fortress-Russia” was one of four alternative scenarios of the Russian future in a 2020 project I 
was involved in with colleagues almost ten years ago. The gist of it is an image of a lonely strategic 
and spiritual “backbone” of stability in the ocean of chaos and confrontation (see Melville and 
Timofeev, 2008). The “fortress-Russia” scenario describes a very adversarial and menacing world 
surrounding Russia, and Russia, in order to withstand the siege, and all the enormous enemies 
from the outside and a “fifth column” inside, needs to get united and mobilize, even if this limits 
economic and political competition, along with political rights and freedoms. Ten years ago, dur-
ing the focus groups which we conducted from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, this scenario was 
considered to be the most improbable. Today however, it seems to have turned into reality.
3 Simplified “Geopolitics for Dummies”—as coined by Kortunov (2015).
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camps found in the current debate on geopolitical revival. This is worth of special 
attention as it contradicts those alternative and well-grounded logical arguments 
in favor of the invariability of really existing world order based on not so much lib-
eral ideology, but on liberal institutional basis per se (see Ikenberry, 2014; Kortunov, 
2016).
What we are left with, then, is a question about other factors causing and/or af-
fecting today’s global geopolitical rivalry and confrontation. Without downgrading 
geopolitics as such, may we examine and try to take into account other possible fac-
tors as well, such as domestic interest groups, elite policy decisions, public attitudes, 
psychology, frustrations, fears, and illusions. In particular, and in order to explain 
the emergence of a “diﬀerent world” and “diﬀerent Russia” in a new geopolitical con-
text we may want to draw attention to factors beyond geopolitics. This may help us 
to contribute to a more nuanced and multidimensional picture of current dramatic 
shifts in Russia and in world politics in general.
Russian geopolitics narratives 
There are peculiar similarities and specific features in the narratives about the geo-
politics of Russia and geopolitics in Russia.
One geopolitical narrative in Russia has specific roots in so-called “Eurasianism,” 
which was a brand of historiosophy before, and especially after 1917, that was 
represented by diﬀerent, mostly émigré authors, such as Nikolay Trubetskoy, Petr 
Savitsky and others. It has ideas that, in some respects, resonate with the classical 
geopolitics of Ratzel, Houshofer, and Mackinder, that emphasize oppositions be-
tween “continental” and “maritime” paradigms of international behavior. A major 
emphasis of “Eurasianism” was on the “non-European” origins of the unique Russian 
civilization as a spiritual antithesis to the “West.” 
During most of the Soviet period “Eurasianism” was practically ostracized. 
However, since the 1980s there emerged isolated attempts of its revival represented, 
in particular, by numerous works of a noted historian, Lev Gumilev. Another impor-
tant, though quite esoteric “Eurasianist” thinker, was Vadim Cymbursky (1993) with 
his tractatus The Island Russia. But the real “Eurasianist” boom in post-Soviet Russia 
is associated with the writings of the notorious Alexander Dugin (2014; 2015), a 
dedicated ideologist of “Neo-Eurasianism” as a mix of geopolitics, Russian national-
ism and orthodox fundamentalism. He is also an activist pretending to exert influ-
ence on current Russian politics. The actual extent of such influence is not clear, 
though, as Dugin and his followers represent a very radical branch of geopolitical 
discourse in today’s Russia. The core of Dugin’s geopolitical narrative is a conception 
of the world as four geopolitical “meridian zones,” with Russia as a “World-Island” a 
unique civilization of “land” called to withstand the “West” as the “kingdom of the 
Antichrist” and predestined to imperial “Greatness.” 
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It is noteworthy that many perceptive Western observers of Russian geopolitics 
largely reproduce a similar logic and argumentation about Russia’s geopolitical “des-
tiny,” although with diﬀerent assessments and appraisals. Their focus is on perennial 
“indefensibility” of the Russian territory with “no natural borders,” eternal predes-
tination of the “despotic state” to “territorial expansion to withstand invasions,” a 
search for enemies “outside” and “inside,” along with the creation of “buﬀer zones” 
and a pursuit of the goal of “strategic depth for security” together with a belief in a 
special “mission.”4 One of the implications of such logic is the mantra of “Weimar 
Russia”—a warning about the dangers of a humiliated and frustrated geopolitical 
“looser” ready for revenge.
The idea of geographic predetermination of international and domestic politi-
cal patterns is reproduced when it is applied to current developments in Russia, 
such as the return to perceptions and attitudes toward the outside world as hostile 
and menacing along with domestic mobilization to withstand external threats. In 
short, it is as if the scenario of “Fortress-Russia” has been turned into reality. In this 
logic the “return of geopolitics” reflects the realities of a de facto “deglobalization” in 
world politics as well as the end of Russia’s illusions of the 1990s to find an appropri-
ate place in the so called “global world” (Guriev, 2015; Gould-Davis, 2016). 
This narrative emphasizes the absolute value of national sovereignty (à la im-
peratives of the Neo-Westphalian world order) vis-à-vis globalization, total primacy 
of national interests (however, poorly defined), Realpolitik and a longing for great 
power status with all of this legitimized by geopolitical predetermination as pre-
scribed by “Neo-Eurasianism.” Thus, the geopolitical contours of Russia’s revived 
“grand strategy” are understood—by proponents and critics as well—as control of 
as much territory as possible, including in the first place the “Near Abroad,” along 
with shifting economic, political and even cultural priorities towards the “East” and 
domestic mobilization supporting Russia’s great power’s status. 
One may reasonably argue that there are diﬀerent factors aﬀecting the current 
geopolitical “revival” in Russia, including political and psychological eﬀects of the 
tremendous territorial contraction after the collapse of the Soviet Union reducing 
Russia to the borders even before the expansion during the reign of Catherine the 
Great, as well as related frustrations and feelings of resentment by the general public 
and elites. This current geopolitical “revival” may be easily legitimized with the help 
of “Neo-Eurasian” rhetoric. However, it may be premature to directly link the cur-
rent explosion of a geopolitical narrative in Russia to philosophical and intellectual 
impacts of a radical ideological “Neo-Eurasianism” in the spirit of Dugin and his 
followers. The mainstream of the current geopolitical “tsunami” in Russia’s politics, 
media and academia, relies on “Neo-Eurasianism” as a political and intellectual le-
4 See recent examples in Kotkin (2016) and Graham (2016).
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gitimization, but it’s social, political, ideological and even psychological foundations 
may, nonetheless, have diﬀerent sources. 
Indeed, in Russia the period since 2013–2014 witnesses a real geopolitical “ex-
plosion” in general political discourse, international relations studies and mass me-
dia. Almost everybody in Russia today talks geopolitics. Geopolitics becomes an 
accepted set of beliefs sine qua non. However, the paradox is that the leading intel-
lectual gurus of the new creed are—surprisingly or not—in very many cases for-
mer advocates of liberal internationalism, globalization and new global agendas for 
cooperation and partnership. Thus, there seems to be at least some inconsistency 
in theoretical approaches of the newly converted geopolitical neophytes in Russia 
beginning with their attitude towards geopolitics as an instrument of political legiti-
mization rather than a long-nourished philosophical belief.
Former “liberal internationalists” today become advocates of the “war of all 
against all” (arguing in favor of the “Hobbesian moment” as return to international 
“normalcy” [Lukyanov and Krastev, 2015]). Globalization and interdependence 
are treated now as “factors of vulnerability” for Russia and a smokescreen covering 
the dire reality of the unipolar and unjust world of the United States and NATO 
monopoly (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 2016). According to this logic 
Russia is predetermined to withstand the geopolitical “West” and to reorient from 
the former goal of “Greater Europe” to that of a “Greater Eurasia.”
No doubt, one may rationalize such theoretical permutations as a reaction to 
changing political circumstances, but this should require a special and in itself intel-
lectually exciting discussion of social and political factors aﬀecting evolving meth-
odological patterns of politically motivated research and analysis. At the moment 
this remains still a prospect. What we have at this moment is a mainstream of a new 
geopolitical narrative focusing on ideological and political anti-Westernism and a 
prescribed “pivot to the East,” a Realpolitik approach to world politics, the “image of 
the enemy” rhetoric, proclamations about “de-globalization,” “Russian special way” 
and an irreconcilable clash of values and civilizations.
In turn, this geopolitical mainstream in Russia’s political discourse today should 
be adequately understood not so much as phenomenon in itself but as one of the 
crucially important components of a larger political and ideological context of con-
temporary Russia—namely, the advent of the New Conservatism. 
Geopolitics and the new Russian conservatism
Neo-conservatism emerges in today’s Russia as a dominant phenomenon; almost 
as a new national consensus and a long-awaited new national idea, which adds 
new specific ideological overtones to a traditional geopolitical narrative. Of course, 
some marginal ideological and political “fringes” may still remain, but geopolitics 
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and new conservatism have become the real spirit of the time.5 No doubt, this 
newly emerged consensus is not entirely monolithic, as there are various flanks and 
coalitions among its proponents, from respectable pro-Kremlin think tanks (like 
the Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research6 and even the quite famous 
Valdai Club7—all with close links to the presidential administration) to much more 
radical extremes (like the Izborsky Club,8 for example). 
However, there is an apparent core of shared ideological beliefs which along with 
revived geopolitics consists of several components: (a) “messianic vision,” i.e. the 
concept of Russia as a unique civilization-state with a special mission in an adver-
sarial world; (b) “new ideological warfare,” i.e. the belief in an irreconcilable clash of 
ideologies and values; (c) “social conservatism,” i.e. the belief in traditional conserva-
tive values which are assaulted by the decadent forces of Western moral decay and 
decadence; and (d) “political conservatism,” i.e. the defense of the status quo as the 
ultimate political priority. 
This new conservative version of the Russian national idea resurrects the centu-
ry-long concept of Russia as a specific “civilization-state” very distinct from “regu-
lar” nation-states and with a special “mission” in the world.9 Russia is claimed to be 
a “floating empire” (as the Izborsky Club puts it; Averyanov, 2015) or a “continental 
empire, and not a nation-state” (as argued in the indicative Manifesto of Enlightened 
Conservatism [Mikhalkov, 2010]). This messianic pathos manifests itself primarily 
in ideological declarations: “At the limit, the Russian ideal is ‘sacredness’”; “Sacred 
Rus is a universal ideal—not limited geographically, ideologically or metaphysically” 
(from one of the reports of the Izborsky Club [Averyanov, 2015, 47]). In practice, 
however, Russia’s ambitions in this respect are more modest today and, in principle, 
include ongoing support for integration processes in the Eurasian Economic Union 
and calls to gather the “Russian world” as a union of “the most dispersed people in 
5  Foreign policy alternatives in today’s Russia are not in the focus of domestic public and expert 
debates. Quite indicative was the 2016 campaign leading to the State Duma elections. It was as 
if the spoiler parties “Fair Russia,” “Liberal Democrats” and the “CPRF” (Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation) were competing for being “more catholic than the Pope” in calling for new 
attention to geopolitics, opposing Russia and the West (“Fair Russia” warning against “imperialist 
globalization” and the “redivision of the world”), stressing the primary role of traditional geopo-
litical interests and formidable external threats (Communists), sounding alarms about the “war 
against Russia without rules,” calling for “Slavic reintegration” and a necessary pivot not only to the 
“East,” but to the “South” as well (“Liberal Democrats”).
6 See: http://www.isepr.ru/en/. Among its quite notable regular publications – the almanac 
“Notebooks on Conservatism.”
7  See: http://valdaiclub.com/.
8 See: http://izborsk-club.ru/.
9 Tsyganov (2016) points that the current discourse of “distinct civilization” is the product of 
international pressures and domestic vulnerabilities.
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history.” The “reestablishment of empire” is, as a serious imperative, not considered 
by the neoconservative mainstream for there are simply no resources for this goal.
For Russian neocons today’s world restores the basic foundation of geopoliti-
cal confrontation based in civilizational incompatibility between the “West” and 
the “non-West.” Values are irreconcilable: “freedom” (“the West” as a core of today’s 
world-system) versus “justice” and “fairness” (Russia and the rising “non-West” as its 
contenders). As such, Russia must constantly counteract Western values. This leads 
to another radical conclusion related to the reinterpretation of Russian national 
identity, where Russia is said to oppose “Europe” (the “West”) not only geopolitically 
but also ideologically, as Russia’s future is no longer within the lines of the “Western 
perspective.” Hence, calls for “detachment” and even “divorce” between Russia and 
Europe and also declarations about Russia’s “self-suﬃciency,” not only strategic and 
geopolitical, but civilizational and cultural as well (Miller and Lukyanov, 2016).
Like in old Soviet times the impossibility of any universal or common values is 
reaﬃrmed. The almost forgotten “ideological struggle” is back,10 as if Perestroika 
and Gorbachev’s “new thinking” never existed. This “struggle” is supposed to have 
both international and domestic dimensions. The argument about “reideologization 
of international relations” bears familiar Soviet overtones: we are on the “right side” 
and our ideological opponents are on the defensive. However, this time “our” ideol-
ogy is not Marxism-Leninism but the new conservatism. Remarkably, the West is to 
be blamed for this “reideologization” as it remains the center of “new international 
ideocracy” (see Lukin, 2016). Hence, the global opposition: “defensive democratic 
messianism” (with its origins in the “West”) vs. “emerging ideology of new conser-
vatism” (emanating from the “non-West”) (Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 
2016). The only logic is “war to death” (Nagorny, 2015) between not only two major 
geopolitical rivals, but two diametrically opposite and irreconcilable systems of val-
ues. 
Social conservatism presents another focal point of this new creed with the 
stress on traditionalism and religious fundamentalism and the opposition between 
collectivist values and the spirit of solidarity vs. individualism and social atomiza-
tion. Traditional (“pre-postmodern”) values need to be protected from the current 
“European decay and decadence.” The gist of these values consists of religious fun-
damentalism (resisting decadent permissiveness), collectivism (as opposed to dis-
ruptive “individualism”), a specific version of patriotism based on the mythology of 
“spiritual bonds” and the primacy of the State (“statism”). Some of these ideological 
10 “The growing importance of alternative projects entails a revival of the role of ideologies and 
ideological struggle. For a quarter of a century after the Cold War ideological messages were a 
monopoly of the West, while others either accepted them or locked themselves away in a com-
bination of fortress mentality and ‘Realpolitik.’ Now, though, attempts to formulate an ideological 
response to the West are apparent. . . . The coming decade may well see an ideological renais-
sance” (Barabanov et al., 2016, 5).
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components evoke memories of the past Soviet rhetoric. However, the truly univer-
sal appeal of Marxism-Leninism is missing in the neoconservative version of new 
identity and national idea for Russia.11
Finally, a political and social status quo comes forward in Russian neocons’ 
pronouncements as it is prescribed by conservatism per se in all places and in all 
times. However, in this particular case attempts to legitimize current conditions 
are derived not so much from appeals to conserve the present, but quite often to 
restore the past—including its symbols, identities and myths. Order and stability 
are interpreted by neoconservatives themselves as of higher priority than individual 
rights and rule of law: “For a conservative, tradition and morality are above the law” 
(Makarenko, 2015, 275). 
However, Russia’s neo-conservative ideology is missing some very crucial ele-
ments, such as, in the first place, a vision of the future and a program of long-term 
practical goals as well as a positive agenda of how to attain them. Despite wide-
spread claims of being a “conservatism for development”12 with reliance on Russia’s 
indigenous resources and capabilities and a pivot towards the “East,” there is little 
to oﬀer as a viable program of Russia’s “sovereign modernization” (see Bluhm, 2016) 
without reliance on Western technologies and investments. Besides, today’s new 
conservatism is self-suﬃcient; it does not need a dialogue with opponents other 
than for self-legitimation. 
And yet, the newly emerged neo-conservative ideology (with its major compo-
nents of geopolitics, the “Russian way,” ideological warfare, fundamentalism and the 
status quo) seems to be quite solid and durable. What then are the sources of its 
domestic support?
On the durability of the new conservative consensus
In the first place, the major conservative impetus comes from central authorities 
and powerful elite groupings whose number one priority is precisely the preserva-
tion of the status quo (and reduction of the threats from other elite groups and the 
dangers of popular dissatisfaction). The immutability of power holder’s and elite’s 
dominant positions with guaranteed access to rents is the key factor and the princi-
pal cause of the current demand for conservative ideology in Russia. Strategic deci-
sions ending previous reformist experiments were made under the exaggerated fear 
of “colored” scenarios after mass protests in 2011–2012, that is, regime status quo 
by any means necessary (in a hostile environment and with no exit strategy). Elite’s 
11 “In eﬀect, Russia is resurrecting a Soviet version of its identity. This new identity is missing 
the socialist/collectivist component, but, nevertheless, retains the equally important patriotic ele-
ment. The next stage in this search is finding a universal idea” (Timofeev, 2016, 10).
12 Frequent appeals to “conservative modernization” (“sovereign modernization”) evoke analo-
gies with “building socialism in one country”—Stalin’s and Bukharin’s concept of mid 1920s.
106 Andrei Melville
cohesion and regime support becomes a condition sine qua non for survival (vis-à-
vis possible contenders).
The preservation of the status quo has been inculcated into the elite and mass 
consciousness via the muscular propagandistic influence of mass media13—espe-
cially television. It is noteworthy to mention that, according to surveys of public 
opinion, the success of the propaganda eﬀorts in some respects also follows the 
paradoxical rise of conservative moods in large segments of Russia’s younger popu-
lation as well, contrary to some conventional sociological wisdom, which assumes 
that the older people are more conservative in their outlooks.
Another important component of the social base supporting new conservatism 
is Russia’s constantly growing bureaucratic estate. Bureaucracy (at all levels—federal 
and regional—and everywhere) is the natural bearer of conservative attitude and 
stance. In Russia today bureaucracy’s natural conservative inclination is reinforced 
by very substantial benefits from status and ever growing salaries. This ideologi-
cal inclination is also widespread among other social groups whose existence and 
wellbeing depends on the government, such as employees of government-financed 
organizations, military, pensioners, and so forth and so on.
Conservative attitudes and values are also typical among large groups of the 
rather specific middle class which emerged as a product of redistribution of rents 
during the oil boom in the first decade of 2000s. Contrary to the famous “Lipset 
hypothesis,” according to which economic growth and welfare of the middle class 
produce democratic and liberal expectations and demands, large segments of 
Russia’s middle class seem to support today conservative values and the status quo. 
A probable explanation of this “paradox” is dependence on the state, and, in fact, in 
very many respects. Economically and administratively this is largely a “service” and 
“servile” middle class, whose very existence depends not on independent economic 
and other activities but on bureaucratic decisions of authorities of diﬀerent levels 
(Gontmakher and Ross, 2015), like in some other non-Western countries (China 
may be another specific example refuting causality between economic growth and 
the wellbeing of the emerging middle class, on the one hand, and support of demo-
cratic values—on the other).
The ideological demand of the authorities and elites turns on a surprisingly har-
monious brew of mass moods, reflecting mobilized propagandistic influence, but it 
is also a specific, largely emotional manifestation of mass complexes, authoritarian 
syndrome, nostalgia, and imagined or phantom pains. The simplified, neoconserva-
tive picture of the world oﬀers fast and simple prescriptions for addressing the real 
problems and pressures of today. By analogy with the “Moral Majority” in the United 
13 The shift from pure coercion to propaganda and indoctrination is the core element of the 
“informational theory of the new authoritarianism” (Guriev and Treisman, 2015).
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States on the eve of the advent to power of Ronald Reagan, such public moods si-
multaneously serve as support and a breeding-ground for new conservatism.
The dominant motives of public sentiments in today’s Russia consist of a mé-
lange, including the glory for a return to the “great power” status, belief in a “special 
Russian way,” a focus on the “image of the enemy,” and a priority of “order and stabil-
ity.” These attitudes also strongly resonate with the major premises of new conser-
vatism. 
Data from the Levada Center14 show that: respondents believe today that Russia 
is a “great power” and what makes Russia a great power is military might, while 
less support is given to Russia’s economic potential. An overwhelming percent of 
Russians are proud to live in Russia (and this figure did not change during the last 
ten years), however, only 68 percent are proud of today’s Russia. Forty-four percent 
are proud of Russian history and 21 percent are proud of Russian territory. This 
patriotic élan is reinforced by the “image of the enemy” imposed by massive pro-
paganda. A large majority of the population feels the presence of the enemies from 
the outside. In 2015 Levada Center data show three quarters of respondents say it’s 
the West and 70 percent say the United States is an adversary and 48 percent say 
that about Ukraine as well in 2016. Public opinion polls reveal that neoconserva-
tive assumptions about Russia’s “special way” are deeply rooted in popular attitudes. 
“Russia’s own way” is unique and fundamentally diﬀerent from all other nations say 
roughly half the respondents. However, when it comes to specifics the majority can’t 
clearly articulate Russia’s “special way’s” nature and peculiarities. Many respondents 
believe that that there is democracy in today’s Russia, and it is very noteworthy that 
the percentage of them dramatically increased after the Crimea events. This trend, 
by the way, may be a remarkable manifestation of both the impact of propagandistic 
mobilization “around the flag” and profound confusion in popular mentality. To the 
question what kind of “democracy” does Russia need?, 46 percent answered “A com-
pletely special kind of democracy that is appropriate to Russia’s national traditions 
and unique characteristics” and only 19 percent answered “that which existed in the 
Soviet Union,” and only 16 percent answered “that of developed European countries 
and the United States.” Powerful urges toward stability and status quo is evident as 
well, where 61 percent of respondents to a survey prefer “order,” even at expense of 
individual rights and freedoms. A growing isolation from the West does not bother 
62 percent of respondents and only 15 percent feel definitely the need to improve 
relations with the West. This data suggest that people seem to get accustomed to 
confrontation, isolation, sanctions, and so forth and they do not care much about 
this new international reality. 
The picture that seems to take shape is public moods in Russia today are con-
fused but definitely in line with major postulates of neoconservative ideology, which 
14 All data in this section comes from Levada Center (http://www.levada.ru/en/).
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leads to a traditional “chicken and egg” issue: do new conservative ideologists build 
their version of the Russian national idea reflecting current popular preferences de-
riving from widespread frustrations and syndromes, or do they through the means 
of powerful propaganda form these preferences? Most probably both arguments are 
true and reflect important bits of complex social reality. But an even more impor-
tant question has to do with the durability of the above mentioned stance in public 
opinion and, hence, popular support of new conservatism. 
One needs to acknowledge the actual (however sometimes embryonic) com-
plexity of the current state of popular moods in Russia today. On the one hand, 
massive support of a neoconservative status quo is pretty obvious, although due to 
diﬀerent causes. But on the other hand, there are signs of doubts about the durabil-
ity of a new social contract (“TV instead of the refrigerator” as a replacement of 
the “Refrigerator instead of political involvement”). One needs only to watch and 
closely monitor signs of potentially important changing trends in public opinion 
which eventually may put into question the popular neoconservative consensus. In 
particular, there are signs of potential fatigue with the massive propagandistic brain-
washing and emergence of new concerns about the real problems aﬀecting daily 
lives of rank-and-file Russians. As an example, in the situation of current economic 
and financial troubles respondents start to range their anxieties in a diﬀerent way: 
instead of “enemies outside” we see support for ideas about “growth of prices” and 
“impoverishment of population”; economic crisis; Russia being drawn into conflicts 
outside its borders; unemployment and increases of tensions with Western coun-
tries. It remains to be seen whether the extant ideological consensus can compen-
sate for the continuing deterioration of the economic situation of the country, as 
well as the growing fatigue of the population vis-à-vis massive propaganda and the 
quite possible lessening of its eﬀectiveness.
In other words, popular foundations of the new ideological consensus in Russia 
may become vulnerable in the future. Obviously, it is hard to clearly predict the 
directions and the outcomes of these fluctuations; however, in the future they may 
significantly dispute the solidity and the durability of the seemingly strong neocon-
servative ideological consensus in today’s Russia.
Besides the obvious volatility of public attitudes, there may be many other fac-
tors at work which could eventually undermine the seemingly lasting and invariable 
status quo situation and the neoconservative ideological consensus in Russia today. 
To continue with the previous argument it is hard to predict how long the social 
base and the ideological appeal of new conservatism can endure. Today this seems 
to be the case. However, as was shown above, there may be various exogenous and 
endogenous disruptions aﬀecting and undermining today’s popular support of the 
status quo. Another long term possibility is the emergence of a new generation of 
elites with no connections with the ancient regime and searching for Russia’s post-
industrial modernization. Generational elite change may become, as in other de-
veloping countries, a powerful instrument for political and social transformation.
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Modest agenda
Whatever the remote prospects may be, the situation today looks rather blunt. Both 
parties of the current geopolitical confrontation are preoccupied with mutual disil-
lusionments and disappointments, blames and accusations. And both parties, al-
though most probably to diﬀerent extents, share at least some parts of responsibility 
for missed opportunities which seemed to emerge after the end of the Cold war. On 
the one hand there are various attitudes towards Russia: a “collapsed empire” and 
a “looser,” not a “new democracy,” the position of the West as a “teacher,” and not 
a “therapist,” Yugoslavia and Kosovo, NATO’s expansion with vague assurances to 
Georgia and Ukraine, sensitive issue of anti-missile defense close to Russian bor-
ders, and so forth and so on. On the other hand there are post-Soviet frustrations 
and “phantom pains,” resentment, and paranoid fears of “color revolutions.” 
Be it as it may, this grievous situation originates not so much from predeter-
mined geopolitical destiny, but from the unintended consequences of a chain of 
political choices. All this does not mean underestimation of dangers of possible 
escalation of confrontation, but quite the opposite; it calls for a modest, pressing, 
realistic, although with a rather minimalist agenda for Russia-Western relations, for 
the foreseeable future. Here are some important priorities of this agenda:
– Stop blaming each other for who is responsible. Take it as a fait accompli and 
accept diﬀerences—in values, perceptions, and interests. Open a new page in 
bilateral and multilateral relations. 
– Keep restraint—in order to manage confrontation, self-restraint and mutual re-
straint are needed. Some “red lines” have been drawn: there should be no more 
moves towards NATO’s membership of Ukraine, and Georgia and no experi-
ments around Donbas.
– Exercise caution—in order to prevent possible dangerous incidents. 
– Continue communication—to develop and maintain all possible channels for 
dialogue: experts exchanges, confidential discussions, “Track – II” diplomacy, 
etc. 
– Exercise endurance—to look for all possible positive elements and openings in 
the relationships. This may mean opportunism in the best sense of the word, i.e. 
looking for opportunities to improve the situation in a sense similar to the spirit 
of the 1980s.
This modest agenda may help us from sliding into an even more dangerous confron-
tation legitimized by arguments of its geopolitical predetermination and prepare 
better options for generations to come.
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Democracy, Crisis and Geopolitics: Emergence 
and Transformation of Anti-Kurdish Riots in 
Turkey
Şefika Kumral
This chapter discusses Turkey’s recent authoritarian turn and the escalation of political 
violence by turning attention to two under-examined processes: democratization pro-
cess and the rise of anti-Kurdish communal violence. It argues that communal violence 
targeting the Kurdish civilians and the authoritarian turn is the result of simultaneous 
crises at two levels: (1) the crisis of the AKP’s eﬀorts to establish its hegemony over the 
Kurdish population through the “democratic opening” process in the first decade of 
the 21st century; and (2) the eﬀects of the escalation of a rising geopolitical crisis in the 
Middle East especially in the aftermath of the Syrian War, which is linked to the crisis 
of the U.S. world hegemony. These two crises—operating at two diﬀerent levels—are ul-
timately interlinked, and they play a crucial role in the emergence, institutionalization, 
and radicalization of communal violence in Turkey in recent years.
Rising tide of violence and authoritarianism
Once hailed as a model of democracy for the rest of the Middle East, Turkey has re-
cently taken an authoritarian turn leading to heightened conflict both within Turkey 
and in the region. As part of Erdoğan’s struggle to remain in power and increase his 
political grip through various means, including the repression of the opposition and 
the censorship of media, Turkey has witnessed the most violent period in its entire 
history. It is not a secret that modern Turkey’s political history was never free from 
various forms of political conflict and violence. History of modern Turkey is full of 
state-led massacres of ethnic/religious minorities (e.g. 1938 Dersim Massacre), anti-
minority riots (e.g. anti-non-Muslim riots of 1955; anti-Alawite riots in ş in 1978 
and in Sivas 1993); military coups (i.e. in 1960, 1971, 1980, and the post-modern 
coup of 1997), prolonged socialist-fascist clashes in the late 1970s, and the ethnic 
armed rebellion by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that came to a peak in the 
mid-1990s. What makes the current period diﬀerent from these former episodes of 
political conflict and violence is that, in recent years, Turkey has been witnessing the 
simultaneous increase in diﬀerent forms of political violence all at once, including 
deadly suicide bombings in major cities, occasional rockets targeting towns border-
ing Syria, heightened armed conflict, and state-led massacres against civilians in 
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the Kurdish region, military operations in Syria and Iraq, anti-Kurdish communal 
violence in western cities of Turkey, as well as civilian violence targeting political 
opponents, as exemplified in the latest coup attempt in July 2016. This chapter ex-
plains the relationship between Erdoğan’s authoritarian turn and this unusual rise of 
political violence in Turkey by turning attention to two under-examined processes: 
democratization process and the rise of anti-Kurdish communal violence.
There are two interrelated features of this rising tide of violence that are not 
well understood. First, in this tumultuous period, ordinary civilians are not only 
used to the routinized political violence, but also have become its main perpetra-
tors. Civilians’ role in the production of violence is particularly visible in increas-
ing communal violence targeting Kurdish civilians. Second, unlike widely assumed, 
this rising tide of civic violence did not start with Erdoğan’s authoritarianism. It is 
true that anti-Kurdish societal violence reached a peak in the tumultuous political 
environment corresponding to the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)—and 
Erdoğan’s, for that matter—hegemonic crisis and rising authoritarianism. Yet, what 
is less widely known is that popular anti-Kurdish riots emerged and became wide-
spread in mid-2000s, when the AKP was still perceived as the champion of demo-
cratic resolution of Turkey’s long lasting Kurdish conflict. In the course of the AKP’s 
“democratic opening,” Kurdish civilians, political parties, shops and civil society or-
ganizations in western cities and towns in Turkey increasingly became targets of 
nationalist mobs (see Figure 1). This new form of societal ethnic violence was intro-
duced to the “repertoire of violence in Turkey” (Gambetti, 2014) in the 2000s, when 
the armed conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK came to an end, 
and when a “democratic/Kurdish opening” process was started. This new form of 
ethnic violence—targeting Kurds—has taken place in various cities and towns of 
western, northern, southern and central Turkey; that is, away from the geographi-
cal center of Kurdish armed rebellion in the East.1 Rather, it is taking place in the 
metropolitan and industrial cities of western Anatolia where internally displaced 
Kurds migrated, in late 1980s and 1990s at the peak of the armed conflict between 
the Turkish armed forces and the PKK (Ayata and Yükseker, 2005).
This chapter discusses the emergence, institutionalization, and transformation 
of anti-Kurdish communal violence in Turkey in the last two decades in relation to 
contradictions of the AKP’s democratic decade and the recent geopolitical crises in 
the region. Based on intensive fieldwork in districts with high levels of communal 
violence, archival research, and original data on ethnic and nationalist violence in 
Turkey (collected by the author), this chapter puts forward three main arguments. 
First, the AKP’s democratic opening process in the 2000s was based on a contra-
dictory double movement: (1) an attempt to co-opt the Kurdish masses through 
1 See Bora (2008), Gambetti (2007), and Ergin (2014) for this new form of anti-Kurdish vio-
lence in Turkey.
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partial extension of democratic rights and liberties, and (2) a full-fledged suppres-
sion of the other main contenders for this hegemony-building project: the Kurdish 
democratic movement. This double movement of democratization, in return, had 
two major consequences for the development of anti-Kurdish communal violence. 
On the one hand, it further polarized ethnic divisions by providing a space for both 
Kurdish social movements and ultranationalists to mobilize. On the other hand, it 
made it easier for the government to turn a blind eye to the emerging popular anti-
Kurdish riots, which helped discipline “bad Kurds.” This policy, however, gradually 
led to the normalization and institutionalization of riots.
Secondly, I argue that anti-Kurdish communal violence further escalated and 
radically transformed since 2014 in the face of escalating geopolitical crisis in the 
Middle East and rising authoritarianism. As Figure 1 illustrates, while the 1990s had 
been characterized by a high level of armed conflict (between the Turkish armed 
forces and the PKK in southeastern Kurdish cities of Turkey) but a low level of 
communal violence, the 2000s were characterized by a low level of armed conflict 
but a high level of communal violence against Kurds in western cities. Since 2015, 
Figure 1: Incidents of anti-communal violence and number of military deaths 
in due to armed conflict
Source: Frequency of communal ethnic violence and extreme right nationalist violence is calculated from 
Ethnic and Nationalist Violence in Turkey (ENViT) database created by the author; Data on military deaths 
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however, we have been observing a third era characterized by high levels of armed 
conflict and communal violence, which takes place both in Kurdish cities as well as 
in the western cities of Turkey (Figure 2).
Thirdly, I argue that these radical transformations since 2015 are results of si-
multaneous crises at two levels: at the national level, we see a crisis of the AKP’s ef-
forts to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish population through the “democrat-
ic opening” process; at the international level, we see the eﬀects of the escalation of 
a rising geopolitical crisis in the Middle East especially in the aftermath of the Syrian 
War, which is linked to the crisis of the United States’ world hegemony. This chapter 
will show that these two crises—operating at two diﬀerent levels—are ultimately 
interlinked, and that they play a crucial role in the emergence of the recent simul-
taneous increase in diﬀerent forms of political violence in Turkey in recent years.
The AKP’s double movement of democratization
When the AKP first came to power in 2002, it promised a change in oﬃcial policy 
toward the long-lasting Kurdish conflict and a move away from a security-military 
focus. Erdoğan became the first political leader to refer to the “Kurdish problem” 
since Turgut Özal. This heralded the beginning of a decade marked by democratic 
opening, which was by no means a straightforward process. Instead of simply ex-









 Democracy, Crisis and Geopolitics 117
tending rights and liberties to the Kurds, the AKP’s strategy for democratic resolu-
tion of the conflict was characterized by a double movement: From the very start, it 
simultaneously pursued partial democratization and increasing repression.
Shortly after the November 2002 elections that brought the AKP to power, Prime 
Minister Abdullah Gül showed the new government’s commitment to a democratic 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict by declaring that they would “take steps that will 
shock the E.U.” (The Association Press, 2002). In his famous Diyarbakir Speech in 
2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan (2005) admitted the past mistakes of the state, de-
clared the existence of a “Kurdish problem” in Turkey, and promised to solve this 
problem through extending democracy and welfare. This change in political atti-
tude was formalized when the National Security Council declared in June 2007 that 
the “fight against terrorism would be carried out ‘on the basis of democracy and 
rule of law’” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011). The democratic initiative was confirmed in a 
public declaration by the Minister of Interior in 2009, widely known as the Kurdish 
Opening, and started a process that included the extension of the “rights and free-
doms of the Kurds” in the spheres of education, culture and media. The Kurdish 
problem began to be discussed publicly in “the media, civil society, and universities” 
and the state “started to negotiate with the PKK and its captured leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, to disarm the question” (Keyman, 2012, 474–475).
Those that attribute these changes to the AKP’s initial commitment to democ-
racy, however, ignore that the democratic turn in the state’s attitude towards the 
Kurdish conflict was above all a pragmatic attempt of the government to establish 
its hegemony over the Kurdish population. This policy was also supported by the 
United States, which needed to contain the Kurdish rebellion in the Middle East 
as part of its neo-imperialist ambitions. In order not to further lose its repressive 
“state capacity” and escape the fate of being a “weakly Weberian state” (Brubaker 
and Laitin, 1998) by prolonging the armed rebellion, the Turkish state chose to in-
crease its consent-making capacity upon the recommendations of United States’ 
policy makers.
Many forget the “Kurdish Opening” process is not an invention of the AKP gov-
ernment. Eﬀorts at democratization-from-above actually predated the AKP era. In 
early 1990s, during the height of the Gulf War, President Turgut Özal—in collabo-
ration with George Bush—made a similar overture, which did not have any actual 
political outcomes (Karatasli, 2015). Furthermore, as part of the European Union’s 
accession negotiations, the coalition government before the AKP had also initiated 
various reforms such as lifting the ban on broadcasting in Kurdish and imposing a 
ban on the death penalty in 2002. When the AKP came to power in 2002, it prom-
ised the continuation and extension of this policy, as indicated by Abdullah Gul’s 
aforementioned remarks.
What was distinctive about the AKP was its desire, will and potential to be-
come a counter-hegemonic force which could replace the secular Kemalist repub-
lican tradition, ideology and institutions, whose hegemony was rapidly declining 
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in the face of rising Kurdish and Islamic movements. Through various discursive, 
legal, and executive moves towards democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict 
described above, the AKP hoped to establish its hegemony over the Kurdish popu-
lation. The success of this strategy also meant enormous electoral benefits for the 
AKP, which were realized in the first half of AKP’s rule. Erdoğan’s Kurdish opening 
especially paid oﬀ in the 2007 elections, when the AKP received 53.2% of the vote 
in the Kurdish region. The AKP also received significant electoral support from the 
Kurdish population in western metropoles such as Istanbul. With this substantial 
electoral support from Kurds, Erdoğan even declared the AKP as the main political 
“representative” of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Despite this seemingly over-
confident declaration, Erdoğan was aware that the AKP had a major contender to 
this hegemony-building project: the pro-Kurdish political parties and social move-
ment mobilization led by a broader left-wing coalition. Hence, the AKP’s quest for 
hegemony over the Kurdish masses through partial extension of their rights and lib-
erties also was accompanied by attempts to delegitimize any competitor for demo-
cratic representation of the Kurds.
The rise of AKP’s democratic contenders
The AKP’s plan to assert its hegemony over the Kurdish population did not go as 
smoothly as planned because the Kurdish movement did not fade away from the 
political scene. While pro-Kurdish political parties of the 1990s were largely seen 
as only “secondary” to the PKK, pro-Kurdish political parties in the 2000s (e.g. 
Democratic Society Party—DTP; Peace and Democracy Party—BDP; Peoples’ 
Democratic Party—HDP) became central actors in Turkish politics. On the one 
hand, pro-Kurdish political parties engaged in a massive social movement mobili-
zation especially among the Kurdish forced migrant population in various western 
cities of Turkey. They substantially grew in strength both organizationally and po-
litically. They established bureaus in various western cities and towns, and Kurdish 
civil society organizations mushroomed throughout the country. They also estab-
lished a major alliance with a wide spectrum of socialist organizations for electoral 
campaigns and for social movement mobilization.
Concomitant with grassroots mobilizations, the electoral power and political 
visibility of Kurdish parties have increased significantly. Especially starting with 
2004, pro-Kurdish parties (or independent candidates) gradually increased their 
votes among the Kurdish population. In the Kurdish region, the pro-Kurdish parties 
received 18% in 2007, 26% in 2009, 27% in 2011, 30% in 2014, 34% in 2014 (presi-
dential elections) and 46% in the 2015 elections (Bayhan, 2014). The increase in the 
political power of the pro-Kurdish political parties is much more significant than 
what is captured by this gradual increase in votes. In 2007, the pro-Kurdish political 
party DTP joined elections with independent candidates (rather than as a political 
party), and in combination secured 22 seats in parliament, thereby by-passing the 
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10% national threshold. The 2007 election inaugurated a period in which pro-Kurd-
ish parties were no longer extra-parliamentary political actors but instead became 
a major parliamentary opposition to the AKP; and sparked a debate about “who is 
the political representative of the Kurds.” After this point, the parliamentary seats of 
pro-Kurdish parties secularly increased as well. In the 2011 elections, 36 indepen-
dent candidates of the Kurdish-socialist alliance (Labor, Democracy and Freedom 
Bloc) were elected to the parliament. This gradual increase of electoral power was 
the first step towards the HDP overcoming the 10% threshold on its own (as a politi-
cal party) in the June 2015 elections.
Overall, pro-Kurdish parties established three things at the same time. They in-
creased their electoral support from the Kurdish masses, increased their political 
visibility and significance by gradually becoming a major opposition party in the 
parliament, and further strengthened an alliance with the Turkish left. The pro-
Kurdish parties increasingly became the strongest left-wing party articulating the 
problems of the most exploited and oppressed sections of the society including the 
working classes, the Kurds, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
community. It not only became a major competitor of the AKP in its quest to estab-
lish its hegemony over the Kurdish masses, but also extended its sphere of influence 
over a larger group of oppressed and excluded populations.
The AKP’s eﬀorts to repress and delegitimize the contenders
The active participation of pro-Kurdish parties in national electoral politics marks 
a fundamental diﬀerence between the democratic resolution process in Turkey and 
how these processes played out in Spain (with the Basque Homeland and Liberty—
ETA) and in the United Kingdom (with the Irish Republican Army—IRA). One 
must note that it was not the AKP, or the Turkish state for that matter, that had been 
pushing the Kurdish movement to participate in electoral politics. On the contrary, 
it is the Kurdish movement which has been struggling for electoral participation as 
a part of its mobilization strategy. Turkish political actors have long been trying to 
exclude the Kurdish movement from parliament. This diﬀerence might help explain 
why a state-led “democratic opening” process cannot be successful as a hegemonic 
strategy without also countering pro-Kurdish democracy forces.
Precisely for this reason, a significant aspect of the AKP’s democratic opening 
process was delegitimization and repression of pro-Kurdish democracy forces. This 
revealed itself in a number of ways.2 First of all, pro-Kurdish political parties faced 
constant legal attacks by the state through party bans and detainment of party and 
2 While the AKP was able to increase its votes in the Kurdish region in 2007 elections, the 
2007 elections were not marked by AKP’s success but by BDP’s challenge. Shortly after elections, 
Erdoğan declared that the “AKP was the true representative of the Kurdish people,” openly show-
ing his disturbance by BDP’s challenge (Radikal, 2007).
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movement activists in this period. Shortly after the victory of independent candi-
dates in the 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish party DTP faced a closure case, 
which included provisions to put political bans on eight members of the parliament. 
Interestingly, most of those members of parliament (MPs) were known to be the 
moderates of the party (“the doves”) rather than the figures closer to the PKK (“the 
hawks”). The party faced a similar legal attack shortly after its electoral success in 
March 2009. In December, the DTP was banned by the constitutional court, and 
its leaders had their positions as MPs revoked. Starting in April 2009, thousands 
of party members, members of mass democratic organizations and activists were 
detained as part of operations against the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), 
also known as the urban wing of the PKK. The anti-KCK operations continued in 
May as members and representatives of Turkey’s largest union of public employees 
(Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions—KESK) were detained. Electoral suc-
cess of the pro-Kurdish party in the June 2011 elections unleashed two other major 
operations against the party cadres as well. Between 2009 and the end of 2011, ap-
proximately 7748 politicians and activists were arrested, most of them awaiting trial 
in prison for years (Bia Haber Merkezi, 2011). The number of political prisoners in 
the AKP decade surpassed those figures during the 1980 military coup.
One objective of the mass detainments was the repression of the Kurdish move-
ment and the undermining of its organizational strength and activities. Another 
aim of the large-scale KCK operations was to delegitimize the party and its activ-
ists, who were increasingly becoming central figures in parliamentary politics. In 
this quest to delegitimize the mass movement that utilizes democratic means of 
claim-making, the state extensively exercised its power over the “discourse on pub-
lic order” (della Porta, 1996).3 Through various acts that include party bans, arrests 
of activists of pro-Kurdish party and civil society organizations and obstructing pro-
test actions, the AKP government continuously framed these institutions, actors, 
and claims as ones that allegedly “disturb the public order.” For instance, during the 
KCK operations, the photos of handcuﬀed party representatives and elected oﬃ-
cials reached millions through the news media. The prime minister—and even the 
president—were constantly questioning the legitimacy of the pro-Kurdish parties 
and MPs in the parliament through hostile public declarations. Ironically, while the 
government was holding secret negotiations with the PKK and its imprisoned lead-
er Abdullah Öcalan, they were continuously forcing pro-Kurdish parties to publicly 
denounce Öcalan and the PKK. State repression had an impact on public opinion 
at the local level as well. In some districts, representatives of the pro-Kurdish BDP 
complained about the negative impact of large-scale police presence during their 
public announcements and protests, arguing that the police presence prevented 
3 On the question of “disturbing the public peace,” see della Porta (1996).
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their messages from being heard by the larger masses and made them appear like 
criminals to bystanders.4
Consequently, the AKP’s double movement, combining simultaneously coopta-
tion and repression, has created a contentious space in which the Kurdish move-
ment increasingly utilized democratic means (electoral politics and social move-
ment mobilizations), while the state/government delegitimized this mobilization, 
casting its goals and leaders as enemies of public order (i.e. criminals, terrorists, 
etc.). Most important of all, this contention was not confined to the higher echelons 
of elite politics. It has also taken place in the public space. The “Turkish majority 
population” became witnesses, and later, active participants in this contention. In 
the 2000s, this participation was mediated by far right nationalists.
Extreme right nationalists riding the tide of AKP’s double 
movement
The AKP’s double movement of “cooptation and repression” of the Kurds through-
out the 2000s greatly benefited the far right nationalists—more specifically, the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The Nationalist Action Party is the “electoral wing” 
of the ülkücü movement, which is Turkey’s historically strongest right-wing nation-
alist movement with strong links to civil society. Despite being a marginal political 
party throughout the 1970s—both in terms of its marginal electoral appeal, extrem-
ist ideology, and violent practices—and suppressed by the 1980 military coup, the 
MHP made a significant return in the mid-1990s by receiving a surprisingly high 
number of votes in both general and local elections.
The MHP emerged as the political actor that put forth the most consistent op-
position to the democratic/Kurdish opening process throughout the 2000s. As the 
Kemalists in the army and various state institutions were gradually liquidated, and 
as the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) took very ambiguous and inconsis-
tent positions with respect to the “democratic opening” process, the MHP emerged 
as the only remaining representative of the “security oriented/militarist” approach 
to the Kurdish problem on the Turkish political scene. This stance enabled the MHP 
to hold a unique position as the AKP’s major contender for representing the conser-
vative-nationalist portion of the electorate that was unsympathetic to any form of 
negotiations with the Kurdish movement. The rise of the pro-Kurdish political par-
ties has further increased the salience of the MHP’s opposition to the democratic 
opening process. The MHP constantly criticized the AKP for the Kurdish Opening 
process, for negotiating with the PKK, and for allowing pro-Kurdish parties, which 
they call PKK’s extensions, to be in the parliament. They embarked upon this dual 
4 Author’s interviews with BDP representatives, 2012.
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opposition to the strengthening of pro-Kurdish parties on the one hand, and to the 
AKP government on the other.5
In the 2000s, the AKP’s double movement created opportunities for the MHP 
not only to find popular support for its nationalist political agenda on the electoral 
scene but also to popularize anti-Kurdish and extreme right violence at the soci-
etal level. Legal attacks and continuous attempts by the government to delegitimize 
Kurdish democratic mobilization, parties, and civil society organizations created 
a legitimate sphere for non-state violence (both actual and symbolic) towards pro-
Kurdish parties and Kurdish civilians. The ülkücü movement made extensive use of 
this sphere. Throughout the “decade of democratization,” nationalist mobs, often 
led by the ülkücü movement, have attacked Kurdish political parties, activists, and 
their supporters, which they openly denote as the nation’s enemies (Kumral, 2017).
In sum, the extreme right greatly benefited from the contradictions of the demo-
cratic opening process. In the 1990s the ülkücü movement organized “anti-terror” 
nationalist demonstrations on the one hand and utilized political violence against 
socialists on the other; however, they were not able to mobilize the masses for vio-
lence. In the 2000s, for the first time in its long history marked by militant and para-
military violence, the ülkücü movement found a space to lead and mobilize civilian 
masses for violence. In turn, the mass character of violence enabled the movement 
to enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy and to avoid being seen as a marginal or 
radical political actor.
The AKP’s role in the institutionalization of riots
In the course of the 2000s, the AKP government not only created opportunities for 
the popularization of nationalist violence, but it also helped institutionalize this vio-
lence by legitimizing the actions of nationalist mobs during and after riots. Besides 
facilitating violent acts through inaction, state further legitimized riot behavior by 
not punishing the perpetrators afterwards (see Wilkinson, 2004; Gambetti, 2007; 
Bora, 2008). One such case was a lynching attempt in İzmir in 2005. The incident 
started when five residents from Diyarbakir had a traﬃc-related discussion with a 
military oﬃcer, which gave way to a false rumor that “Kurds are attacking the sol-
diers,” which in turn sparked mob violence. Eventually, only one of the attackers was 
put on trial, and he was found not guilty by the court. On the other hand, two of the 
lynching victims were found guilty of “resistance to a public oﬃcer” by the court 
(Çalışlar, 2009).
Likewise, five leftist university students in Trabzon, who became targets of a 
lynching mob in 2005 while distributing political pamphlets, were arrested by the 
5 Inter-electoral violence targeting Kurds was also an attempt by the AKP to change MHP’s 
monopoly over nationalism.
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police after the incident. During an episode of the Zeytinburnu riots in 2011, to 
give another example, when a nationalist mob was confronted by a Kurdish group, 
the police were reported to have gently asked the nationalist mob to leave saying 
“Friends please disperse. We [the police] are more than enough for them [the Kurds].” 
(İnsan Hakları Derneği, 2011). Another interesting detail in the report shows how 
state repression was utilized: while the arrested Kurds were taken to the “anti-terror 
branch,” nationalists were taken to “public security branch” of the police.
State inaction and failure to punish the rioters was further reinforced by the sup-
portive post-riot remarks of government oﬃcials. In most of these remarks, riots 
and attacks were generally referred to as “incidents” and rioters were called “angry 
masses” or “citizens.” When thousands of people attempted to lynch five socialist 
students in Trabzon, who were mistaken for Kurds, Prime Minister Erdoğan em-
phasized “the importance of the ‘sensitivity’ of the public” for the outbreak of the 
‘events’.” He even stated that “when this sensitivity is ‘touched,’ there would certainly 
be reactions” (Hürriyet, 2005). His discursive support for the vigilantes increased 
further in time. After a nationalist attack in 2008, he interpreted the event as a case 
of “self-defense”: “I advise my people to have patience. Yet of course, until when 
should one have patience? If you break the glasses of their shops, threaten their lives, 
then citizens would choose the path of self-defense if they have the means and op-
portunity to do so.” (Saymaz, 2010).
Even though riots actually constitute a breach of the state’s monopoly over vio-
lence, as long as they did not have the aim or potential to debilitate state author-
ity, they were not repressed—as any other non-state collective violence would have 
been. Hence, the riots become an interesting showcase to see the organic link be-
tween the political society and the civil society. Anti-Kurdish riots provided a two-
way legitimization: while the state produced and institutionalized the legitimate 
sphere for civilian violence, mob violence against the Kurds provided a popular le-
gitimacy for the AKP’s disciplinary repression of the Kurdish mass movement.
Changing dynamics of anti-Kurdish violence after 2015
Since 2015, however, the government and state institutions are no longer confined 
to turning a blind eye to riots, legitimizing and normalizing violence against Kurds. 
The government and state institutions themselves have started full-fledged deadly 
attacks against the Kurdish population.
It is reasonable to suggest that the qualitative shift occurred after the June 7, 
2015 elections. Until the June 2015 elections, the AKP managed to increase its votes 
in every election: From 34.28% in 2002 to 46.58% in 2007, and to 49.83% in 2011. 
As Figure 3 shows, from 2007 to 2011, the AKP managed to receive votes from the 
MHP as well as other center right and Islamic parties. In addition, the AKP did not 
lose significant votes to the Pro-Kurdish coalition.
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After 2011, however, this pattern started to gradually change. The massive anti-
government protests in the summer of 2013—the biggest anti-government pro-
test in the history of modern Turkey—were clear evidence that discontent against 
Erdoğan’s regime was rapidly escalating. While Erdoğan was re-elected in the 2014 
presidential elections with 51.79% of the votes, his hopes to become a president in a 
“presidential system” were interrupted with the defeat of the AKP in the June 2015 
elections. Election results showed that the AKP lost its parliamentary majority. The 
AKP’s electoral support declined from 49.83% (in the June 2011 general elections) 
to 40.8% (in the June 2015 elections). As Figure 4 shows, the AKP lost its votes 
mainly to two groups, both of which were riding the tide of the democratization 
process, albeit in two opposite ways: (1) the pro-Kurdish party (HDP) and (2) to the 
ultranationalist MHP. Around 8.49% of the AKP supporters in the 2011 elections 
supported the Kurdish party in the 2015 elections; and 7.48% of the AKP supporters 
in the 2011 elections supported the ultranationalist MHP in 2015.
The most important feature of the June 2015 elections was the rise of the HDP. 
For the first time in Turkish history, a pro-Kurdish party (i.e. the HDP) entered into 
parliamentary elections not through an independent candidate strategy but as a par-
ty, and managed to pass the 10% national threshold by receiving 13% of all votes. The 
Figure 3: Shifts in electoral preferences from July 2007 to June 2011 general 
elections
Source: Author’s calculations using the changes in the percentages of votes at the district level. Width of bars 
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success of the HDP mostly rested in its ability to forge a broad left-wing and social-
democratic coalition, to win some of the “loyal” Kurds back from the AKP, to attract 
a new “young” electorate who were politicized during the 2013 anti-government 
protests (aka the Gezi uprising), and to mobilize these segments against the AKP 
and Erdoğan based on a highly eﬀective motto: “we will not make you President [in 
a presidential system].”
After the June 7, 2015 electoral defeat, President Erdoğan’s plan to replace 
Turkey’s parliamentary political system with a presidential system was interrupted 
by the opposition. In response, Erdoğan blocked any possibility for a coalition gov-
ernment. Since a coalition government between the Kemalists (CHP), ultranation-
alists (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish parties (HDP) was not possible, the only remain-
ing option was to call for another round of elections in November.
Erdoğan promoted a bloody campaign for the early November elections. The 
campaign was based on a simple slogan: “Without AKP rule, there is only chaos for 
Turkey.” Curiously, that’s exactly what happened. The period after the AKP’s elector-
al defeat in the June 2015 elections became the most violent and tumultuous period 
in the history of Turkey. In the inter-election period, armed clashes between the 
PKK and the state re-emerged, and violence and repression resumed in the Kurdish 
Figure 4: Shifts in electoral preferences from June 2011 to June 2015 general 
elections
Source: Author’s calculations using the changes in the percentages of votes at the district level. Width of bars 
and lines shows the relative size of votes.
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region. The town of Cizre came under fierce state attack and Kurdish civilians were 
massacred in their homes by the army in what was presented in the mainstream 
media as a “terrorist hunt.” The state resurrected emergency rule in Kurdish cities 
by establishing various “provisional security zones” weeks before the November 1 
elections.
This period also coincided with two suicide bombings targeting Kurds and so-
cialist groups allying with the Kurdish movement. The first blast killed 33 social-
ists in Suruç that were on their way to help reconstruct Kobane. The other took 
place in the heart of the capital, during a peace rally organized by the pro-Kurdish 
HDP and leftist parties and unions, killing 102 people. This bombing attack “was 
the most devastating terrorist assault in the history of the Turkish Republic” (Öniş, 
2016, 150). While Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was the perpetrator of these 
bombings, the AKP, Prime Minister Davutoglu and President Erdoğan utilized the 
suicide bombings as propaganda against the HDP and the PKK. For instance, in the 
days following the Suruç operation, around 1300 people were detained. While only 
150 of them were related to ISIS, the rest were members of the Kurdish movement 
and the revolutionary left in Turkey (Zirngast, 2015). Turning ISIS terror into an 
anti-Kurdish campaign was possible because, “for the average citizen, the originator 
of terror—whether ISIS or the PKK—seemed irrelevant . . it was easy to paint dis-
sent as a threat to stability and public order” (Öniş, 2016, 150–151).
This violence came to a peak just before the November 2015 elections. In 
September 2015, the death of sixteen soldiers at the Dağlıca military outpost 
sparked nationalist fervor throughout the country and nationalist demonstrations 
organized by right wing nationalists turned into violent attacks against Kurdish ci-
vilians and oﬃces of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP). Within two days, HDP 
oﬃces were attacked in various cities and some were set on fire by demonstrators; 
Kurdish workers became targets of lynch mobs; Kurdish civilians were beaten to 
death by their neighbors; passenger buses traveling to Kurdish cities were attacked 
by nationalists blocking highways.
Turkey entered into the November 1 elections in this chaotic context. If there 
was any time when elites tried to use communal violence in order to gain national-
ist votes, it was probably in this period. The eventual success of Erdoğan’s bloody 
electoral campaign—where the AKP managed to increase its votes from 40.8% to 
49.50% in four months—and popular support for violence shocked both his oppo-
nents and observers. The November 1 electoral victory also implied that nearly 50% 
of the citizens gave their implicit support for this inter-election violence. As dis-
turbing as this civilian support for anti-Kurdish violence might be, it was far from 
shocking. After all, as we have discussed in previous sections, the popular support 
for anti-Kurdish violence was already visible before the elections. Civilians were not 
only supporters of state-led anti-Kurdish violence in southeastern Turkey, but also 
their main perpetrators in western cities.
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The rise of the AKP-led anti-Kurdish violence, however, cannot merely be un-
derstood as Erdoğan’s response to electoral defeat. Good evidence for this fact is the 
continuation of repression and violence even after the elections, despite the AKP 
victory. The AKP’s electoral defeat in the June elections was preceded by a hege-
monic challenge that the AKP faced from the Kurdish mass movement. While the 
AKP recovered its votes by attracting the nationalist votes, it was not able to liqui-
date this hegemonic challenge.
What we have been observing since 2015, then, is not a mere replica of the previ-
ous forms of violence. We have been observing a major transformation in the form 
of anti-Kurdish violence today. Below, I will note four major and inter-related as-
pects of this new era that is marked by Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s hegemonic crisis at 
the national level and geopolitical crisis at the international level.
The end of the “democratic opening process”
First of all, after it became apparent that the Kurdish movement would not sup-
port Erdoğan’s presidential system, the AKP’s “democratic opening” was put on the 
back burner. In this new era, we have been witnessing a shift towards “domination 
without hegemony” in the AKP’s attitude towards the Kurds, after a decade-long at-
tempt at hegemony-building. Dialogue between the state and the PKK’s imprisoned 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan, has halted. The ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK that 
was in eﬀect since 2013 gave way to military clashes. As the “hegemony building” 
strategy comes to an end, conflict has further escalated—even though the PKK an-
nounced a unilateral ceasefire in October 2015 (Al Jazeera Turk, 2015).
With the collapse of the democratic opening process, the AKP government has 
started to emulate the old hardline nationalist approach to the Kurdish problem 
and to frame all of these movements as part of terrorist activities, including justify-
ing the repression and killing of civilians in Kurdish towns or the imprisonment of 
Kurdish activists in western cities as part of a “terrorist hunt.” Even non-Kurdish 
activists or intellectuals (e.g. Turkish academics) are not immune from this treat-
ment.6 As a part of their combat against terrorism, the AKP—with the support of 
both the ultranationalist MHP and the Kemalist CHP—even proposed a law to lift 
the immunity of Kurdish MPs in the parliament on May 2016 (Balik, 2016; Hürriyet 
Daily News, 2016a). As a result, thirteen MPs of the HDP are imprisoned, including 
the two co-chairs. This wide perception of “terrorism” is not alien to ultranational-
6 A good example of this is the way Erdoğan and the AKP government responded to the 
“Academics for Peace” petition signed in January 2016 by thousands of academics in Turkey and 
all over the world. President Erdoğan immediately publicly denounced all petition signers as ter-
rorists and started an investigation—through legal prosecutors or through universities—against 
all petition signers. Many academics have been dismissed or suspended from their jobs for sign-
ing the petition; some were put in pretrial detention and jail.
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ist conception of Kurds as “enemies within.” As we have shown, it was also already 
visible in the AKP’s selective repression of the dissidents in the previous decade. 
What we have been observing, however, is the melding of these two conceptions 
into each other. Now, as the AKP’s hopes to coopt the rest of the Kurds are dashed, 
and since it started to lose even some of the “good Kurds,” the AKP emulates the 
nationalist approach with a nuanced twist. They claim that all rights and liberties of 
Kurds have already been recognized and whoever tries to push further are terrorists 
who want to divide and separate the society. As Erdoğan himself put it in January 
2016, “There is no Kurdish problem in Turkey any more. We only have a terrorism 
problem” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016b).
The AKP’s emulation of the fascist strategies
One of the major reasons why Erdoğan and the AKP shifted their position is the fail-
ure of their hegemony-building project. Having failed to coopt the Kurds, Erdoğan 
has been trying to ride the tide of nationalism. Indeed, today the MHP voters are 
the main group supporting the AKP against the Kurds. To maintain and further in-
crease this support, Erdoğan is using a dual strategy. First, he is playing with fire by 
provoking the PKK and a resurgence of the armed conflict, to make the “rise of ter-
rorism” argument more plausible. Furthermore, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons—
Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK), which is a splinter of the PKK—have started 
bombing attacks, one of which killed 37 people in the capital (Ankara) on March 13 
to avenge the 300 Kurds killed in Cizre. President Erdoğan and the AKP government 
have been using these incidents to further justify a full-fledged attack against terror-
ism and their supporters.
It is important to note that the resurgence of armed conflict—in a context where 
riots are institutionalized—would have significant repercussions for ethnic vio-
lence, which would quickly go out of control. This process will definitely not be a 
return back to the 1990s where the armed conflict was confined to fighting between 
the Turkish armed forces and the PKK. As we have seen in previous sections, even 
sporadic armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Armed forces during the 
democratic opening period triggered various major riots on the societal sphere. 
Likewise, the trigger for the recent anti-Kurdish riots in September 2015 was the 
resurgence of armed conflict in the Kurdish region, i.e. the death of sixteen soldiers 
in Dağlıca. Hence, unlike the 1990s when armed conflict in the Kurdish region did 
not lead to riots outside the war zone, the escalation of armed conflict in today’s 
conditions has the potential to further intensify deadly ethnic riots with massive 
popular support.
Secondly, going beyond legitimizing and institutionalizing riots throughout 
the 2000s, Erdoğan’s AKP has started to emulate the fascist strategy, by directing 
horizontal violence against mass movements that challenge his authority. This was 
visible during the 2013 Gezi uprising, when Erdoğan embraced shopkeepers who 
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attacked the protestors as “the police, the soldier, the guardian of the neighborhood, 
when necessary” (Cumhuriyet, 2014). Youth branches of the AKP attacked and/or 
intimidated protestors in various cities. Utilizing the “riot strategy” was particularly 
visible in recent post-election anti-Kurdish riots in September 2015. In his quest 
for constituting the “masses” as active nationalist subjects through activating anti-
Kurdish [and anti-HDP] hostility before the elections, riot production became an-
other tool in the hands of Erdoğan.
In various cities, the violence was led by a relatively new organization called 
Osmanlı Ocakları (Hearts of the Ottoman) formed in 2009, which has organic 
links with the AKP and considers its members to be “soldiers of Recep T. Erdoğan.” 
Emulating this fascist strategy of utilizing horizontal violence against the Kurds, 
which also seems to be a successful electoral strategy in diﬀerent contexts, like 
India, Erdoğan hoped to increase nationalist fervor and emerge as the main rep-
resentative for the nationalist electorate.7 Furthermore, the increasing salience of 
this new paramilitary organization, which bears a remarkable resemblance to ülkü 
ocakları (Hearth of Idealists), also indicates how Erdoğan has started to copy fascist 
organizational forms as well—which worked well for the electoral fortunes of the 
MHP throughout the 2000s—in a quest to compete with them.
Rise of the geopolitical crisis: The Kobane eﬀect
A third related process was that state and non-state violence against the Kurds 
have increasingly melded into each other in the face of rising geopolitical crises. 
Especially the Battle of Kobane—where the Kurdish militia in the Rojava region of 
Syria and ISIS fought—became a critical turning point in that regard. To explain 
how this dynamic played out we need to introduce some of the relational links be-
tween the Rojava movement and the Kurdish movement in southeast and western 
Turkey.
As part of the Syrian conflict, which has turned into an internationalized civil 
war, Kurds managed to establish their de-facto autonomy in the Rojava region on 
the border of Turkey. Paradoxically, the “democratic opening process” in Turkey 
played an interesting role in the strengthening of the Rojava movement. The Kurdish 
armed forces who left Turkey as part of the bilateral peace negotiations between the 
Turkish state and the PKK went to Rojava and concentrated their power in western 
Syria at the Turkish border. Using the opportunities produced by the Syrian Arab 
Spring protests, the Kurdish militants gained their de facto autonomy and declared 
self-rule in their cantons. The Kurdish movement in Rojava has also started to gain 
7 Erdoğan’s strategy also became obvious to the MHP soon after the eruption of recent riots. 
After the initial fervor of mobilizing nationalist demonstrations, the ülkücü movement made an 
announcement to praise “peace” to its activists and followers and pointing fingers to AKP as the 
instigator of the recent riots, saying: “those who follow AKP’s lead cannot be an ülkücü.”
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some degree of legitimacy and partial international support due to their successful 
resistance and fight against ISIS during and after the Battle of Kobane.
The AKP government was very keen to gain United States’ support for a military 
operation in Syria, for the purpose of defeating the Kurdish movement in Rojava. 
Yet, the United States—after the disastrous consequences of the war in Afghanistan 
and the war in Iraq—was not willing to lead such an operation or to help Turkey 
in this regard. Having failed to gain United States’ support, the AKP government 
decided to use a dual strategy: On the one hand, they provided implicit support to 
ISIS militants who were fighting the Kurds in Rojava. They also stopped Kurds who 
wanted to join the fight against ISIS during the Battle of Kobane from crossing into 
Syria from Turkey, while they allowed ISIS militants to pass the border more freely 
(The Economist, 2015). When the United States and Western Allies pushed Turkey 
to play an active role in the coalition against ISIS, Erdoğan did his best to use this oc-
casion “to attack the PKK as part of the all-around campaign against terror groups” 
(Öniş, 2016, 150).
On the other hand, they started to use a military repression strategy in Kurdish 
regions of southeast Turkey, where the Turkish armed forces have never been suc-
cessful due to the strong presence of the PKK in the region. In response to increas-
ing state intervention—and also riding the tide of self-confidence generated from 
Kobane—the Kurdish youth self-defense organization (Patriotic Revolutionary 
Youth Movement—YDG-H) in southeastern Kurdish cities of Turkey—which was 
set up for “young Kurds who didn’t want to join the PKK but who could organize 
and resist the state from their cities”(Fitzherbert, 2015)—took up arms, started to 
fight against security forces and proclaimed autonomy in the form of self-defense 
neighborhoods.
The autonomy of the Syrian Kurds, their ongoing fight with ISIS and escalation 
of violence in southeast Turkey, in return, had various repercussions for the inten-
sification of anti-Kurdish violence in western cities. For one thing, the Turkish gov-
ernment’s implicit support for ISIS at the expense of the Kurdish defense during the 
battle of Kobane in the fall of 2014 gave way to a series of anti-ISIS and anti-govern-
ment protests by Kurds and leftists in various Kurdish and western cities of Turkey 
in October 2014. Police responded brutally to the protests. Pro-ISIS groups and 
extreme-right nationalists also organized counter-demonstrations in various cities, 
which turned into violent attacks in riot-prone locations such as the Zeytinburnu 
district of Istanbul. In addition, pro-ISIS Islamists attacked Kurdish protestors and 
party buildings. 46 people were killed in the course of the protests. This episode of 
violence was critical since the state, paramilitaries and “rioters” joined together in 
attacking the Kurds; raising fears of the possibility of murderous ethnic cleansing.
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Emergence of ISIS as a new actor
As is clear from these examples, a final fundamental novelty of this new chapter 
of violence is the addition of ISIS as a new actor in this conflict. In the last few 
years ISIS and pro-ISIS groups have engaged in various forms of violence against 
the Kurds, including paramilitary violence and suicide bombings. During the mas-
sive anti-ISIS protests in October 2014 mentioned above, Islamist groups in both 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish regions attacked protestors and Kurdish party buildings. 
Pro-ISIS groups and mobs fired guns at protestors and engaged in lynching attempts 
in various non-Kurdish cities like Adana and Istanbul, whereas attacks by Islamist 
groups8 against Kurdish protestors gave way to deadly clashes in the Kurdish re-
gion.9 ISIS was also responsible for a series of bombings targeting HDP buildings 
in Mersin and Adana, and targeting the HDP’s electoral rally in Diyarbakir before 
the June 2015 election. In the post-election period, ISIS attacks became much more 
violent and took the form of fatal suicide bombings targeting Kurdish and socialist 
rallies/gatherings.
Not surprisingly, the state has largely tolerated Islamist violence targeting Kurds, 
creating a legitimate sphere of action for ISIS in Turkey. This process is analogous 
to state inaction—and turning a blind eye—during ultranationalist mobilization of 
the 2000s. Yet this time, violence escalates conflict to a much higher and radical 
level. Furthermore, as in the case of violence of the 2000s, there is also a surprising 
level of mass support behind these violent attacks. This support was particularly vis-
ible after the blast in Ankara that killed 102 people. After the bombings, in Konya, 
thousands of spectators at the Turkey-Iceland football match shouted Allahu Akbar 
during the moment of silence for victims of the Ankara blast. Hence, while the de-
cade of democratization institutionalized fascist violence, the current period of 
chaos seems to be legitimizing violence by Islamist extremists. We are witnessing 
the substantive rise of ISIS’s legitimacy and sphere of influence in Turkey, facilitated 
by Erdoğan. Yet fascists—and its Islamo-fascist variants for that matter—are not the 
“right hand” of the state. They are independent actors with a significant degree of 
autonomy. It remains an open question whether Erdoğan can manage to control 
fascism-from-below today as Franco and the Japanese state/military (Paxton, 2005, 
198–199) did in interwar Spain and Japan.
8 Including Huda-Par, which is a legal Islamist political party, and the Turkish Hizbullah.
9 For more information on the list of state and non-state violence against Kobane protests in 
Turkey, see the special report by Human Rights Association (İnsan Haklari Derneği, 2014).
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Conclusion: Prospects for a deadly ethnic violence
Erdoğan’s hegemonic crisis is far from over despite the popular support received in 
the November 2015 elections, the 2016 coup-attempt, and his victory at the 2017 
constitutional referendum that substantially increased the executive powers of the 
president. Democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict is oﬀ the table. After the 
2015 elections, Erdoğan stated that the “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one 
state” policy will continue. Since then, the conflict has escalated. The government 
has engaged in a full-fledged attack in Kurdish cities whose severity surpassed any 
other military involvement by the previous governments. Military operations main-
ly targeted urban centers and destroyed major Kurdish cities, killing hundreds of 
civilians and forcing thousands to migrate. Furthermore, the crisis in the Middle 
East has the potential to further escalate internal conflict in Turkey. The conflict in 
Syria shows few signs of winding down in the near future. The popular support for 
the September 2017 independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan already sparked 
the nationalist fervor and was responded with military exercises at the Iraqi border.
Michael Mann (2005, 178–179) shows how factionalization and radicalization 
in the face of mounting geopolitical crisis led to statism, paving the way for the 
Armenian Genocide in the early 20th century. In line with this observation, anti-
Kurdish riots that emerged and became institutionalized in the period of conten-
tious democratization have the potential to escalate into deadlier forms of ethnic 
violence in the face of current political and geopolitical instability. Rising authori-
tarianism, regional conflict, increasing polarization, increasing salience of paramili-
tary groups and the escalation of armed conflict, in a context where civilians have 
already become perpetrators and targets of violence, point towards the gloomy pos-
sibility of ethnic cleansing in Turkey’s future.
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African Islamist Terrorism and the Geopolitical 
Fracturing of Postcolonial Borders
William F.S. Miles
When the Organization of African Union embedded in its founding charter the prin-
ciple of inviolability of inherited colonial borders, its framers had in mind territorial 
expansiveness by potentially aggressive neighbors. What we have experienced over the 
last decade, however, is the fracturing of African borders for reasons unpredictable in 
the 1960s: the rise of Islamist extremism. Cross-border and borderland exploitation 
by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Shabab, 
Ansar Din, Boko Haram and other terror groups are but African examples of a wider 
challenge within geopolitics. Umma, the ideal of a single, global, Islamic nation has 
long coexisted in geopolitical tension with the ideal and reality of the post-Westphalian 
nation-state. From the jihadists’ point of view, blurring/fracturing/deconstructing es-
tablished boundaries is part and parcel of the geopolitical reordering that they view as 
theologically imperative. Inattention to African borders is a geopolitical oversight with 
underappreciated dangers to Europe and the United States, not to mention Africa itself. 
Socioeconomic development within those borders and borderlands is necessary so that 
there is hope and reason to reject the violent Islamist messages and their messengers.
Africa in comparative geopolitical perspective 
In 2011, the National Defense University Press published a collection subtitled 
Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization (Clad et al., 2011). Although that work 
focused on the borderlands of Southeast Asia, the same paradigm is applicable to 
those of Africa. As Zachary Abuza (2011) makes clear in his chapter on insurgency, 
until the end of the Cold War Southeast Asia’s greatest security threat—one posing 
the greatest potential for territorial reconfiguration—emanated from China. The 
attack by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 rebalanced the Chinese threat in that 
region; Islamist militant organizations, with a Middle Eastern orientation, increas-
ingly emerged to provide their own challenge to the regional status quo.
In Africa, the present chapter will demonstrate, a similar geopolitical threat to 
boundaries and borderlands emerged in the wake of 9/11—with one major excep-
tion. In the African context, no single nation-state represented a threat to territorial 
stability and border maintenance in the way that China did in Southeast Asia. In 
contrast with Southeast Asia, Africa lacks a local hegemon which may take on the 
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role of regional policeman (or counterterrorist) and confront caliphate re-bordering 
pretensions. (China reserves its own “right,” of course, to re-border for its own pur-
poses.)
When the Organization of African Union (precursor to today’s African Union) 
embedded in its founding charter the principle of inviolability of inherited colonial 
borders, its framers had in mind territorial expansiveness by potentially aggressive 
neighbors. The last thing it then envisioned was the grave and chronic violation of 
sovereignty by terrorist organizations. Preservation of colonial-inherited boundar-
ies was not merely viewed as a mechanism for reducing the likelihood of inter-state 
disputes; it was seen as a building block for larger federations. These regional units, 
or confederations, could then act as more viable economic units in the world at 
large. African regionalism in the 1960s was viewed as a building block in the process 
that by the 1980s would become known as globalization.
What we have experienced over the last decade, however, is the fracturing of 
African borders for reasons unpredictable in the 1960s: the rise of Islamist extrem-
ism. From Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa to Boko Haram in West 
Africa to Al Shabab in East Africa, violence associated with Islamism has grave-
ly harmed life, limb, and national sovereignty. International interventions, from 
French operations in Mali to American interventions from Djibouti, have shed a 
spotlight on the porous borders that undermine peace, security, and prosperity in 
many African borderlands, turning them rather into shatterzones.1 Multiple are the 
programs of assistance from Western nations designed to aid African governments 
in their struggle to secure their borders. Such eﬀorts have met with mitigated suc-
cess.
This chapter argues that inattention to African borders is a geopolitical oversight 
with underappreciated dangers to Europe and the United States, not to mention 
Africa itself. This situation is a byproduct of an overall historical neglect of Sub-
Saharan Africa by U.S. policymakers and academic programs alike. Governmental 
and scholarly institutions alike would do well to revalue Africa within their respec-
tive planning and budgetary processes. 
The rest of this chapter presents the evolution in African geopolitical strategiz-
ing from the creation of the Organization of African Unity, to regionalist continen-
tal thinking, to the incorporation of Africa into the paradigm of globalization. It 
then discusses the implications of 9/11 and radical Islamist organizations in West 
and East Africa. The concluding section summarizes the geopolitical implications 
of cross-bordering African Islamist and terrorist groups.
1 The term “shatterzones” deliberately echoes the Bartov and Weitz (2013) historical anthology 
on the violent borderlands of eastern Europe.
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From African regionalism to naïve globalism
Founded in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) aimed to erect norms to ensure inter-state peace on the continent. Respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity were cardinal pillars of this strategy. 
Noninterference in the internal aﬀairs of members’ states was another. The July 
1964 Cairo Resolution of the OAU explicitly reaﬃrmed members’ acceptance of 
“the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.” So, did the 
Charter of the United Nations.
Founding heads of the African states present at the Addis conference were not 
unaware of the problematic nature of the boundaries they had inherited from the co-
lonial powers. Partition of indigenous ethnic groups, both arbitrary and deliberate, 
had been common by colonial continent carvers. Festering grievances on account 
of colonial partition had already surfaced from West Africa (e.g., Ewe split between 
Togo and Ghana) to the East (e.g., disenfranchised Somalis outside of Somalia in 
Kenya and Ethiopia), and would continue to be a source of conflict (Onah, 2015). 
Reopening such basic issues was nevertheless deemed more dangerous than restor-
ing ethnic integrity and/or indigenous national justice.
Nor did the savvy political leaders at the time of Africa’s wave of indepen-
dence ignore the potential for violence on other scores. Political assassination was 
condemned outright by the OAU, as were acts of subversion on the part of other 
African states. As civil and inter-state wars in independent Africa’s early years in 
Congo, Burundi, and Nigeria bloodily proved, such concerns were well founded.
At the same time, economic reasons impelled African states to attempt to cre-
ate federations of neighboring states to overcome structural handicaps emanating 
from colonial-era boundaries. Some (e.g., the defunct Mali Federation of Mali and 
Senegal and the East Africa Community [EAC] of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) 
were less successful than others (the extant Economic Community of West African 
States [ECOWAS] and the Southern African Development Community [SADC]). 
Over the years, a delicate equilibrium developed between the desire to maintain 
state sovereignty and the realization that economic progress was best served by 
combining resources, manpower, infrastructure and geographical advantage to the 
benefit of neighboring states. As the paradigm of globalization began to take hold in 
the late 1980s, African intellectuals (notably Ali Mazrui) began to take note of and 
lend caution to an otherwise upbeat neoliberal assessment of the phenomenon’s 
implications for Africa.
The end of the Cold War brought to Africa the same hopes for a peace dividend 
that enthralled the former adversarial camps worldwide led by the Soviet Union 
and the United States. African states allied with the former (e.g., Ethiopia; Angola; 
Mozambique; Zimbabwe) buried the anti-capitalist hatchet (and, for the most part, 
communist economics.) While the principle of maintaining national sovereignty 
was not seriously brought into question, patrolling state borders became less of a 
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priority for security purposes. Countering of smuggling and other forms of traﬃck-
ing did, on the other hand, remain a reason for not opening borders in the European 
Union mold.
Oﬃcial recognition of the importance of globalization for the developing world 
writ large came in 1999 with the publication of the United Nation Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) tenth annual Human Development Report (HDR). As with 
all previous and subsequent reports, the HDR was themed: globalization was that 
year’s focus. Acknowledging critical scholars who claimed that globalization was 
not a new phenomenon at all,2 the report invoked four factors to buttress the claim 
of globalizing (if not geopolitical) novelty: new markets (especially service-, finan-
cial-, and consumer-oriented ones); new actors (multinational corporations, NGO, 
regional blocs, the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court); 
new rules and norms (relating to democracy, human rights, privatization, trade 
and the environment); and new modes of communication. Although the Report 
invoked Africa tangentially, one telling example was the unfavorable comparison of 
Mali with Botswana: the latter lauded for its macroeconomic policies, strong gover-
nance and social services making trade liberalization successful, the former singled 
out—despite its economic liberalization—for its negative growth in per capita in-
come (UNDP, 1999, 85). The message (reinforced by the UNDP’s rival sibling, the 
World Bank [via its own World Development Reports] was clear: open borders lead 
to prosperity.3
Globalization overlapped with another innovative paradigm, one that rethought 
the very meaning of defense. “Security” was redefined from a purely (and, implicitly, 
antiquated) “national” preoccupation to being rather one of (an implicitly more en-
lightened) “human security.” As the 1994 Human Development Report put it, states 
should shift their focus on defending sovereignty to “the security of people in their 
homes, in their jobs, in their communities and in their environment.”
In this halcyon post-Berlin Wall crash decade, scholars—including Africanists—
tended to tie the globalization-human security nexus to their specific regions of 
interest. Emblematic was the volume (published in the same year as the UNDP’s 
Globalization report) by Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (1999) on Globalization, 
Human Security and the African Experience. While critical voices emerged there 
and elsewhere (e.g., Kieh, 2008; Carmody, 2010) to warn against neo-liberal excesses 
of globalization, the dynamic international duo per se (human security and global-
ization) was not challenged on empirical grounds.
2 Although it does not mention them directly (“Some argue that the globalization is not new, 
and that the world was more intergrated a century ago” UNDP, 1999, 30), the report is channeling 
such works as Bordo et al. (1999).
3 See, for example, the 2009-themed Reshaping Economic Geography chapter “Winners with-
out Borders” (World Bank, 2009, 260—285).
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9/11 and its African aftermath
Two years after the globalization paradigm was reified in the HDR, as with many 
other prevailing schools of thought it took a hit along with the Twin Towers of the 
World Trade Center. Almost overnight, if we take September 11, 2001 as the semi-
nal date, the open-borders/security-as-development momentum was halted if not 
reversed. Once again, rather than a concept that needed to be transcended, borders 
were now perceived as “things” that had to be secured and surveilled. International 
development was now justified not on account of human ethics (or even national 
interest) but as a tool for counterterrorism (Miles, 2012). Increasing human secu-
rity in Africa was now linked to its value in providing hard security for America 
(Carmody, 2005). Even the most hitherto obscure (or at least neglected by the West) 
regions of the globalizing planet (cf. Miles, 2005) were reappraised in light of the 
blow struck by Persian Gulf terrorists operating out of the Near East.
A case in point is the Sahara Desert. Long ignored by Western policy-makers 
and military strategists, this throwback to French Foreign Legion times and cin-
ematic backdrops, was now described by U.S. military strategists in urgent tones. 
NATO Commander General James Jones referred to the “large ungoverned spaces 
in Africa”—particularly its mostly empty desert, ringed by Muslim populations—
as “tempting” to terrorists.4 In 2003 the U.S. Department of Defense and the State 
Department set up a Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to equip and train security forces of 
the Saharan-Sahelian nations on the Sahara’s edges: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger. 
In the decade to follow PSI expanded and underwent several institutional metamor-
phoses to constitute today’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 
whose African partners include Senegal, Burkina Faso and Nigeria.
Whether General Jones was a prophet or the Sahara as terror zone became a 
self-fulfilling prophecy (as this commentator warned in the Fletcher Forum [Miles, 
2008a]) is debatable. Suﬃce it to say that, nearly fifteen years after 9/11, areas of the 
Sahel and Sahara have indeed become no-go zones for Westerners on account of 
opportunistic border crossing militant groups.
West Africa
The notion of jihad has a strong historical resonance in West Africa, dating back to 
the largely Fulani-led uprisings of the eighteenth century in Futa Jalon (in today’s 
Guinea) and Sokoto (embedded currently in Nigeria). West African jihads endured 
until colonial suppression of Islamic resistance to European overrule. Such suppres-
sion more or less coincided with the superimposition of borders that has defined 
4 For a challenge to the conventional Sahara-Sahel definitional dichotomy within the context of 
borders and terrorist networks, see Walther and Retaillé (2010).
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the region continent. Contemporary jihadist movements that defy postcolonial 
boundaries as they wage Islamist war include:
– Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): This group has undergone various 
nominal transformations since beginning as an anti-government Islamist op-
position movement in Algeria in the 1990s (Armed Islamic Group [GIA] until 
1998, Salafi Group for Call and Combat [GSPC] until 2005, when it declared 
allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda). AQIM has staged numerous at-
tacks in the borderlands between Algeria and Mauritania, Algeria and Mali, and 
Algeria and Niger; between Mali and Mauritania, Mali and Niger; and Algeria 
and Tunisia. Attacks on African government forces, kidnappings for ransom 
of Western tourists and oﬃcials, and sabotage of state installations have been 
its hallmarks. One of the most spectacular AQIM operations was the assault 
on the Amenas gas plant in Algeria’s Sahara in January 2013, in which nearly 
forty Westerners were murdered. Another outrage with which it has been as-
sociated was the November 2015 attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, 
Mali. In that incident, more than half the nineteen victims were non-Malians. In 
October 2017 an ambush in Niger (near the border with Mali) that killed four 
U.S. soldiers on a training mission was also attributed to AQIM.
– El-Mourabitoun: This one-time splinter group reunited with AQIM to lead the 
Radisson Blu attack in Bamako. It is the product of a merger, in 2013, of two oth-
er Saharan extremist groups: The Masked Men Battalion (aka al-Multhamun) 
and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). 
– MUJAO (see above): It became a significant player in 2012 when it joined two 
ethnic-based (Tuareg) secessionist movements: the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar al-Din. MNLA represents the more 
“classical” kind of oppositionist group that early founders of the OAU antici-
pated in their declared maintenance of colonial boundaries: militant autonomist 
(if not pro-independence) groups desirous of territory and sovereignty for their 
particular “tribe.” Ansar al-Din departed from this familiar model of secession-
ism by grafting an Islamist theology upon the traditionally “liberal” Muslims 
among the Tuaregs. Both groups worked to establish control over northern Mali 
(including the storied Timbuktu), but in its attempt to impose a harsh form of 
sharia, Ansar Din turned on its erstwhile ally the MNLA. Tuareg in northern 
Niger have similarly, periodically, joined forces and then splintered in order to 
promote an ethnically-defined polity. Uniting the Tuareg of Mali and Niger un-
der a single flag waxes and wanes as an objective.
– Boko Haram (“Western Education is Taboo”): Operating mainly in northeast 
Nigeria (with periodic bombings of targets in the capital Abuja in the center of 
the country), this group has also taken hostages and undertaken trans-border 
attacks in Cameroon and Niger. Internationally, it garnered great attention with 
its kidnapping (and forced “marriages”) of two hundred (Christian) schoolgirls 
from Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria. Many of the girls were subsequently spot-
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ted in Cameroon and Chad (whose military forces successfully engaged in Boko 
Haram, on their own, in Nigerian territory). But the most long-lasting cross-bor-
der consequence has been the approximately 200,000 refugees from northeast 
Nigeria who have sought sanctuary in Niger Republic. “Although Boko Haram 
has exploited state weakness along Nigeria’s northern border . . . to mount at-
tacks and seek sanctuary, as of this writing Boko Haram has not been a Nigérien 
Hausa phenomenon per se” (Miles, 2015, 198–199).
East Africa
Although fewer trans-border terrorist groups operate on the eastern edge of the 
Trans-Sahara, the United States has been preoccupied and engaged there for an 
even longer time. “Operation Restore Hope” is better remembered in American 
consciousness as “Black Hawk Down,” the ill-fated attempt ordered by outgo-
ing President George H.W. Bush in 1993 to provide humanitarian assistance in 
Mogadishu despite militia opposition during Somalia’s civil war. The ensuing de-
bacle and American withdrawal left a power vacuum that was eventually filled by:
– Al Shabab: Anarchy in Somalia throughout the 1990s spurred the creation of an 
Islamist militia, the Union of Islamic Courts, which attempted to impose a degree 
of security and stability. In 2006, the leader of this organization swore allegiance 
to Al Qaeda and changed its name to “The Youth” (Al Shabab). Responsible for 
numerous attacks in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu and the second city, Kismayo, 
Al Shabab is most notorious for its cross-border operations. In Uganda’s capital 
Kampala, over seventy people were killed in a suicide bombing in 2010. Almost 
as many were killed in the Westgate, Nairobi, shopping mall attack in Kenya in 
2013. Tanzania, less aﬀected, has nevertheless witnessed since 2015 an uptick in 
of Al Shabab related violence.5
– Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Somalia’s location and Al Shabab’s 
ideology extends the influence and operations of this group beyond the African 
continent proper. Zarif (2011) specifies these links as they emerged at the out-
set of the current decade, with Al Shabab joining the AQAP “franchise.” Within 
the framework of this chapter, the Gulf of Aden represents a water boundary 
no less porous than the unmarked desert ones of the Sahara. An even more 
direct threat to the United States is represented, directly and indirectly, by Al 
Shabab outreach, plausibly with AQAP participation, to disaﬀected Somali im-
migrant youths. Between 2006 and 2010, dozens of them left their homes in the 
Minneapolis, Minnesota region to join Al Shabab in Somalia (Savage, 2010). 
There are now reports that that same recruiting network is being utilized by 
5 See the United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering 
Violent Extremism Country Reports on Terrorism for 2015 and 2016 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016; 2017).
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Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Attempts to bring Somali-American youth 
to Iraq and Syria bring us beyond the scope of this chapter’s focus on Africa. 
They nevertheless illustrate the trans-border terrorist (and counterterrorist) di-
mension to a facet of globalization that constitutes a major challenge to regional 
and world security (see Figure 1).
Cross-border threats have accordingly risen to the forefront of African state con-
cerns and Western donors, particularly as relates to the Horn and what the U.S. 
Government refers to the Trans-Sahara region. TSCTP and U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) resources have been used to strengthen Mauritanian security force 
surveillance of its boundary with Mali and Niger army control of unregulated flows 
across its borders. United States government assistance to Nigeria in combatting 
Boko Haram now includes its monitoring of activities along the border with Niger 
Republic. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program of the U.S. Department 
of State also aims to enhance the capacity of Nigerian customs and immigration 
services to secure their nation’s borders. Another State Department program—
Counterterrorism Finance (CTF)—provides training to assist Nigeria in restricting 
Boko Haram’s capability to obtain, transfer and secure funds.
Figure 1: Islamist militant groups and their areas of activity in Africa
Notes: Each circle represents location of a violent event.
Source: Map courtesy of Caitriona Dowd.
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On the other side of the continent, an equivalent to TSCTP has emerged in 
the form of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). 
Founded in 2009 (out of the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative), the PREACT 
includes “expanding border security” in its mandate. Although only areas within a 
single country (Somalia), provide havens for terrorists (unlike the plethora of coun-
tries spanning the Sahara that are so aﬀected in West Africa), PREACT includes 
many more member states than does TSCTP: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and, naturally, the oﬃ-
cial government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Camp Lemonier in Djibouti has 
emerged as the epicenter of United States counterterrorism activities in East Africa, 
under the rubric of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).
Globalization, geopolitics, borders, and Islamism
M.A. Khan’s (2007) aptly subtitled book The Geopolitics of Islam and the West brings 
to the fore competing geopolitical visions of Muslim politics in a world otherwise 
constituted politically by the nation-state. Umma, the ideal of a single, global, 
Islamic nation has long coexisted in geopolitical tension with the ideal and reality 
of the post-Westphalian nation-state. The contradiction is particularly acute in rela-
tion to the postcolonial state with a demographically dominant Muslim population. 
Why should such states exist independently of one another, particularly when they 
were the arbitrary creations of European powers? This is one of the few anticolonial 
theses that have united such otherwise disparate actors as Saddam Hussein and his 
Baath Party (who went to war to “reunite” Iraq with Kuwait) and ISIS (who murder 
and terrorize also to “recreate” a single Islamic State).
Islamism may also be understood as “a backlash antiglobalizationist movement” 
(Charlick, 2007, 20). Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999) char-
acterizes its promoters as Muslims “brutalized or left behind by this new system.” 
Benjamin Barber (1995) had already made a similar point in Jihad vs. McWorld. It 
is the extension of this line of thinking from the “core” of the Muslim world (usu-
ally understood as the Middle East) to the Sub-Saharan periphery that is relatively 
new from a geopolitical perspective. What is particularly troubling is the religious-
ly-inspired violence—including a return of jihad—that has descended from other 
climes to disturb the relative quiet of the Sahara and its adjoining Sahel.6 There and 
in the Horn of Africa, inherited colonial borders that previously were dismissed by 
Africanists and globalists alike as “arbitrary “or “artificial” now represent corridors 
for religious fanatics whose monitoring constitutes a major challenge for govern-
ments near and wide. Early postcolonial and globalization hopes in Africa have 
6 For a perspective that emphasizes rather the local sources of Islamist violence in Africa, see 
Dowd (2015). For a focus on the return of jihadism, see Miles (2018).
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been replaced, for the foreseeable future, by a “sclerosis, or hardening, of the bound-
ary” (Miles, 2008b) on the one hand, and a slew of “border disorders” on the other 
(Walther and Miles, 2018). 
This tension reflects geopolitical shifts on an even broader scale that are occur-
ring elsewhere in the world, largely on account of the same terrorism-counterter-
rorism dynamics we have discussed in the African context. Instability in the Middle 
East, much aggravated by the rise of ISIS and other post-Al Qaeda Islamist militant 
groups, has led to the greatest refugee crisis since World War II. This crisis has spilled 
over from refugee haven nations, such as Turkey and Jordan, to Europe. Resulting 
attempts by the Turkish and Jordanian governments to reinforce their borders with 
Syria and Iraq mirror the African boundary sclerosis we have referred to above. 
But Middle Eastern refugees—often joined by would-be African migrants—are also 
taking to trans-Mediterranean corridors in order to reach and resettle in Europe. 
Coastal Libya (itself rocked by violence between pro- and anti-ISIS factions) has 
become a particularly problematic staging point for European states wishing to re-
strict the unregulated refugee-migrant flow. 
The inability of African and Middle Eastern governments, and particularly their 
boundary control apparatuses, to contain the spontaneous cross-border flow of 
populations has had great consequences in Europe itself. Gateway European states 
such as Greece and Italy are in tension with European Union partners who, though 
better resourced, assume less of the burden associated with being first ports of (il-
legal) entry onto the continent. Brexit was fueled, in large measure, by fears that the 
United Kingdom could not control its own in-flow of migrants and refugees from 
the Continent as long as it remained a part of the European Union and subject to its 
open border policies.
While several geopolitical steps removed from Europe’s refugee crisis, the United 
States too is aﬀected by border fracturing elsewhere. President Trump’s attempted 
travel ban on two Sub-Saharan countries (Somalia and Sudan) and a North African 
one (Libya) (in addition to three Middle Eastern nations) reflect fears that Islamist 
extremists could very well make their way to the United States. Even the much-
heralded wall between the United States and Mexico, its advocates have intimated, 
also will have an anti-Islamist infiltration benefit, notwithstanding its primary func-
tion as a barrier to drug smuggling and human traﬃcking from Central and Latin 
American nations.
From the jihadists’ own point of view, blurring/fracturing/deconstructing estab-
lished boundaries is part and parcel of the geopolitical reordering that they view as 
theologically imperative. It is not only in the Fertile Crescent that ISIS has striven 
to replace state boundaries created by colonialism (in particular, between Iraq and 
Syria) with a caliphate governed according to sharia. Africa, too, would be subject 
to a geopolitical restructuring, by which the northern half of the continent would 
see its dozens of independent states reorganized into but three caliphates: Maghreb, 
Land of Habasha, Land of Alkinana. Before ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
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had already declared its intention to dissolve the artificial borders between the 
Muslim states of Northwest Africa and the (mostly) Muslim ones of the Sahel. But 
the wider aim has been global jihad, a kind of New Islamic World Order.
Radical Islamist organizations in Africa, then, constitute branches of a transcon-
tinental movement aimed at replacing a basically secular geopolitical order with 
a fundamentally faith-based (qua Islamic) one. Although originally rooted in local 
grievances, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, AQIM in North and 
West Africa and their various oﬀshoots need to be viewed as part and parcel of a 
much larger jihadist challenge to the geopolitical framework composed of postco-
lonial states and boundaries. 
The vast majority of African Muslims, and all of the states in which they reside 
(including the Islamic republics of Mauritania and Sudan), reject such a massive 
reordering of the continent’s boundaries and governing principles. Western assis-
tance to these victims of jihadism will be futile if it is military only. Yes, it is danger-
ous to the entire geopolitical order if the borders of Africa can be freely crossed by 
terrorists who exploit them to wreak mayhem. But even more important is develop-
ment within those borders so that there is hope and reason to reject these violent 
messages and their messengers.
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Geopolitics in the Anthropocene
Simon Dalby
The recent revival of geopolitics often brings with it assumptions of stable geographi-
cal contexts, boundaries and inevitable rivalries. This involves a serious failure to un-
derstand connections across political boundaries and between human actions and 
the natural world, not least the scale and speed of current transformations. In contrast 
contemporary geographic scholarship shows that globalization and the remaking of 
economic and political matters is key to the material transformations that are now hap-
pening on a geological scale. Hence the designation of current events in terms of a new 
geological epoch, the Anthropocene. This highlights not just climate change issues but 
the larger transformation of land, water use and mining as well as species extinction. 
Conventional thinking that either simply denies the significance of climate change or 
focuses on conflict in the global South as a threat to Northern security ignores the his-
torical responsibility of Northern states for climate change, and is dangerously myopic 
about the processes that connect across geographical boundaries.
Geopolitics returned?
Alarming headlines in 2016 suggested that violent rivalries are the order of the day. 
Discussions of migration, boundary walls, fences, military interventions, and the 
use of nationalist tropes have raised the rhetorical temperature in international pol-
itics. Walter Russell Mead (2014) is concerned that antagonistic politics between at 
least some great powers suggests just such a return of geopolitics after a period in 
which it was apparently absent. If the term is used to refer to territorial disputes, and 
the use of military force or the threat thereof, then clearly the conflicts over Crimea, 
Ukraine, various islands disputed by China and Japan and by various states in the 
South China Sea, or Russian and Turkish actions in early 2016, suggest its utility giv-
en the belligerence in recent events. Opportunistic populist politicians frequently 
respond with xenophobia and threats of force rather than intelligent policy. Robert 
Kagan (2015) is worried that the “weight of geopolitics” is now reducing the role of 
democracy in global governance as authoritarian states flex their political muscles.
In response, and in stark contrast, John Ikenberry (2014) is equally convinced 
that the liberal order of recent decades remains intact and that regional skirmishes 
and nationalist rhetoric are not undermining globalization. Geopolitics has not re-
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turned apparently, at least not in the sense that force and great power rivalries are 
the most important matter in international politics. Nonetheless there is fractious-
ness to international politics recently, and nationalist logics, increased border con-
trols, walls and fences are being used to try to reinforce territorial modes of power. 
Ominously, geographical verities are being invoked in the language of many nation-
alist politicians suggesting mobility and migration are a threat to supposedly stable 
political entities. British voters decided that they wanted to leave Europe, in the 
“Brexit” referendum in 2016, apparently fearing the influence of immigrants on the 
British state. What really is alarming is the failure of contemporary modes of gover-
nance to deal with many complex interconnected changes in a timely fashion.
These political developments also occur in the context of the persistence of for-
mulations that invoke classical notions of geopolitics, of the world arranged in par-
ticular geographical ways that shape if not determine the conduct of foreign policy. 
While Samuel Huntington (1996) gets pride of place in most such discussions with 
his infamous mapping of global culture regions, Robert Kaplan (2012) and others 
also use geographical language to suggest that context determines destiny. The clas-
sical writings of Mackinder and Mahan are back in vogue in discussions of Chinese 
policy in the United States.
Whether it is because of their simplicity and ease of intelligibility, or the rhetorical 
power of charismatic and idiosyncratic advocates, or simply their play to an audience 
receptive to reassurance and stasis in times of rapid change, these geopolitical visions 
refuse to dissipate. It is through underplaying the role of global trade and finance, a 
disregard for the multiple versions of sovereignty and power that exist in the world, 
and a denial of the possibility for alternative perspectives in world politics that have 
allowed Mackinder, Mahan, and Monroe back onto the centre-stage of the globalist 
regime. (Richardson, 2015, 236)
In Europe too, classical geopolitics has undergone a revival with political thinkers 
invoking geographical formulations as the context for policies (Guzzini, 2012).
These intellectual and political developments fly in the face of much recent 
scholarship and commentary, by political geographers in particular, who empha-
size the growing interconnectedness of the global economy and the dynamism, per-
haps best called globalization, that repeatedly changes patterns of production and 
trade (Agnew, 2009). The revival of concerns with geopolitical matters in scholarly 
investigations over the last few decades, as opposed to just in the recent foreign 
policy commentaries, involves a more profound engagement both with the forms 
of geographical representation that structure policy discussion as well as with these 
rapidly changing geographies of global political economy.
But little of this discussion so far explicitly links up with matters of the rapid 
transformation of the environment, another pressing and directly related matter in 
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global politics. Now, this chapter argues that linking geographical representations, 
and the changing global political economy with discussions of the contemporary 
transformation of the earth system, focused in the rapidly growing debate about 
“the Anthropocene” as a new human caused geological epoch (Purdy, 2016), is nec-
essary to grapple with geopolitical change. Geological language, as in the use of the 
term Anthropocene, may be helpful here not least because conventional forms of 
environmental governance have fallen so far short in tackling global change (Galaz, 
2014). Relying on traditional geopolitical thinking may have some considerable po-
litical utility for populist, nationalist and more expressly fascist politicians, but in 
so far as such notions structure policy by emphasizing separation, competition and 
conflict, they are making the dangerous global environmental transformations of 
our times much more diﬃcult to address.
Geopolitics revisited
Geopolitics has often been understood as the contextual matters shaping politics 
at the planetary scale, about struggles for power and the rivalries of big states and 
empires, which have played out over the last few centuries as the global economy 
grew and technologies ushered in new human possibilities (Agnew, 2003). It is 
also about the related attempts to politically divide the world into various spatial 
configurations, empires, blocs, and such things as the Grossraum formulations of 
Carl Schmitt (Minca and Rowan, 2015). Schmitt may have been a more influential 
thinker in Nazi Germany than Karl Haushofer, who frequently gets the blame for in-
troducing Adolf Hitler to Friedrich Ratzel’s thinking, and hence indirectly, the per-
nicious ideas of Lebensraum that informed Nazi ambitions for rearranging the map 
of Europe by force (Snyder, 2015). Schmitt’s (2006) Nomos of the Earth suggested 
various divisions of the world and the superiority of European modes of law and 
authority, but relied on an anachronistic fixed geography and a remarkably limited 
view of the transformative eﬀects of the global economy.
Geographical scholarship of the last few decades often under the rubric of “criti-
cal geopolitics,” has investigated how geographical language has important political 
consequences (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Even a fairly limited reflection on recent history 
suggests that geographical entities in global politics are not permanent and immu-
table but rather temporary, contingent and relational (Dodds et al., 2013). However 
geographical representations frequently pass without this critical interrogation pre-
cisely because they are apparently obvious. This is both in terms of how geographi-
cal language frequently structures particular nationalist narratives of the homeland, 
but also in how such language shapes larger interpretative frameworks of supposed 
territorial autonomy, grand strategy and justifications of the use of force in interna-
tional aﬀairs (Dalby, 2010).
Such formulations often link to technological fantasies of geographical con-
trol, to territorial sovereignty and to the supposed sanctity of national boundaries 
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(Brown, 2010). Linked to the invocation of martial vigor these are a heady brew in 
political rhetoric which links fear to the necessity of strength to provide security in 
troubled times. Invoking external threats to supposed internal stabilities is a pow-
erful mode of geopolitical discourse that is repeatedly used in American politics 
(Dalby, 2013) as seen in 2016 with presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rhetoric 
of wall building as a “solution” to the supposed “problem” of migration. At more or 
less the same time in the “Brexit” referendum British voters decided that they want-
ed to leave Europe apparently fearing the influence of immigrants on the British 
state. Once these cartographic entities become the hegemonic assumptions of how 
the world is organized, frontiers appearing as “natural” and permanent features (Fall, 
2010), then these geographical categories become powerful tools for policy makers 
anxious to emphasize diﬀerences and dangers on a variegated planetary surface.
In a similar manner Benjamin Ho’s (2014) examination of Chinese exceptional-
ism points to the risks of assuming permanent fixed identities in geopolitical think-
ing and making assumptions that geography presents eternal verities. In a world of 
rapid change and globalization this assumption is likely to be misleading in many 
ways. The relations between places are crucial, and have been changing rapidly due 
to the processes of globalization that involve changing geographical patterns of 
manufacturing and trade linkages. These are much more important than the mili-
tary rivalries that usually get so much attention in geopolitical thinking related to 
foreign policy. Yes, military conflicts matter, and Second World War vintage tech-
nologies were key to setting the contemporary acceleration of globalization in mo-
tion. But military matters have been a minor factor in the overall pattern of the 
global economy although some regional industrial strategies were clearly involved 
in the Cold War period on both sides of the iron curtain. 
John Agnew’s (2015) recent discussion of geopolitics and globalization is ana-
lytically helpful in explaining these important but much wider formulations. As 
with other scholars who have been back over the history of geopolitical thinking 
of late (Kearns, 2013), Agnew notes that the early twentieth century formulations 
of geopolitics in terms of naturalized assumptions of spatially autonomous com-
peting geographical entities obscured a larger body of historical thinking that em-
phasized the interconnections between places, the flows of resources from colonies 
to imperial centers, as well as larger concerns with geographical settings, trading 
arrangements and cultural exchanges. Looking back to Montesquieu and Voltaire’s 
reconstruction of Alexander the Great’s imperial eﬀorts to enhance cultural inter-
actions and trade among the regions he conquered, Agnew (2015) crucially argues 
that the narrow territorial sense of competing entities in late nineteenth century 
thinking obscured this larger sense of geopolitics, and in the process sets up a false 
dichotomy of geopolitics versus globalization.
This analysis shows that the processes of geopolitics are part and parcel of the 
growth of globalization over the last half century. United States’ eﬀorts to promote 
trade and investment in at least some parts of the global economy, a “geopolitics of 
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globalization,” interacts with the very diﬀerent colonial histories of various forms 
of statehood, a “geopolitics of development,” and most recently with the rising new 
international agencies in what he terms a “geopolitics of regulation.” These process-
es have shaped how world politics operates. In Panitch and Gindin’s (2012) terms, 
American foreign policy has made the world safe for capitalism, and in the process 
greatly advantaged American based industrial and agricultural interests.
The Anthropocene formulation makes it clear that these globalizing forces of 
state and economic “development” are also geomorphic and environmental forces 
rearranging landscapes, damming rivers and moving huge amounts of material to 
build roads, railways and cities, while connecting them into a “global” economy. This 
transformation of the biosphere caused by the history of the expansion of European 
power over the last half millennium has only become clear in recent decades. 
Humanity has been remaking its planetary home on a more drastic scale than has 
been understood until very recently (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016).
This transformation is now the new context for geopolitical thinking even if its 
profound consequences have been slow to challenge contemporary geographical 
imaginations (Dalby, 2014). Anthropocene geopolitics is now much more a mat-
ter of the unfolding consequences of production decisions made by the dominant 
states and corporations in the planetary system than it is just a matter of territorial 
rivalries in a supposedly stable geographical configuration. Rapidly changing cli-
mate, rising sea levels and the melting of Arctic Ocean ice are only the most obvious 
symptoms; ones that have yet, despite progress in Paris in late 2015, to be seriously 
tackled by the processes of global politics. All this has, however, made it abundantly 
clear that classical geopolitical thinking, which suggested that climates in various 
parts of the world determined the fate of the resident human communities, is now 
backwards. Geopolitics is now shaping future climates, not the other way round 
(Dalby, 2015).
Geopolitics and governance
The most important point about contemporary governance and the geopolitical 
challenges of the present is so obvious that it frequently goes unsaid. That is, the 
organization of the world into nearly two hundred supposedly sovereign territorial 
states (Jackson, 2000), a matter that appears stable and fixed. The United Nations 
system is premised on this geographical division of the earth’s terrestrial, and by ex-
tension, parts of its oceanic surface. This arrangement was to a substantial extent an 
eﬀort to solve one of the key problems of European geopolitics – the long- standing 
pattern of using military force for territorial aggrandizement. Winners of European 
wars traditionally got territorial rewards as the spoils of victory, but in the process 
frequently sowed the seeds of future conflicts. Fixing the frontiers once and for all 
as the United Nations system did after World War Two, removed this temptation 
while making aggressive warfare international anathema. The apparent violation of 
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this norm in the case of the Russian-Ukraine conflict in recent years is one of the 
reasons that it generates so much international attention.
Globalization is partly about accelerating interconnections, but frequently those 
interconnections are between the now relatively fixed spaces of territorial states and 
regional blocs enclosed by various rules, or forms of sovereignty (Agnew, 2009). 
In the case of non-traditional security threats, such as diseases and environmen-
tal problems, states adapt to international arrangements in ways that frequently 
enhance the power of elites and leading sectors in their economies, a pattern that 
suggests once again that globalization favors well connected corporations and their 
local suppliers (Hameiri and Jones, 2015). Simultaneously, numerous complicated 
matters of international finance slip out of control of national governments but re-
quire their collective intervention when matters become too chaotic. Arcane tech-
nical specifications govern trading arrangements, and in many cases curtail free-
dom of action by governments, at least those who wish to remain within the more 
complicated structures of the international trading system. The territorial state is 
the dominant mode of administering these larger arrangements of political econo-
my, and seen as such the proliferation of nation states, while apparently suggesting 
the supremacy of territorial rule and sovereign jurisdictions, in many ways simply 
operates as the local instantiation of larger globalization processes.
The scale of material transformation involved in the rapidly evolving global 
economy; the interconnected world that Montesquieu and Voltaire discussed, 
needs to be updated to include the transformation of the biosphere and the geo-
physical consequences that are manifested as climate change. Most terrestrial sur-
faces that are potentially useful for modern agriculture are now being exploited 
(Ellis, 2011). Rapid deforestation and the rise of plantations for such things as palm 
oil are emphasizing the point that environmental change is part of the growth of 
the global economy. Crucially, the consumption of fossil fuels is both powering the 
industries of the global economy, often through the use of cheap coal, and by using 
petroleum facilitating the mobility of both commodities and people linking places 
in the processes of globalization. But it is precisely this consumption of fossil fuels 
that is a key factor in destabilizing the climate system and rendering the taken for 
granted geographies of the world increasingly anachronistic.
Trying to assert control over contemporary changes by using territorial strate-
gies, only most obviously in case of the current migration crisis flies in the face of 
the basic processes of geographical change. In the case of environmental change the 
key mode of adaptation for most species is to move to more conducive climes. But 
where animals, four legged as well as two, encounter barriers in the form of fences 
and walls this most basic mode of adaptation is thwarted. The would-be migrants 
are rendered ever more vulnerable by their being hemmed in precisely when they 
need to move. Now as the geological scale of contemporary transformations be-
comes ever more clear this contradiction between geographical fixity and the need 
to accommodate rapid change has become acute. The governance arrangements to 
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hand are increasingly inappropriate, and the situation is aggravated by attempts to 
use force to try to dominate matters in a badly divided world. Rethinking these con-
textual questions is now key to dealing with these counterproductive consequences 
of the “return of geopolitics.”
Welcome to the Anthropocene
The rapid proliferation of the use of the term Anthropocene in recent years suggests 
that it is becoming a synonym for the present, the latest stage of globalization, and 
one that brings with it threats to numerous aspects of the human condition. Much 
of the discussion seems, at least so far, to have underplayed the significance of the 
fact that this is a geological term (Crutzen, 2002). The significance of this lies in the 
scale and longevity of the phenomenon. The implications of thinking in geological 
rather than environmental terms suggest much longer term and dramatic transfor-
mations are already afoot. Humanity is changing matters profoundly, moving the 
planetary system out of conditions that have pertained for hundreds of thousands of 
years and launching the planet into a new and as yet unknown configuration.
Just as the assumption of autonomous spaces is impossible so too is the modern 
assumption of humanity separate from nature. The Anthropocene makes this clear, 
but how to think of humanity as making new spaces is not so easy. Related to this are 
the expanding processes of commodification and enclosure as the global economy 
incorporates ever more processes and products into its circulations; governance 
and property relations are increasingly commercialized. In the process, boundaries 
and borders extend in new ways to privatize and hence price many things, change 
generates numerous new modes of bordering, incorporating and governing social 
and ecological processes (Dalby, 2014). Hence the irony of a globalization process 
that apparently crosses numerous boundaries but simultaneously involves numer-
ous new rules, regulations and enclosures to function. Lengthy commodity chains 
are the new shape of global economy, ones that require modes of security that tran-
scend territorial boundaries while incorporating their governance practices into 
commercial arrangements that cross many borders (Cowen, 2014).
The planet is being remade by these contemporary production and commercial 
activities. Decision makers have been slow to grasp that crucial point. The aspira-
tional statements in the Paris Agreement of December 2015 about limiting climate 
change to 1.5 degrees Celsius suggest that politicians are finally thinking about how 
hot it should get. But the implications are not clearly in focus yet in a way that trans-
forms how national economies are powered or terrestrial ecosystems rethought in 
terms of their abilities to buﬀer the worst excesses of climate extremes and facilitate 
species migration. The rich and powerful among us are in eﬀect making decisions 
about the future configuration of the planet—how many polar ice caps the planet 
will have for millennia to come, and profound decisions as to which species will 
survive and which will not. We have entered the sixth major extinction event in the 
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planet’s history, one caused by humanity and its dramatic reworking of both terres-
trial and marine ecosystems (Kolbert, 2014).
The crucial insights of the new literature on the Anthropocene, and the earth 
system science research that drives the discussion, make it clear that the earth’s 
biosphere is interconnected in numerous complicated ways; ones that render on-
tological formulations of relatively separate geographical regions of the planet re-
dundant. While climate change gets much of the attention it is crucial to note that 
other phenomena are involved in this novel understanding of interconnectedness 
(Rockstrom et al., 2009; Steﬀen et al., 2015). The depletion of stratospheric ozone 
came to be understood as a global problem in the 1980s when the ozone layer re-
peatedly disappeared in winter over the polar regions. This came as a nasty shock 
to policy makers as scientists showed the importance of interconnections when an 
apparently innocuous industrial product turned out to have very dangerous conse-
quences in a realm where its presence had not been considered.
Species loss as a result of the extraordinary expansion of agriculture, the de-
struction of forests and other ecosystems, have transformed terrestrial ecosystems 
so much that the nineteenth century mappings of the world in terms of biomes 
and “natural regions” now need to be updated. New ecological assemblages of “an-
thromes” must be added to our understandings of the spatial arrangement of many 
things (Ellis, 2011). The huge transfer of species around the world by human action, 
whether for agriculture, pets, or accidentally due to trading activities, means that 
the planet now has terrestrial species mixed up in ways that may not have happened 
since the splitting up of Pangaea a couple of hundred million years ago at the begin-
ning of the current cycle of plate tectonics (Kolbert, 2014). The wholesale pollution 
and fishing of the oceans, simultaneously with the rapid acidification due to the 
rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, means that ocean ecosystems are 
also being transformed with as yet unclear consequences. 
Above all the matter of rapid anthropogenic climate change looms over interna-
tional aﬀairs, a key theme in the new geopolitics of our times. In Paris in December 
2015, despite high profile terrorist attacks a huge conference lead to an agreement 
on a number of measures to be taken to begin, belatedly, to tackle climate change. 
This was not the binding treaty many hoped for, and the aspirational statements 
about keeping the average global temperature rise to close to 1.5 degrees Celsius, 
were in stark contrast to the promised commitments to cut greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Nonetheless, the meetings did convey a clear sense that major powers were 
at last beginning to think about how to craft a global arrangement to deal with the 
threat of increasingly severe weather events, rising sea levels and much more dra-
matic future disruptions to the existing planetary climate. The Paris agreement’s 
entry into force in November 2016 is a start in the right direction, albeit one that 
requires voluntary commitments on the part of state parties to the arrangement.
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Climate wars?
In his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin in 2013, President Obama elevated 
climate as a top priority for United States’ national security, and then set in motion 
confidential negotiations with China to grapple with the issue. The deal between the 
United States and China in late 2014 made Paris possible; without such a meeting 
of minds the Paris Agreement would probably have accomplished even less. By in-
corporating all the major states into a loose framework, it perpetuated the attempt 
at universal involvement in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The United States insisted that nothing in the Paris Agreement was to be 
understood as an admission of responsibility for causing climate change and such 
language showed up in the final documents. This was one important factor that 
prevented a binding treaty from being the final outcome. In the process the United 
States acted as a great power by dictating the terms of its accession to the arrange-
ment. Nonetheless some notion of universal involvement in the process to grant it 
legitimacy was maintained. In terms of the climate change process the argument 
that geopolitics has returned appears at least partly inaccurate. 
However the growing literature on climate security suggests that some of the 
more pernicious formulations of geopolitics are reappearing in ways that are dan-
gerous to the formulation of intelligent policy (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015). The 
climate justice arguments, heard repeatedly in Paris, and key to the justification for 
the aspirational statements to keep the average temperature rise to no more than 
1.5 degrees Celsius, suggest that given the lengthy residence time of carbon diox-
ide in the atmosphere, the developed world with its long history of greenhouse gas 
emissions has primary responsibility for dealing with climate change. The ill-fated 
Kyoto accord of the 1990s started on the premise that those who had caused the 
problem should take the lead in trying to deal with it. This garnered no support 
in Washington where Congress voted in patterns that prevented the Clinton ad-
ministration from even trying to get the accord acceded to by the United States. 
Television advertisements at the time showed the world map being cut into pieces 
with the implication that all countries ought to be involved in dealing with a global 
problem. Equating un-equals is not a new rhetorical strategy, but it worked eﬀec-
tively to obscure responsibilities in the 1990s well before the full weight of the cli-
mate denial movement was felt in American public discourse (Oreskes and Conway, 
2010). 
Perhaps more worrisome than this blanket refusal to deal with questions of his-
torical responsibility, beyond repurposing some aid budgets to deal with climate 
adaptation issues, is the portrayal of vulnerable places in the world in terms of per-
sistent tropes of dangerous zones of violence and degradation in terms of places 
beyond the remit of civilization (Dalby, 2013). The 1990s rhetoric of bifurcation, 
of a world of pacified zones and wild zones, only most famously in Robert Kaplan’s 
(1994) dystopic warnings of “a coming anarchy,” has persisted through the war on 
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terror and been updated in such formulations as Thomas Barnett’s (2004) “non-
integrated gap” in the global polity. Now these ideas of wild zones are linked into 
Pentagon notions of failed states and forms of political instabilities for which cli-
mate change now acts as a “threat multiplier.” Climate change is now upgraded 
to a “catalyst of conflict” in the more recent formulations of the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014).
This “threat multiplier” formulation has become widespread in the internation-
al security community. Climate change risks were elevated to the top of the list of 
global risks in the discussions at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 
2016. The contemporaneous Munich Security Report had similar concerns:
Climate change is a very particular kind of threat. For low-lying countries, it is an 
existential danger. To most societies, it is a threat multiplier: An increase in extreme 
meteorological events, droughts, and land degradation as well as the sea-level rise can 
and do exacerbate political fragility and resource disputes, increase economic hardship 
and mass migrations, and magnify ethnic tensions and civil strife. (Munich Security 
Conference, 2016, 44)
The dangers in such formulations are, as with the earlier formulations of environ-
mental security after the Cold War (Dalby, 2002), that these geographical specifi-
cations of dangerous places are disconnected from the larger transformations of 
geopolitics. They facilitate violent actions in the periphery in ways that perpetuate 
rather than ameliorate the disruptions set in motion by the interaction of changes in 
rural political economy in the global South with climate change. All of this, may be 
aggravated by unilateral attempts by some states and corporations to reduce their 
climate risk and ensure food supplies by purchasing large tracts of land in the South, 
thereby diversifying their holdings and reducing climate vulnerabilities among those 
in the North regardless of the consequences in the South (Dabelko et al., 2013). 
Even more ominous are the warnings from scholars who link the historical con-
cerns with Nazi geopolitics to the larger reasoning practices used to shore up its 
genocidal violence. Welzer’s (2012) discussion of how the Nazi regime gradually 
changed laws and assumptions concerning what was considered “normal” and how 
current geographical formulations of wild zones and inevitable war in the South 
are shaping policy discourse, is a cautionary tale that needs to be taken seriously. 
Likewise Timothy Snyder’s (2015) careful reconstruction of the political geography 
of the holocaust in his Black Earth points to the related dangers of geopolitical for-
mulations of Lebensraum. Nazi interpretations of “living room”, linked geopolitical 
claims on agricultural land in Eastern Europe to logics of consumerist aspiration 
and entitlement in Germany, at whatever political and economic cost this may have 
inflicted elsewhere on the continent. Discourses of consumer entitlement and fears 
of numerous environmental threats from external sources have been a persistent 
theme in recent American geopolitical discourses, too. Forms of “inverted quaran-
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tine” structure the privatized security response in numerous commodified forms in 
attempts to, in Andy Szasz’s (2007) terms, “shop our way to safety.”
Such formulations simultaneously rely on fantasies of non-porous borders 
(Kearns, 2013) and the implicit assumptions that “containment” or “quarantine” 
are eﬀective security strategies in a world where interconnections are the key to 
ecological and economic processes. This geographic assumption of separation is 
powerfully reinforced by claims to territorial jurisdiction, property boundaries, and 
sovereignty. It is epitomized by the penchant for wall building as a strategy to try to 
limit migration of various sorts, as well as discourses of invasive species as threats 
to diﬀerent forms of farming and economic activity. Territoriality is a key strategy 
of control in many human aﬀairs—demarcation, communication and enforcement 
being the key interrelated practices in Sack’s (1986) classic discussion of the pro-
cess—but it is much less eﬃcacious when it comes to either economics or ecology 
than its advocates often assume. 
Nonetheless territorial strategies are being attempted by many states and politi-
cians in an attempt to shore up at least a sense of being in control despite an obvi-
ously waning sovereignty (Brown, 2010). Donald Trump made headlines during his 
campaign early in 2016 promising to build a wall across the American border with 
Mexico and force Mexicans to pay for it. Many such walls and fences are being con-
structed in the world, including along parts of the United States-Mexican border, 
where relatively rich states are situated in close proximity to relatively impoverished 
areas (Jones, 2012). They reinforce a carceral cartographic imagination; one where 
political borders often take on cultural significance as though these lines on the map 
were in some way “natural” frontiers (Fall, 2010).
Geopolitical vision
All this is related to the larger questions of geopolitical vision, how the world is 
represented as an object to be struggled over, divided and dominated by great pow-
ers, or shared by an interconnected humanity inhabiting an increasingly artificial 
world. While Macdonald, Hughes and Dodds’ (2010) series of essays on observant 
states emphasize the importance of scopic regimes, technologies of seeing, and the 
constitution of objects to be governed through these practices, the ability to see 
the globe as a whole through satellite imagery, is now also a key part of the climate 
discussion. The “zoom in” functions literally contextualize new stories now; mere 
stationary contextual cartography is now largely passé! In a similar mode, “The 
Situation Room” on CNN long mimicked military presentations of a central control 
room, monitoring from afar, distant events that might have geopolitical repercus-
sions. They used the modern scopic regime to imply a visuality that conveyed a su-
perior panoptical surveillance vantage point on the world’s evolving political scene. 
But in doing so, the connections between places are frequently implied rather than 
investigated; storms, floods and disasters are sometimes linked to climate change, 
162 Simon Dalby
but the larger context of a transformed world, only occasionally structured these 
representations. 
Frequently, what Donna Harraway (1988) famously called the “god trick” view, 
denies the details of practical struggles related to climate change in particular plac-
es, reinforcing a sense of a global problem—a terrifying prospect that “requires” big 
science and technocratic planning by great powers (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2015). 
This is the imperial administrator’s view of the world; not the view from the desper-
ate refugee in part of the contemporary carceral archipelago built by metropoli-
tan states on Lampedusa, Lesbos or Christmas Island. Viewed from there, things 
are likely to look somewhat diﬀerent; the fences and guard towers that supposedly 
provide security for residents of the prosperous suburbs of the Global North are 
precisely what prevent migrants from gaining access to health services, food, shelter 
and employment. Who has “human security” is very much a matter of geography 
and how practical matters of bureaucracy play out at international borders in terms 
of who is admitted and who is not (Mountz, 2010).
Failure to understand how geopolitics is shaping the future configuration of the 
planet both through processes of globalization directly, and indirectly by all the 
ecological and geophysical transformation the global economy entails, may indeed 
bring the world to future climate wars (Dyer, 2008). But if this kind of geopolitics 
returns, with all the rhetorical force of the cartographies of enmity that it implies 
(Dalby, 2013), it will be because of failures of geographical imagination to under-
stand geopolitical forces in motion and the complex causalities of an interconnected 
global economy that has already set in motion very considerable geophysical trans-
formations (Parenti, 2011). Precisely because of these geophysical transformations, 
discussions of solar radiation management and other attempted technical fixes to 
global warming are also being discussed. Given the failure, at least so far, to tackle 
the issues of climate change with the seriousness they need, the possibilities of ar-
tificially adjusting the global temperature by engineering means are on the agenda 
(Burns and Strauss, 2013). 
Such attempts to artificially manipulate weather patterns in particular regions 
or the temperature of the planet as a whole have the potential to cause serious po-
litical conflicts. If attempts to change rainfall patterns by cloud seeding to enhance 
agricultural productivity in a particular region have trans-boundary eﬀects then in-
ternational politics will be engaged. Given the large uncertainties in weather system 
behavior it might be hard to prove that weather modification in one place is related 
to droughts of storms elsewhere, but the perception that this is the case might be 
enough for serious political dispute. The potential for conflict is there, even if, given 
the interconnectedness of the global system, it is clear that careful international co-
operation would be essential for any scheme to possibly succeed (Horton, 2013).
Once again such discussion emphasizes the importance of the contextualiza-
tions that structure geopolitical discussions. While the appearance of nuclear 
weapons and subsequently intercontinental ballistic missiles changed the context 
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of super-power rivalries, in the process dramatically heightening both the dangers 
of great power conflict and the speed with which crises could spiral out of control, 
this changed context has shaped practices of global security. Restraint is necessary, 
a matter of “negarchy” in Daniel Deudney’s (2007) terms, where security requires 
limiting the use of force and constraining the temptations to try to use war as a 
strategy of statecraft. Now the Anthropocene makes it clear that this understand-
ing has to be extended to grapple with the transformation of the biosphere and the 
potentially destabilizing consequences of climate change in particular if land-use 
changes, methane leakages and other greenhouse gas emissions are not dealt with 
in the immediate future. Restraint on these matters is now key in geopolitics for 
survival reasons in similar ways to the issue of nuclear weapons in the Cold War pe-
riod. International leaders have been slow to realize this, and alarmist stories of im-
minent disaster have not led to appropriate recontextualization in North American 
policy making circles despite President Obama’s clear designation of these new cli-
mate dangers to global security. 
The political economy of fossil fuel extraction in North America explains part 
of this; the enthusiasm for fracking in particular in recent years promised rapid 
wealth for those in the industry. This, however, has to be understood as related to 
the larger political campaign from the right wing in both Canada and the United 
States where corporations have lavishly funded political agendas anathema to the 
steps needed to constrain carbon emissions and move towards a new post-fossil 
fuel economy (Mayer, 2016). The cultural politics of climate change denial involve 
the construction of various forms of othering in the anthropocentrism that under-
lies the refusal of environmentalist claims (Jacques, 2009). Powerfully reworked in 
the climate denial movement, assumptions of an autonomous humanity, somehow 
separate from the surrounding context, are key to this rhetoric. Once again this is an 
explicit formulation of spatial separation, one that then invokes hostility and danger 
from outside, and physical force as the solution to problems that may result. The 
ecological interconnections that shape humanity’s context are once again denied, as 
modernity in general, and classical geopolitics in particular, has so long done in the 
powerful dualisms that structure modern thinking (Kearns, 2009). These include 
a separation of culture from nature, civilization from primitive barbarism, urban 
accomplishment from rural backwardness, industrial acumen from non-Western 
tradition, and consumption “here” from production and pollution “there.” 
The failure to see the interconnections across these supposed separations have 
long been the focus of environmentalist thinking, at least since Alexander von 
Humboldt took Goethe’s insights about nature into the rainforests of South America 
and formulated the ideas of human induced climate change as he investigated the 
changing hydrologies resulting from deforestation (see Wulf, 2015). The struggles 
over climate change link these long-term political struggles into recast discussions 
of responsibility and the attribution of blame and geopolitical arguments about pe-
ripheral dangers and metropolitan action that once again obscure the motive forces 
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that matter in causing rapid change. Challenging these formulations remains a key 
task for scholars wishing to make a useful contribution to climate geopolitics; ones 
made all the more urgent as the earth system science of the Anthropocene charts 
the trajectories of transformation in ever increasing detail. The geographic context 
for politics in the future is being shaped by current decisions about political econo-
my and energy systems in particular; that point is now unavoidable in any consider-
ation of the future of geopolitics.
Anthropocene geopolitics
The Anthropocene, the new geological age we are living in, suggests that while tech-
nology is crucial to human changes it is also part of the overall transformation of the 
biosphere –the context for humanity that we are actively reassembling, often with 
disastrous consequences for other species and their habitats. Much more so than 
in the earlier age of science we now understand the interconnectedness of life, its 
various substrates, and its adaptations. We, too, understand that humanity has en-
dangered its own existence in previously unimagined ways, and the political strug-
gles are very much about reshaping the earth, material transformations designed to 
enhance particular modes of life and power and prestige among certain groups of 
humanity (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016). 
These eﬀorts are having cumulative eﬀects that amount to a new geological era, 
one in which the geophysics of the planet are interlinked in numerous ways with hu-
man activities, ones that are causing climate change, acidification of the oceans and 
mass extinctions simultaneously. All of this suggests that we need to add a specifi-
cally geophysical understanding to the operations of power, linking physical trans-
formations of context into our understandings of power, prestige and the search 
for security of various types. We are, as the U.S. military likes to put it, “shaping the 
future.” But how that future is to be shaped is a matter of geopolitics; a matter in part 
of collective deliberations, and also the attempts by certain people to control the 
process and eﬀectively decide on the physical configuration of the future biosphere 
and its components (Dalby, 2016). 
The longstanding suggestion from earth systems thinking that our conceptions 
need a second Copernican revolution where life is now understood as a key part of 
the planetary system (Schellnhuber, 1999), rather than a surficial afterthought, is 
instructive here. We are not “on” earth. We are earth. We have reversed the geologi-
cal processes of carbon sequestration by our processes of combustion, and as such 
the key to both human powers and the earthly context in which they play out are 
tied to these geophysical transformations. The consequences for how we rethink 
geopolitics, and how we think about creating a world for humanity that stays fairly 
close to the circumstances of the last ten thousand years of earth history that have 
facilitated the emergence of civilization, rather than accelerate the destabilization of 
the planetary system into something unpredictable and likely disastrous for much 
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of humanity, is now the key task for intellectuals of whatever academic disciplinary 
background engaging geopolitics.
Geopolitics is now about how the world is being remade, and how the strate-
gies to do this relate to the types of knowledge, representations and legitimations 
invoked in the arguments about who should rule and what kind of a future should 
be produced to whose advantage. Failure to think about this new understanding of 
the world and how it is being shaped by geopolitical choices may lead to the kind 
of future water wars that so worry the climate security analysts, and novelists like 
Paulo Bacigalupi (2015) in his depiction of violence in his imagined future of the 
American South West in The Water Knife. Such dystopic futures are avoidable if 
politicians tackle institutional problems appropriately. Making the rapidly chang-
ing geographies of the present the key point in geopolitical analyses is essential to 
both sensible scholarly analysis and appropriate policy advice. It requires directly 
challenging geographical formulations that inform populist and nationalist invoca-
tions of endangered “here”s and threatening external “there”s. Not least, this is the 
case because it is the consumption of fossil fuels, historically mostly “here” in North 
America and Europe, that is now causing the increasing storms, floods, droughts 
and disruptions that set people “there” in motion.
Geographical verities are not permanent; change is accelerating and our policies 
and our politics need to embrace these insights so that collectively we can shape 
a future conducive to human flourishing in a rapidly changing world. The task for 
scholars, analysts and policy advisors now is to work out how to share a crowded 
and rapidly changing world. Traditional geopolitics was about trying to dominate a 
divided world while ignoring the connections across the boundaries between sup-
posedly autonomous regions, and in so far as such modes of thinking and action 
have returned, they make the urgently necessary tasks of constructing new institu-
tions and practices for sharing a rapidly changing world all the more diﬃcult.
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From Geopolitics to Astropolitics
Albert J. Bergesen
The role of geography is essential for the study of terrestrially bound politics (geopoli-
tics). Orbital space is increasingly populated with satellites, space stations and space 
planes becoming increasingly congested, competitive, competitive, politicized and 
even weaponized. Human politics are, therefore, no longer limited to terrestrially 
bound politics.  As such it would seem reasonable that the role of space is as essential 
for the study of politics (the idea of astropolitics) as terrestrial geography has been for 
the study of earth bound politics (the idea of geopolitics). This chapter provides some 
preliminary reflections upon this assumption.
Introduction
There is a notable return to geopolitics in the early 21st century, but our theoretical 
analysis of this activity is quite diﬀerent from that of classic 19th and 20th century 
geopolitical thinkers. At the heart of any serious geopolitical analysis is the question 
of the power and borders of states that in the final instance are enforced by military 
power.1 From the GPS of small army units, to identifying and selecting targets for 
naval, ground, and air force units we see today the indispensable role of satellite 
obtained and mediated information. This means there can be no serious military 
analysis without a role for satellites, and since there is no serious geopolitics without 
some attention to military aﬀairs, there must be a role for space and for something 
like “astropolitics”2 to supplement, or even replace, geopolitical analysis. 
1 Even during the previous era of globalization, it was the case that American military power 
lay behind the seemingly smooth running post-1945 economically globalizing world as well.
2 By astropolitics all that is meant is attention is paid to the role of space as a significant variable 
in explanatory models of politics and international relations. For examples of astropolitical analy-
sis, see 2  Dolman (2001) and the journal Astropolitics: An International Journal of Space Politics 
and Policy (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fast20/current;). For a more sociological perspec-
tive on space studies see The Astrosociology Research Institute (http://www.astrosociology.org/
index.html).
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If we think of geopolitics as focusing upon the physical environment’s constraints 
and opportunities it places upon political behavior, geo and astro emphasize identi-
cal deployments of environmental eﬀects separated in time. That is, since the emer-
gence of anatomically modern humanity some 200,000 years ago humanity and its 
societies and politics have been limited to the surface of the earth; its geography in 
eﬀect. Such geographic eﬀects have been the primary extra-human determinant of 
political structure, process, and conflict. 
These eﬀects still exist, obviously, but since the Wright brothers flew their first 
airplane in 1903 humanity’s struggle against gravity has progressed rapidly: by 1957 
they launched a satellite (Sputnik); by 1956 they put a man in space (Yuri Gagarin); 
by 1969 they put men on the moon (Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin); by 1971 they 
put a habitable space station in orbit (Salyut 1); and since 2000 they have maintained 
a continuously inhabited International Space Station (ISS). As for the future, they 
are making plans for manned missions to Mars. As such, space enters theoretical 
discourse as a new domain of eﬀect upon the political, hence the concept of ast-
ropolitics.
The human presence in space has increased dramatically since 1957. Today 
there are currently 4256 satellites orbiting the planet but only 1419 of these are op-
erational according to the Union of Concerned Scientists. These include 713 dealing 
with communications, 374 with earth observation and science, 160 with technol-
ogy, demonstration, and development, 105 with navigation and global positioning, 
and 67 with space science. Also, some 65 countries have launched these satellites, 
with the largest number being the United States (576), China (181), and Russia (140) 
(Lavender, 2016). 
On the economic front, there is an increasing number of established aerospace 
companies, such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Airbus, and BAE Systems 
along with new start-ups such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, World View, Virgin Galactic, 
and Moon Express, that are involved in space tourism, asteroid mining, launch ser-
vices, satellite construction, and other ancillary activities tied to commercializing 
Space. There is also a growing residential presence in space illustrated by the fact that 
the International Space Station (ISS) has been continuously inhabited since 2000. If 
decommissioned as planned in 2024 it would have been a habitable orbital platform 
of greater longevity than many terrestrial nation-states.3 Also, the Chinese presently 
have a manned space lab (Tiangong-2) which they plan to turn into a space station 
in 2020. The Russians, who earlier had a space station, are also planning another 
one in the near future. There are also plans by the commercial enterprise Axiom to 
launch their own space station and “work is underway to establish the world’s first 
3 The ISS has not been continuously inhabited by the same set of individuals. Astronauts from 
diﬀerent nations come and go.
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private, international commercial space station, a complex that would serve a global 
community of sovereign and private astronauts” (David, 2017).
Finally, of course, there are plans by the United States, China, a Russian-
European Union consortium, and with private interests to go to Mars in the 2030s 
if not before. At present, there are 6 active satellites from India, Russia-European 
Union, and the United States orbiting Mars, and the Opportunity and Curiosity rov-
ers from the United States continue to map, photograph and test samples on Mars. 
There are also plans for the China and a Russian-European Union space consortium 
to land rovers on Mars in the near future. Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the UK 
have planned lunar landing missions over the next 15 years.
There is a clear geopolitics centering on national rivalries, arms races, space rac-
es, and security concerns among the United States, Russia (earlier the USSR) and 
China at the minimum with perhaps India, Japan, and Europe being added as well. 
It would seem, that not only the political and commercial, but civil society as well is 
establishing footholds in orbital space. 
Obviously virtually all humanity remains earth bound, and what satellites, space 
stations, and deep space probes exist are but extensions of the social, political, and 
economic dynamics on earth. Taking a geopolitical stance on space activity is to-
tally warranted. But the dramatic victory over gravity since 1903, also suggests a 
continuation of the human migration story that began in Africa and took humanity 
and its social structural relations around the globe by the later 19th century, suggests 
dramatic change that warrants further inquiry. No sooner had human social rela-
tions linked the globe at the end of the 19th century (the modern world-system), by 
the start of the 20th century humanity found ways to lift oﬀ from its terrestrial home 
and venture for a few minutes into the air above it; and then, by 1961 launch a hu-
man into orbit. 
We are obviously at the very early stages of anything like humanity permanently 
living in space, hence having social relations and forming potential sovereign space 
entities (like nation-states) in orbit. The movement into space is also dramatic and 
extensive with the promise of more to come. Based upon this assumption, you can 
view humanity’s beginning movement into space as an extension of terrestrial so-
ciology and geopolitics, or as a new chapter in the human migration story. Chapter 
one would be out of Africa and around the planet. Chapter two is oﬀ the planet and 
into space. If geopolitics has dealt with terrestrial politics then the present signs of 
a coming migration oﬀ earth naturally leads us to consider some distinctly astropo-
litical and astrosociological issues. A beginning discussion of a few preliminary is-
sues occupies the rest of this chapter. 
Moral positions on leaving earth
We can start with the moral issue that is raised by the increasingly realistic pos-
sibility of humanity becoming a multi-planet species. Up till now, the predominant 
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moral philosophy of human/environment relations has been various versions of en-
vironmentalism, which has been accompanied by the idea of the Anthropocene—a 
new geological epoch where, “human beings have become the primary emergent 
geological force aﬀecting the future of the Earth System . . . [where] scientific evi-
dence suggests that the period from around 1950 on exhibits a major spike, mark-
ing a Great Acceleration in human impacts on the environment”(Foster, 2016, 9). 
Having done this, the moral burden follows upon human shoulders to undo, fix, 
repair, or somehow quit harming the earth if not restoring it to some original state. 
This position is also tied with ideas about the inalienable rights of nature itself to its 
own existence (Deep Ecology moral philosophy) and the accompanying environ-
mental morality to stay terrestrial and fix the environmental degradation humanity 
has produced.
In opposition is a fledgling moral impulse tied to the notion of humanity’s cos-
mic essence as a multi-planet species. Marx theorized the realization of our species 
being as the overcoming of our alienated labor by transcending the class ownership 
of the means of production and the realization of our pure species essence. For the 
stay on earth morality, the imperative is to stay and end environmental degradation 
thereby overcoming our alienation from nature/earth. 
Are we then, religious beings alienated from our god, or a biological species be-
ing alienated from ourselves, or a natural being alienated from earth, or finally, are 
we cosmic beings separated from the cosmos by staying here on earth? If we are 
alienated cosmic beings, are we overly attached to earth when we should instead 
seek our full realization—not our religious, or species, or natural, but our cosmic be-
ing—by seeking some kind of union with the cosmos itself? And if the mechanisms 
for redemption have been rites and creed for a religious being; social movement 
participation and secular activism for species being; green consciousness, a sense 
of oneness with the planet and environmental action for a natural being; what is the 
practice tied to a realization of cosmic being? Would it be space travel or coloniz-
ing Mars? Who knows. The moral tension is just starting; for every argument about 
human destiny as a multi-planet species, there is the counter that we were born on 
earth and meant to live on, and to repair, earth. 
Earth from space: A species wide collective identity
Obviously, the view of earth from space engenders a more unified picture of human-
ity. It has often been said that traveling out into space is like earlier voyages across 
the world’s oceans, and from “sea faring people” we now speak of being a “space far-
ing species.” The distinction between “a people” which is more national, or ethnic, 
and “a species” which is a more trans-national, humanity wide, implies that identity 
is an important step toward the emergence of a humanity wide collective identity. 
 From Geopolitics to Astropolitics 173
Earthly geographic distinctions lead to a focus upon intra-earth variation, such 
as between continents and oceans, which are foundational theoretical oppositions 
for geopolitical ideas like sea power and land power. It also advanced the notion of 
the Indian Ocean/South China Sea as the great 21st century hydrocarbon highway, 
or the North European Plain and Eurasian Steppes as historical invasion highways. 
When it comes to space, though, the contrast is with the globe as a whole; not 
just its sea people, or land people, or maritime or continental states/empires, nor for 
that matter is it capitalist (the United States) or communist (China) space programs 
either. With some 80 countries having their own satellites with the leading space 
powers (the United States, Russia China, India) accounting for 43% of the world’s 
population, it is not a reach to conceive of this migration into space something of a 
species wide endeavor.
Space, then, fosters a global consciousness or self-conception diﬀerent from that 
of, say, world-system linkages. Going to, or seeing earth from, space yields an un-
diﬀerentiated wholeness absent in the terrestrial core, periphery, semi-periphery 
distinctions of a world-system. While a world-system is global in scope it is regional 
in essence; for example, core, periphery, semi-periphery; developed countries vs. 
underdeveloped ones; the global North vs. the global South. The world in political 
economic terms is clearly a divided one of haves and have nots; parts not wholes. 
The unity conveyed is that of inequality and hierarchy4 whereas the world from 
space is easier seen as a single essence.5
4 This is not to say that highlighting global inequities is not important and a reality not to be 
patched over by a false sense of global unity when it does not exist.
5 If we think of earth’s terrestrial surface and its orbital space as both part of its larger nature, 
and if geopolitics holds any water, then it may be that the eternal opposition of maritime and 
continental states, will in the end, trump the overall stitching together of the world-system as 
a political economic global formation. In classic geopolitical thinking, we have always noted 
the maritime/continental oppositions: Athens vs. Sparta, maritime Europe (Britain, France, 
Netherlands, Spain) vs. continental Europe/Eurasia (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia), and in 
Political Economy of the World-System (PEWS) terms, the hegemons of Wallerstein’s (1974) cap-
italist world economy have all been economically dominant and hegemonic sea powers (Spain, 
Netherlands, Britain, the United States today). For all the theorizing about the autonomy of the 
social over the mechanical geographic, it remains the case that neither Germany, nor Russia, nor 
Austria-Hungary nor any continental state, no matter how “capitalist” its social structure might 
seem, has ever been the hegemon of the world-system.
If orbital space is but another “environment” like terrestrial geography, then it too should also 
have demonstrable eﬀects upon human social relations. Even at these earliest of stages of the 
Second Great Human Migration (earth to space) we can see distinct social science eﬀects of 
space, namely, that earth, the world, the planet, human kind, are all seen and often conceptualized 
as a singularity. It is not that one cannot see, say, core and periphery or rich and poor countries 
from space, but that the distance plus the orbiting property lead toward a singularity. That is the 
view from space and, as noted earlier, the view of space from earth suggests a commonality, not a 
division, of humanity on earth.
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Orbital/terrestrial relations
So yes, there is a burgeoning debate over the morality of leaving vs. staying on earth 
and yes, the view from space seems to stimulate a broader collective identity for 
humanity than might be available from just the dynamics of terrestrially developed 
world-systems, world economies, and international state systems. But, are there is-
sues other than these which might benefit from an astrosociological, or astropoliti-
cal perspective? 
The answer I think is yes, and it begins with assuming that the present expansion 
into space will only continue and accelerate. From the perspective of rising or low-
ering space agency budgets, or the rise and fall of space races, continued migration 
into space may or may not be the case. But if we take a broader perspective and look 
back just a century ago with the 1903 Wright brothers’ first flights through today’s 
space stations, the OSRIS-Rex mission to sample minerals from the asteroid Bennu, 
and plans by a number of countries for not just a return to the moon but by the 
2030s to have manned missions to Mars, movement oﬀ planet has been undeniable 
accelerated. 
If we now apply the continued expansion into space assumption, with the pres-
ent reality of low earth orbit space stations, we can further assume that the habitable 
presence of humanity in orbital space will increase in the future. This would yield an 
extension of the terrestrial nation-state into orbit, and one could further speculate 
about the possibility that some of these may in the future become sovereign orbital 
political entities.
Therefore, we can conclude that for the first time since the emergence of ana-
tomically modern humanity 200,000 years ago that it now occupies more than one 
physical platform, e.g. terrestrial earth and orbital space stations. While the num-
ber of humans living in orbit are both extremely small and for short durations, it 
still seems reasonable to assume that both number and duration will only increase 
throughout the 21st century. 
The political in orbit
To grasp potential issues in orbital/terrestrial political relations, consider for a mo-
ment Max Weber’s (1946) classic definition of the modern state as “a human com-
munity that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state.” 
This definition certainly characterizes sovereign political forms on terrestrial earth, 
which have geographically defined borders. These fixed6 lines on the ground limit 
6 These terrestrially fixed boundaries/borders can be challenged, expanded, contracted, and in 
some instances, disappear altogether, as in the historical case of Poland and the present national 
boundary of where eastern Syria ends and western Iraq begins. But this is an unstable state of 
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the number of borders terrestrial polities can have. Today’s Germany, for instance, 
in any single day has stationary Weberian borders with nine countries (Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Luxembourg, 
and Denmark). In Germany, on one side of their border, is the German military; on 
the other side those of France, Austria, Poland, and so forth. 
But in orbit, overhead, circles an American, or Russian, or Chinese satellite, or 
for that matter one of 80 or so other countries owning satellites. Using the speed 
of the International Space Station at 17,500 mph these extensions of political into 
orbit, circle the earth every 90 minutes and combined with the rotation of the earth 
on its axis, they pass over a great many of the world’s countries everyday. It is safe 
to assume that 21st century space powers are developing weapons for their satel-
lites. For the sake of our exposition here, let us say that their satellites are armed 
with a powerful laser weapon capable of hitting targets within terrestrial states be-
low them. Whereas Germany has nine militaries arrayed on her terrestrial borders 
she has, in principle, many more national militaries passing overhead. If we project 
Germany’s Weberian boundaries upward through the atmosphere (which is already 
politicized) into orbital space, then Germany would have many more than nine 
military forces on her extended borders multiple times a day. Virtually all of the 
world’s terrestrial states possess militaries; close to a hundred now have satellites; if 
these come to be armed, then we can imagine a world in which every country shares 
a space border with every other country, that is, a Russian armed satellite passes 
over much of the world’s terrestrial states, as does the Chinese equivalent pass over 
Russian national territory.
The concept of an “international state system,” then has to follow states into space, 
yielding two potential versions: the Terrestrial State System (TSS), which has been 
with us since Westphalia (1648) if not before in diﬀerent formats, and the Orbital 
State System (OSS) which represents national military satellites in orbit, along with 
the interaction of the TSS/OSS system. This is probably an existing reality already 
and if not then certainly it will become one as the 21st century unfolds.
Multi-domain battlefield
Having introduced the notion of national and weaponized satellites in what is al-
ready a militarized space environment, the question of military strategy arise. While 
the academy is just beginning to focus upon potential elements and issues of Astro-
IR the military has already begun to recognize space as an emerging domain of po-
litical conflict along with the domains of land, air, sea, cyber, and electromagnetic. 
If war is the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 1989) then the 
political being and lines are redrawn. The political history of the world may be one of shifting 
boundaries, but it is nonetheless the history of boundaries—e.g. geographic borders—and that is 
the point here.
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multi-domain battlefield is also the continuation of multi-domain international re-
lations by other means. Three-dimensional chess is a good metaphor for both multi-
domain military and political international relations. 
Reference is often made to the “global geopolitical chessboard” as somehow 
grasping the totality of political/military international relations, but upon a mo-
ment’s reflection it becomes clear that this is outdated in a universe of permanent 
terrestrial political formations (nation-states) and permanent orbital political assets 
(satellites, space stations, etc.). The advent of space forces a major re-think of basic 
social and political theoretical frameworks, such that the “global” is now just one 
domain (the terrestrial) and the “chessboard” is not spatially hierarchical (land/sea, 
air, space). 
Consider too, the concept of the world-system (Wallerstein, 1974). If “world” 
means the world that some people know, e.g. not the globe as a whole, then that 
world today includes presently politicized orbital space as well. Yet the “political 
economy of the world-system” perspective only focuses upon planetary aﬀairs, 
which for historical analysis is sensible, but not for the future. If “world” means ter-
restrial earth then that meaning is also outdated. As with Weber’s (1946) geographic 
definition of the state, until now international relation, or world-systemic, or world-
societal analysis has been entirely terrestrial analysis. As such, geopolitical theory 
was appropriate prior to the Space Age, but with the conquest of gravity7 came the 
start of human migration oﬀ planet and as such the opening for the space social 
sciences, such as astropolitics and astrosociology. As strange as this sounds today, 
imagine what something like astrophysics, astrochemistry, astrobiology would have 
sounded like prior to the Space Age.
Orbital/terrestrial social relations
At present astropolitical and astrosociological approaches to humanity in space 
are largely applications of extant theory to space activities as something of a new 
dependent variable. Further, such studies are largely limited to earth bound activi-
ties: national space races, the ins and outs of space law, the advent of start-up com-
mercial space enterprises, the organizational aspects of space agencies, and disaster 
7 Technological innovation can also be seen as part of the gravity struggle. For instance, the 
invention of the wheel, while clearly a means to ease human labor, aid economic development, 
transport, communication and war, is also, an innovation that aided the fight against gravity’s 
weight upon human eﬀorts to widen their lateral and hierarchic social relations. The same logic 
holds for the boat, as moving on water, like rolling on land, lessens gravity’s hold. More recent 
victories would include 18th century French hot air balloons and late 19th century English heavi-
er than air gliders. Wheel, boat, flight, and orbit: milestones on the road to victory over grav-
ity. Given that our gravity well was created by the earth’s mass, the anti-gravity struggle is also a 
struggle against the earth itself; an obviously contentious claim.
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research on incidents like the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger. These are all 
legitimate objects of study, obviously. 
I would like to suggest, though, that astrosociological and astropolitical theory 
should be more similar to geopolitical theory8 than either sociological, political sci-
ence, or international relations theory, in that space should constitute an indepen-
dent variable in explanatory models of human social and political relations. 
The reasoning here is straightforward. If it makes sense to identify eﬀects de-
rivable from the geographic environment of humanity upon their social relations,9 
then it is also reasonable to consider space eﬀects if and when they become a rel-
evant part of human social relations. If it makes sense to theorize constraints and 
imperatives posed by continents, oceans, mountains, plains, steppes, or biomes, on 
international politics then when the international becomes the orbital it is neces-
sary to consider aspects of space as much as oceans and continents in any political 
or social analysis. 
Where do we start in considering properties of outer space in models of human 
behavior and social order? There may be many, but one I would like to focus upon 
here centers on the implications for humanity to be split between two fundamental 
physical platforms, earth and orbital space. Again, when all of humanity was earth 
bound the platform variable was absolute and unvarying, hence only entered into 
intra-terrestrial variation models, such as those of geopolitics. Continental states vs. 
maritime states, sea power vs. land power, and so on and so forth. But what happens 
when the environmental factor moves from intra-environments (land, sea, etc.) to 
inter-environments (earth, orbit)? This leads to the question: Does existence upon 
a platform in constant motion (space station) in relation to another platform (earth) 
aﬀect the interaction between individuals upon the two platforms?
Einstein’s Problem
Individuals on space stations circle individuals on planet earth. That is obvious. 
From the point of view of those on the space station, though, it is individuals on 
earth who are moving while individuals on the space station are stationary vis-à-vis 
each other. And, conversely, from the point of view of those on earth it is individuals 
8 Classic geopolitical theory places geographic variation at the heart of its explanatory hypoth-
eses: it is sea power, or land power, or the North European Plain and Eurasian Steppes that are 
invasions highways, or the Indian and South China Seas that are hydrocarbon highways. The rise 
of Critical Geography among professional geographers has turned the tables, where now it is the 
social construction of, or the political use of, land, seas, oceans, steppes and plains that constitute 
the independent variable.
9 For the moment, we will leave aside the Anthropocene idea that it is not nature→society, 
but society→nature→society, or perhaps, humanity→nature→humanity, or, for some 
capitalism→nature→humanity. Or, from a Deep Ecology perspective with an emphasis upon 
the inalienable rights of nature, it is just humanity/capitalism→nature.
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on the space station that are moving. Individuals interacting with each other upon 
either earth or space station are stationary vis-à-vis each other. This in turn has soci-
ological implications, for it facilitates their forming stable social relations with each 
other. On the other hand, individuals on the space station and individuals on earth 
have more diﬃculty interacting with each other as both are in motion to each other, 
which could potentially undermining social relations between them.
Again, this was to be expected for the dispersion of humanity was co-terminus 
with a single reference platform, earth, allowing for the emergence of stable social 
relations. Einstein’s Problem, though, arises when humanity comes to be dispersed 
over more than one platform, such as habitable space stations and perhaps within 
the century lunar and Martian settlements. Such stable interaction for all humanity, 
is not possible when humanity is dispersed across two platforms (earth, orbit) that 
are in a diﬀerent, but constant motion vis-à-vis each other. 
It is, therefore, not interaction that leads to social order, but common fixed plat-
form position that makes sustained, fixed, formalized, interaction possible—social 
order, or for that matter society, or states, or world-systems. The diﬀerences be-
ing ones of scale not ontological essence, as there are micro social systems (small 
groups, dyads, marriages), macro social systems (societies), and world-systems (the 
modern-world system, world-society, world-culture). Contrary to present theory, 
human interaction does not at t-1 lead to social order at t-2; they are one and the 
same. There have never been individuals without social relations nor social relations 
without individuals. Their false separation was a product of not understanding the 
role of platforms and hence having to take humans at t-1 to be the origin of hu-
man social relations at t-2 and then said relations the origin of societies at t-3. This 
means that humans cause humans, or society causes society, or the history of man-
kind is the history of humanity is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 
2002) or the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity (Durkheim, 2014) or 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Tönnies, 1940) or traditional to rational legal author-
ity (Weber, 1958).
In eﬀect with platform relativity absent a kind of absolute universalism prevails. 
All that seems necessary is just individuals and then groups, and then organizations, 
and then societies, and then world-systems of individuals. Nothing else matters. 
Certainly, geography is held constant—all humans exist only on earth. One plat-
form; ergo, an absolute universal universe within which the human drama unfolds. 
The only thing that varies, hence the only variable seen as relevant to explain social 
change, is social life itself. Therefore, the hermeneutic bubble that is the social. It 
leads to all sorts of extreme claims that are not questioned, like the “social construc-
tion of reality” or “if things are defined as real they are real in their consequences,” 
leading to the universal wish that cancer was defined as unreal and hence does not 
exist. 
Einstein’s Problem is what do we make of cross-platform social relations? We 
can begin to tackle this question by formalizing the ingredients to some degree. 
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The lack of experiencing the motion of platform’s A and B, provides the stationary 
existence of individuals A’ and B’ such that their individual motion (interaction) al-
lows its interpretation to be that of actors A’ and B’ and not platforms A and B. In 
this way actors A’ can form society S in orbit O, or SO, as can actors B’ form society 
S on earth, E, SE. Within social systems SO and SE all the laws of classic sociological 
theory operate. 
That is Marx, Weber, Durkheim and all theories up to today hold among indi-
viduals on any fixed platform that is, on earth or on a space station, or in the future 
other celestial bodies. 
An earthly example
At present there are a) few people in a constant motion circling earth and b) they ex-
ist as extended agents of the terrestrial nation, doing something like a tour of duty in 
space, analogous to national ships on the high seas. A true test of Einstein’s Problem 
(do relativity eﬀects bleed into sociology) cannot be adequately performed at this 
time. Hints can no doubt be found in memoirs of astronauts, reports of their inter-
personal relations, and while in orbit, their feelings toward their terrestrial nation 
and social relations back on earth. 
Having said this, there is some supporting evidence here on earth. Remember 
the general principle: individuals on platforms in constant motion do not experi-
ence that motion amongst platform peers but do in their relationship to others on 
other platforms. Again, people on trains and space stations experience themselves 
as stationary and observe others on train-stations and earth as moving by them. 
Trains were Einstein’s example; I am using space stations here, but carts, wagons, 
horses, oxen, camels and so forth could also be seen as platforms in motion and no-
mads the individuals upon those platforms.10 Trains pass train-stations; space sta-
tions pass countries on earth; and nomads pass towns and other settlements. There 
is, therefore, a relativity of motion experienced between nomads and townsfolk. 
Therefore, the social relativity model would not only be present between earth and 
orbit but also on earth between nomads and townspeople.
To nomads the townspeople are in motion and they are at rest, and of course, 
they are in motion to those in towns. Interestingly, and I suppose understandable 
in terms of which groups came to constitute the dominant civilizations, states, and 
empires, we have applied the motion property to but one platform people, the “no-
mads” but not to the other, the “townspeople,” even though, in fact, from each of 
their own reference platforms they are stationary and the other is in motion. It is 
as if we attribute an absolute motion to them while we take individuals in towns as 
10 I would like to thank Beksahn Jang for this observation. Nomads include Huns, Mongols, 
Bedouins, Cheyenne, Comanche, Kiowa and others peoples.
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absolutely at rest, but there, in fact, is no absolute state of rest or motion, or trans-
lated into sociology, there are neither absolute nomads nor absolute townspeople.11 
This labeling phenomena is solved when we also realize that social scientists are 
themselves utilizing the larger earth platform as their reference point, such that, to 
them, as to those in towns, it is the “nomads” who are moving, when in fact that is 
only a relative state of being.
So, for example, think of what Einstein’s Problem poses to ideas of social con-
struction of realities, hermeneutics, world-views, cosmologies and even culture it-
self as a trans-individual collective agreement, if each side sees the other as moving 
and themselves as stationary. In eﬀect, if a hypothetical society were comprised of 
individuals on earth and in orbit, or in town and nomadic tribe, would it be possible 
for a coagulation of sentiment to occur to socially construct “reality” when, say, half 
of this hypothetical society views the other half as in motion and they stationary 
and vice versa? On first glance it would seem to be a problem, if for no other reason 
than what is meant by things “social” are things agreed upon between individuals, 
but individual A, say a Mongolian upon a constantly in motion wagon-platform 
experiences individual B in the Russian town she passes, as passing her, while the 
Russia experiences the Mongolian as passing her. How, then, do we get trans-AB 
agreement on a socially constructed reality when the laws of physics prohibit such 
a reality from existing? 
Again, classic sociology concepts and theory hold on the nomad platform and 
the town platform. But again, if it is correct to say “the embankment is in motion 
relative to the carriage,” then the town is in motion relative to the nomadic tribe, and 
of course as the “carriage is in motion relative to the embankment” (Einstein, 1956 
[1916], 39), so, obviously, is nomadic tribe is in motion relative to the town. 
But again, note. The obviousness of motion and nomads is only a relativity eﬀect 
where we assume the reference platform of earth. Hence stationarity or being at rest 
seems natural, obvious, and a universal fact of nature, when in fact it is not. It is un-
derstandable that most of humanity is earth bound residentially such that “nomads” 
are the exception numerically, but that probably was not always the case. If earlier 
human social life was characterized as hunter-gatherer societies, then the nomadic 
was the norm, not the exception. That the settled came to dominate the nomadic is 
11 So, for instance, a dictionary definition of nomadic centers on “roaming about from place to 
place” which assumes absolute spatial space that can be fixed such that one can determining go-
ing from “place” to “place.” Similarly, “roaming” also assumes absolute fixed universal space as the 
backdrop for towns (stationarity) and nomads (motion) when in fact there is no absolute space 
nor motion, but only platform relative space and motion. Here we see the omnipresence of earth 
the platform in social science explanation. As individuals on a moving train do not experience 
themselves in motion, so people on earth also experience themselves as stationary and as earth 
is the universe of humanity what turns out to be a relative platform has been theorized as an 
absolute universal stationary background. Again, none of this was realized until humanity came 
to exist upon other non-earth platforms, like space stations.
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also true; that most of us are settled and so take our natural earthly reference point 
is also true. But what is not true is that this is an eternal state of the universe, but it is 
instead, a condition of a particular platform whose relative existence has only come 
to our attention with the advent of 21st century space station existence. 
If we are dealing with human political and social relations solely on earth then 
geopolitical principles hold. If though, humanity is edging toward a trans-platform 
existence, where earth as a whole is now but one possible platform, then if not as-
trosociology or astropolitics, some special theory of relativity informed analysis will 
soon become mandatory to fully understand human social and political existence 
into the 21st century. 
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